{"id":14401,"date":"2024-10-15T15:10:07","date_gmt":"2024-10-15T15:10:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/drdavidcring.net\/descartes-ideas\/?p=14401"},"modified":"2024-10-15T15:12:32","modified_gmt":"2024-10-15T15:12:32","slug":"amy-morgan-schmitter-on-cartesian-mechanisms-of-representation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/drdavidcring.net\/descartes-ideas\/representation\/amy-morgan-schmitter-on-cartesian-mechanisms-of-representation\/","title":{"rendered":"Amy Morgan Schmitter on Cartesian Mechanisms of Representation"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Amy Morgan Schmitter \"An in her “Representation, Self-Representation, and the Passions in Descartes”1<\/a><\/sup>Amy Morgan Schmitter, “Representation, Self-Representation, and the Passions in Descartes,” Review of Metaphysics 48 (December 1994): 332\u201333.<\/span> explains her model for how to understand the mechanisms of representation found in Descartes’s writings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I suggest that one way to understand Descartes’ metaphysical turn in his mature work is as an attempt to ground the accounts he has offered of signification in something further: representation, particularly mental representation. From the start, Descartes explains signification by reference to mental representation: a word, figure, or symbol signifies its objects by prompting the mind to think of those objects. Although Descartes offers detailed and comprehensive accounts in works such as the Rules for the Direction of the Mind<\/em> of what constitutes effective and convenient systems of signification by way of the relations between signifying element, system, and the objects signified thereby, the mental operations that allow signification to operate, especially that of the “intuition of simple natures,” is never fully explained. It remains to the mature phase of Descartes’ career to crack open the basic operations of our thought by developing the full-fledged doctrine of ideas\u2014a doctrine that makes explicit how an object is represented to a subject.2<\/a><\/sup>Schmitter\u2019s footnote:<\/strong> I have discussed Descartes’ early work on signification and the problems it raises in chapter 1 of my dissertation. See Amy Morgan Schmitter, “Descartes’ Representation of the Self” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1993), 1\u201339. Later chapters discuss representation in ideas.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Looking at the doctrine of ideas developed in such works as the Meditations<\/em> allows us to develop a model of representation, that is, what is involved when Descartes says that an idea “represents” such and-such an object. What I suggest is that a “representation” is a structural whole embracing several, interrelated component parts. The component parts include what I call the “subject-position,” that is, a relation to the first-person subject for whom the representation is a representation. This subject-position is directed at an object, what is represented in the representation (the representatum<\/em>), through a “vehicle” of representation, which vehicle stands in a particular (and variable) relation to the represented object. This vehicle, I should emphasize, does not as such constitute some tertium quid<\/em> intervening between the subject-position and what the idea is of; what an idea is “of” is<\/em> its object, which is directly represented therein. Indeed, in many cases the vehicle is not metaphysically distinct from the object. (If, for instance, the object is a substance, it may be represented through some of its modes, which constitute the vehicle. To be sure, we may also talk of representing a chunk of extension through its color or a mode of extension through a line segment, in which cases the relation of representation is\u2014or should be\u2014considered conventional.) More generally, the vehicle is formed by the interaction of subject and object. The object can be modified by the vehicle, in the sense that what the object is represented as is a matter of the vehicle through<\/em> which the object is represented.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although I will not argue the matter further here, I do think there is a great deal of textual evidence for this model\u2014particularly in Descartes’ crucial notion of “an idea taken objectively” as well as his use of per<\/em>, ut<\/em>, and in the case of materially false ideas, tanquam<\/em> clauses that modify the represented object as or through something or other. Various of these component parts have been noticed by other commentators, such as Vere Chappell, who remarks on the “to me” relation that characterizes ideas, and Ann Wilbur MacKenzie, who introduces the notion of a vehicle in her discussion of representation in sensory ideas.3<\/a><\/sup>Schmitter\u2019s footnote:<\/strong> Vere Chappell, “The Theory of Ideas,” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations<\/em>, ed. Amelie Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 191; Anne W. MacKenzie, “Descartes on Life and Sense,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy<\/em> 19, no. 2 (1989): 163\u201392.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The model explains and clarifies the range of possible metaphysical and epistemic relations between objects and their representing vehicles, thereby establishing the basis for relying on the perception of objects presented in and though representations.4<\/a><\/sup>Schmitter\u2019s footnote:<\/strong> The full development of this model forms the bulk of my dissertation, especially of chapters 1, 3, and 4. For a useful comparison of other seventeenth-century notions of representation, see Louis Marin, Portrait of the King (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), especially the introduction.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This model of representation is particularly designed to allow us to determine the reliability of representations within ideas. For this reason it also serves in Descartes’ theory of error, particularly as it is developed in the notion of material falsity. Although I cannot give an adequate explanation here, I suggest that material falsity is largely a matter of failing to distinguish the contributions made by the subject from those made by the object in forming the vehicle of representation, so that what properly belongs to the representing appears as a feature of the represented object.5<\/a><\/sup>Schmitter\u2019s footnote:<\/strong> Chapter 4 of my dissertation discusses material falsity and representation.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, because the model of representation contains a “to me” relation and because it turns out that the reliability of the representation requires distinguishing the activity of the subject-position, the account of representation also works as an account of my nature as a thinking thing, a being that forms ideas that represent. I am an active representer, occupying the subject-position in representations and actively directed at the object; indeed, my activity is crucial in generating the entire representative structure, although the contents that properly specify the representation are activated by the thing that appears as the object, and it is the interaction of both that fully characterizes the idea. An idea, then, as a representation, is a whole embracing both subjective and objective components and not some double standing in place of and between the things it represents and the subject.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why does Schmitter believe that the material falsity of ideas can be explained by the fact that there is a failure to distinguish the contributions made by the subject from those made by the object in forming the vehicle of representation, so that what properly belongs to the representing appears as a feature of the represented object. What are examples where this occurs?<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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