{"id":19379,"date":"2025-01-06T02:41:34","date_gmt":"2025-01-06T02:41:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/drdavidcring.net\/descartes-ideas\/?p=19379"},"modified":"2025-07-11T16:16:33","modified_gmt":"2025-07-11T16:16:33","slug":"descartess-five-distinctions-formal-objective-material-objective-material-formal-eminent-formal-and-material-falsity-formal-falsity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/drdavidcring.net\/descartes-ideas\/distinctions\/descartess-five-distinctions-formal-objective-material-objective-material-formal-eminent-formal-and-material-falsity-formal-falsity\/","title":{"rendered":"Descartes\u2019s Five Distinctions: formal\/objective, material\/objective, material\/formal, eminent\/formal, and material falsity\/formal falsity"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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[NOTE:<\/mark><\/strong> This page is unfinished and remains under construction.<\/mark>]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Descartes<\/a> makes many distinctions<\/a>, especially about how to regard different aspects had by ideas. Amongst these, he distinguishes between formal reality\/objective reality<\/a> (fr\/or<\/a>), the material\/objective<\/a> (m\/o),1<\/a><\/sup>See the penultimate paragraph (19th in this case) of \u201c2. Ideas and The Formal-Objective Reality Distinction<\/span><\/a>\u201d in \u201cDescartes\u2019 Theory of Ideas<\/span><\/a>\u201d at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/em><\/span><\/a> where Kurt<\/span><\/a> Smith<\/span><\/a> \"An defines the material\/objective distinction.

<\/span> the material\/formal<\/a> (m\/f), and between material falsity<\/a> and formal falsity<\/a> (mf\/ff).

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If this wasn\u2019t enough already with all the overlapping but incompatible usages of the term \u201cformal,\u201d we need to include one more to clarify and disambiguate its relationships to other ones, namely, the eminent\/formal<\/a> since it too uses the term \u201cformal\u201d even though technically it is not just a distinction between ideas, but rather between different types of causation, that can also involve ideas when causes are taken into account.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The nature of ideas<\/mark><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Descartes<\/a> (1596\u20131650) claims that ideas are forms of thoughts and that a mind is \u2018immediately aware of them.\u2019 For example, he defines an idea as \u201cthe form of any given thought, immediate perception of which makes me aware of the thought\u201d (AT VII: 160; CSM II: 113<\/a>). In replying to Thomas Hobbes<\/a> (1588\u20131679), in the Third Set of Replies to Objections<\/em>, Descartes<\/a> says that an idea is \u201cwhatever is immediately perceived by the mind\u201d<\/strong> (AT VII: 181; CSM II: 127<\/a>). Replying to Pierre Gassendi<\/a> (1592\u20131655), who wrote the Fifth Set of Objections<\/em>, he says that the term \u201cidea\u201d is extended \u201cto cover any object of thought\u201d<\/strong> (AT VII: 366; CSM II: 253<\/a>) and in a letter to Marin Mersenne<\/a> (1588\u20131648), dated July 1641, Descartes<\/a> explains that \u201cidea\u201d covers \u201cin general everything which is in our mind when we conceive something, no matter how we conceive it\u201d<\/strong> (AT III: 393; CSMK III: 185<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Cartesian distinctions amongst ideas and their causes<\/mark><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Descartes<\/a> uses five terminological distinctions amongst ideas and their causes which are each discussed in detail below. Click on the distinction to jump to that section.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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(D1) (F\/O) formal\/objective<\/a><\/mark><\/strong> \u2014 actual existence<\/em> (formal reality) versus objectively real representations contained in ideas<\/em> (the object of thought as mentally represented). [Third Meditation<\/a><\/em>]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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(D2) (M\/O) material\/objective<\/a><\/mark><\/strong> \u2014 understood as an act of a mind<\/em> (taken materially) versus the thing represented<\/em> by that operation (taken objectively). [Preface to the Reader<\/span><\/a>, Descartes Philosophical Works<\/em>, vol. 2, translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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(D3) (M\/F) material\/formal<\/a><\/mark><\/strong> \u2014 mentally occurent act\/event<\/em> and to which truth or falsity doesn’t apply (materially understood) versus ideas being “forms of a kind” [ideae sunt formae quaedam<\/em>] and taken as representing something<\/em> (formally understood). [Read it online at Fourth Replies<\/em><\/a>, 64\u201365, translated by Jonathan<\/a> Bennett<\/a>. Also at \u201cFourth Replies\u201d (to Arnauld)<\/a>.\u201d See The Philosophical Writings of Descartes<\/em> vol II<\/a>, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 130.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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(D4) (E\/F) eminent\/formal<\/a><\/mark><\/strong> \u2014 the distinction describes different types of causality. An eminent cause has properties capable of causing a property in an effect<\/em> by having it in a \u2018higher degree\u2019 without itself having the property it causes<\/em> in the effect (eminent causation) versus a formal cause that does possess the same property caused in the effect<\/em>. [The Philosophical Writings of Descartes<\/em> vol II<\/a>, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 28; AT VII 41.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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(D5) (MF\/FF) material falsity\/formal falsity<\/a><\/mark><\/strong> \u2014 Descartes distinguishes between those ideas being materially false since their content inclines a perceiver into making false judgments versus false judgments themselves that Descartes labels formally false. [Third Meditation<\/a><\/em>]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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(F\/O) Formal\/Objective distinction<\/mark><\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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The formal reality\/objective reality<\/a> contrast distinguishes when something formally (actually) exists<\/a> versus when a mental state contains explicit representational content determining that idea\u2019s object of thought. Descartes<\/a> claims such content comes in degrees or amounts of formal or objective reality<\/a> depending upon how each mirrors the corresponding formally real hierarchy of finite modes, finite substances, or an infinite substance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Formal Reality and Objective Reality<\/a>:<\/mark><\/strong> In the distinction between formal and objective reality, \u2018formal\u2019 refers to when something currently exists. Descartes<\/a> often uses the phrase \u201cactual or formal\u201d [actualis sive formalis<\/em>; actuali sive formali<\/em>] when speaking of things that exist, as he does in the Third Meditation, fourteenth and twenty-seventh paragraphs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The best quotations establishing that Descartes commits to formal reality meaning actual existence occur multiple times in the Third Meditation, especially at (AT VII 41; CSM II 28<\/a>):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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And this is transparently true not only in the case of effects which possess <what the philosophers call> actual or formal reality [actuali sive formali<\/em>], but also in the case of ideas, where one is considering only <what they call> objective reality. . . . For although this cause does not transfer any of its actual or formal reality to my idea it should not on that account be supposed that it must be less real. . . . The nature of an idea is such that of itself it requires no formal reality except what it derives from my thought, of which it is a mode.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, zero Cartesian commentators disagree with the interpretation that something with formal reality always means that that thing currently exists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Applying this meaning to ‘formal reality’ means that no potentially existing things ever have formal reality until that thing is instantiated or exemplified.2<\/a><\/sup>As often happens in philosophy, a particular philosopher\u2019s position unacceptably defines some things out of existence by definition<\/em><\/strong>, as Descartes does here in his conception of formal reality. A more Platonistically oriented philosopher could hold that potential things have actual existence as abstract objects, or a David Lewis might hold that possible worlds exist in other possibilities than the ones we can be aware of.

We already know that Descartes defines unconscious thoughts out of existence by definition when requiring no thought or idea could exist with formal reality if one was unaware of it.

Freud and the poets, who Freud claims had already discovered unconscious thoughts before he defended unconscious mental states, hold that such thoughts can still have consequences even though a person remains unaware of them.

Even if unconscious thoughts were impossible or non-existent, the mere existence of Freud\u2019s theory requires that his argumentative opponent not define what they are arguing about out of existence by definition<\/strong> without begging the question<\/a> of whether or not such thoughts exist.

<\/span> However, given the above understanding of formal reality, when an idea or thought occurs, it too must have formal reality as an occurrent mental state because if it did not have formal reality, meaning actual existence, then that idea lacking formal reality could not be thought since an idea doesn\u2019t exist when it lacks formal reality. So, somewhat surprisingly, it\u2019s not wrong to claim that ideas with objectively real representations, when actively thought, simultaneously have both formal and objective reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kurt<\/a> Smith<\/a>\"Aagrees with the claim that existing ideas must have a formal reality:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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When speaking of an existent<\/em> mode<\/strong>\u2014in this case, an actually occurring idea<\/strong>\u2014Descartes will say that it possesses formal reality<\/strong><\/em>. The formal reality of a thing is the kind of reality the thing possesses in virtue of its being an actual<\/em> or an existent<\/em> thing<\/strong> (AT VII 41\u201342, 102\u20134; CSM II 28\u201329, 74\u20135). For example, given that the Sun is an actual or existent thing, it possesses formal reality. By contrast, given that Pegasus is not an actual or existent thing, he does not possess formal reality. Given that the idea<\/em> of the Sun or the idea<\/em> of Pegasus are actual or existent ideas, where an idea is actual or existent when it is being actively thought by a mind, each would possess formal reality<\/strong><\/em>.3<\/a><\/sup>Kurt<\/span><\/a> Smith<\/span><\/a> \"An in the first paragraph of section \u201c2. Ideas and The Formal-Objective Reality Distinction<\/span><\/a>,\u201d \u201cDescartes\u2019s Theory of Ideas<\/span><\/a>,\u201d Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/span><\/a><\/em>, 2017.

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Justin<\/a> Skirry<\/a> \"A<\/a> (author of Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature<\/a><\/em> \"An) in his article \u201cDescartes<\/a>\u201d from The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/a><\/em> also subscribes to the above characterizations of the formal\/objective distinction when he explains it as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Descartes goes on to apply this principle to the cause of his ideas. This version of the Causal Adequacy Principle states that whatever is contained objectively in an idea must be contained either formally or eminently in the cause of that idea. Definitions of some key terms are now in order. First, the objective reality contained in an idea<\/strong> is just its representational content<\/strong>; in other words, it is the \u201cobject\u201d of the idea or what that idea is about<\/strong>. The idea of the sun, for instance, contains the reality of the sun in it objectively. Second, the formal reality contained in something<\/strong> is a reality actually contained in that thing<\/strong>. For example, the sun itself has the formal reality of extension since it is actually an extended thing<\/strong><\/em> or body. [bold and bold italic not in original]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Descartes<\/a> reinforces how to understand formal versus objective when he explains the distinction in his “Meditations on First Philosophy,” in Meditation III, with the French additions inside of curly braces { }:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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But it now occurs to me that there is another way of investigating whether some of the things of which I possess ideas exist outside me. In so far as the ideas are {considered} simply {as} modes of thought, there is no recognizable inequality among them: they all appear to come from within me in the same fashion. But in so far as different ideas {are considered as images which} represent different things<\/strong>, it is clear that they differ widely. Undoubtedly, the ideas which represent substances<\/strong> to me amount to something more and, so to speak, contain within themselves more objective reality<\/strong> than the ideas which merely represent modes or accidents. Again, the idea that gives me my understanding of a supreme God, eternal, infinite, {immutable,} omniscient, omnipotent and the creator of all things that exist apart from him, certainly has in it more objective reality than the ideas that represent finite substances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as much {reality} in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause. For where, I ask, could the effect get its reality from, if not from the cause? And how could the cause give it to the effect unless it possessed it? It follows from this both that something cannot arise from nothing, and also that what is more perfect\u2014that is, contains in itself more reality\u2014cannot arise from what is less perfect. And this is transparently true not only in the case of effects which possess {what the philosophers call} actual or formal (actualis sive formalis<\/em><\/strong>) reality<\/strong>, but also in the case of ideas, where one is considering only {what they call} objective reality.4<\/a><\/sup>Ren\u00e9 Descartes, Third Meditation<\/span><\/a>, ed. and trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdock, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 27\u201328<\/a>. The Third Meditation in Latin is available at the Latin Library<\/a>.

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14. Atque hoc non modo perspicue verum est de iis effectibus, quorum realitas est actualis sive formalis<\/strong>, sed etiam de ideis, in quibus consideratur tant\u00f9m realitas objectiva. Hoc est, non modo non potest, exempli caus\u00e2, aliquis lapis, qui prius non fuit, nunc incipere esse, nisi producatur ab aliqu\u00e2 re in qu\u00e2 totum illud sit vel formaliter vel eminenter, quod ponitur in lapide; nec potest calor in subjectum quod pri\u00f9s non calebat induci, nisi a re quae sit ordinis saltem aeque perfecti atque est calor, & sic de caeteris; sed praeterea etiam non potest in me esse idea caloris, vel lapidis, nisi in me posita sit ab aliqu\u00e2 caus\u00e2, in qu\u00e2 tantumdem ad minimum sit realitatis quantum esse in calore vel lapide concipio. Nam quamvis ista causa nihil de su\u00e2 realitate actuali sive formali<\/strong> in meam ideam transfundat, non ideo putandum est illam minus realem esse debere, sed talem esse naturam ipsius ideae, ut nullam aliam ex se realitatem formalem exigat, praeter illam quam mutuatur a cogitatione me\u00e2, cujus est modus.<\/em>(Descartes, Third Meditation<\/a>, 14th paragraph)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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\"For<\/a>: And this is not only clearly true of those effects whose reality is actual or formal<\/strong> [actualis sive formalis<\/strong><\/em>], but also of ideas in which only objective reality is considered. That is, not only cannot, for example, a stone that did not exist before begin to exist now, unless it is produced by some thing in which all that is either formally or eminently present, which is placed in the stone; nor can heat be induced in a subject that was not previously hot, unless it is of an order at least as perfect as heat is, and so on with the rest; but furthermore, the idea of \u200b\u200bheat or stone cannot exist in me, unless it is placed in me by some cause in which there is at least as much reality as I conceive it to be in the heat or stone. For although this cause does not transfuse anything of its actual or formal reality<\/strong> [actuali sive formali<\/strong><\/em>] into my idea, it should not be thought that it should be any less real, but that the nature of the idea itself is such that it requires no other formal reality from itself, besides that which it borrows from my thought, of which it is the mode.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In his Third Meditation, Descartes<\/a> defines ideas broadly, setting the stage for his later discussion of formal and objective reality. An idea’s formal reality is the actual reality it has just as an existing thought or mode of mind as shown when he replies to Caterus in the First Replies<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Rene Descartes First Replies to Objections (Caterus) (bold not in original):<\/strong>
Finally he comes to the matter that generates the chief difficulty<\/strong>, namely these two questions: What should we take ‘idea’ to mean in this context?<\/strong> What cause does an idea require? Now, I wrote that an idea is a thing that is thought of, considered as existing representatively in the intellect<\/strong> . . . . I was speaking of the idea, which is never outside the intellect<\/strong>; and in this sense ‘existing representatively’ simply means being in the intellect in the way that objects normally are there<\/strong>. For example, if someone asks me ‘What happens to the sun when it comes to exist representatively in my intellect<\/strong>?’, the best answer is that the only thing that happens to it is that it comes to fit an extraneous label\u2014i.e., comes to answer to the description “is thought about by so-and-so”\u2014and this is indeed a mere matter of some act of the intellect’s being shaped up in the manner of an object. But when I am asked ‘What is the idea of the sun?’ and I answer that it is the sun considered as existing representatively in the intellect<\/strong>, no one will take this to mean the sun itself<\/strong> considered as having an extraneous label pinned to it. And now ‘the sun exists representatively in the intellect’ won’t mean ‘some act of the intellect is shaped up in the manner of the sun’; rather, it will signify the sun’s being in the intellect in the way that its objects are normally there. I mean that the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect<\/strong>\u2014not of course existing there as a real blazing star, as it exists in the heavens, but existing representatively<\/strong>, i.e., in the way in which objects normally exist in the intellect<\/strong>.5<\/a><\/sup>Ren\u00e9 Descartes, \u201dFirst Replies to (Caterus’s) Objections,\u201d<\/span><\/a> trans. Jonathan<\/span><\/a> Bennett<\/span><\/a> (Internet, 2017), 2\u20133, http:\/\/www.earlymoderntexts.com\/assets\/pdfs\/descartes1642.pdf<\/span><\/a>. (AT VII: 41\u201342, 102\u20134; CSM II: 28\u201329, 74\u201375<\/a>; Meditations and Replies, First Objections, Cottingham, 132\u201333<\/a>).

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Descartes, Meditations, First Objections, (Johan de Kater). I use here the translation used by Kenny, Descartes, p.115. (Cottingham p.132.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes replies:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

‘Now I wrote that an idea is the thing which is thought of in so far as it has objective being in the intellect. But to give me an opportunity of explaining these words more clearly the objector pretends to understand them in quite a different way from that in which I used them. “Objective being in the intellect”, he says, “is simply the determination of an act of the intellect by means of an object, and this is merely an extraneous label which adds nothing to the thing itself.” Notice here that he is referring to the thing itself as if it were located outside the intellect, and in this sense “objective being in the intellect” is certainly an extraneous label; but I was speaking of the idea, which is never outside the intellect<\/strong>, and in this sense, “objective being” simply means being in the intellect in the way in which objects are normally there. for example, if anyone asks what happens to the sun through its being objectively in my intellect, the best answer is that nothing happens to it beyond the application of an extraneous label which does indeed ” determine an act of the intellect by means of an object”. But if the question is about what the idea of the sun is, and we answer that it is the thing that is thought of, in so far as it has objective being in the intellect, no one will take this to be the sun itself with this extraneous label applied to it. “Objective being in the intellect” will not here mean “the determination of an act of the intellect by means of an object”, but will signify the objects being the intellect in the way in which its objects are normally there. By this I mean that the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect – not of course formally existing, as it does in the heavens, but objectively existing, i.e. in the way in which objects normally are in the intellect. Now this mode of being is of course much less perfect than that possessed by things which exist outside the intellect; but, as I did explain, it is not therefore simply nothing.’<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes, Meditations, First Replies; CSM II: 132\u201333<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Notice that Descartes<\/a> says “but existing representatively<\/strong>, i.e., in the way in which objects normally exist in the intellect<\/em><\/strong>” that certainly suggests that ideas with objective reality may possibly only apply to non-sensory ideas of the pure intellect. Of course, it is not conclusive that this is so, but it is suggestive. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other hand, Descartes<\/a> does divide the mind\u2019s functions into two and only two categories under which all mental acts must fall, namely, what Descartes<\/a> calls the intellect or understanding versus the will. Descartes explains or refers to the intellect (understanding) versus willing distinction in these passages:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“The will is by its nature so free that it can never be constrained. For the intellect only supplies the material for action, it does not constrain the will.”
(Letter to Mesland, February 9, 1645, Descartes: Philosophical Letters<\/em>, Oxford University Press, 1970, 88\u201389)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Found in Selected Correspondence of Descartes<\/em>. Edited and translated by Anthony Kenny, 1970.)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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“The will simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid), or rather, it consists simply in the fact that when something is proposed to us by the intellect, we are moved to affirm or deny it, or to pursue or avoid it in such a way that we are not compelled by any external force.”
(Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., & Murdoch, D., The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II<\/a><\/em>, Fourth Meditation, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 39\u201340<\/a>)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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Correspondence with Elisabeth of Bohemia<\/strong>: “When we direct our will towards something, we must always have some sort of understanding of it.”
(Descartes’ Letter to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, May 21, 1643, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes<\/em>, Volume III, Translated by Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch, and Kenny, 217)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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Principles of Philosophy<\/strong>: \u201cWe have only two ways of thinking: perceiving with the intellect, and willing. The kinds of thinking that we experience within ourselves can be classified under two general headings: perception, or the operation of the intellect, including sensory perception, imagination and pure understanding, and volition, including desire, aversion, assertion, denial and doubt.\u201d
(Principles of Philosophy<\/em>, Part I, Article 32<\/a>, earlymoderntexts.com, translated by Jonathan Bennett, 2017, 8)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

“Among the modes of thought, some are referred to as modes of intellect or understanding, and others as modes of will.”
(Principles of Philosophy<\/em>, Part I, Article 32, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume I<\/em>, translated by Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., & Murdoch, D., Cambridge University Press, 1985, 204\u2013205)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In his Rules for the Direction of the Mind<\/em>, although less explicit in categorizing intellect and will, Descartes implies the operation of these faculties as foundational to methodical reasoning:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cThose are purely intellectual which our understanding apprehends by means of a certain inborn light, and without the aid of any corporeal image. That a number of such things exist is certain; and it is impossible to construct any corporeal idea which shall represent to us what the act of knowing is, what doubt is, what ignorance, and likewise what the action of the will is which it is possible to term volition, and so with other things.\u201d
(Rules for the Direction of the Mind<\/em>, Rule XII, , translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane, .)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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“The understanding is the faculty of conceiving things; the will is the faculty of choosing.”
(Rules for the Direction of the Mind<\/em>, Rule XII, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. I<\/a><\/em>, edited by Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., & Murdoch, D.,  Cambridge University Press, 1985, 45<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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Letter to Mesland (1645)<\/strong>: “The will is by its nature so free that it can never be constrained. For the intellect only supplies the material for action, it does not constrain the will.”
(Letter to Mesland, February 9, 1645. Found in Selected Correspondence of Descartes<\/em>, edited and translated by Anthony Kenny, 1970, 88.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This means that sensory ideas too must fall within the Cartesian intellect\/understanding since sensory ideas are not acts of will and there are only these two overarching categories for all mental activities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is large agreement amongst Cartesian scholars as to the proper way to interpret Descartes\u2019s<\/a> functions between formal and objective reality. For examples, we have Vincenzo<\/a> Ciccarelli<\/a> \"An who explains the objective dimension as requiring \u201cthe existence of something according to representation\u201d while formal reality is \u201cexternal existence\u201d that is \u201ca mind independent entity\u201d:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The \ufb01rst notion he brie\ufb02y introduces is the distinction between formal and objective reality. The terminology is a bit puzzling, for by \u2018objective reality\u2019<\/strong> he means the existence of something according to representation<\/strong> (which we would perhaps consider as a subjective reality), whereas by \u2018formal reality\u2019<\/strong> he means \u201cexternal existence\u201d, i.e. as a mind independent entity<\/strong>. For instance, I may say that Santa Claus has objective reality\u2014given that I have a certain idea of Santa Claus as having certain properties\u2014but no formal reality, since he does not exist over and above my representation. Therefore, the \ufb01rst premise of the argument (P1) may be rephrased by saying that God has objective reality, i.e., he exists as an idea in my mind and that it is true according to my representation (i.e., true in objective reality) that he is an in\ufb01nite substance.6<\/a><\/sup>Vincenzo<\/span><\/a> Ciccarelli<\/a><\/span> \"An<\/a>, \u201cA formalization of Descartes\u2019 causal argument for existence of God<\/span><\/a>,\u201d \"An Principia: an International Journal of Epistemology<\/a><\/em> 28, no. 1 (July 2024): 41\u201342.

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Notice Ciccarelli’s<\/a> \"An<\/a> characterization of formal reality as meaning <\/strong>\u201cexternal existence,\u201d i.e., as a mind independent entity isn’t quite right because of the concept of ‘external.’ External to what? The only reasonable answer is external to minds. However, this cannot be the proper definition for formal reality since anything that exists has formal reality\u2014whether it is external or internal to a mind is irrelevant to its actual or formal reality. Furthermore, formally real items need not be mind independent entities either since ideas themselves are mind dependent entities but whenever an idea exists in a mind it is correct to say that that idea has formal reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kurt<\/a> Smith<\/a> \"An writes in his \u201cDescartes\u2019s Theory of Ideas<\/a>\u2019\u2019 at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/a><\/em> that formal reality has two features. Something with formal reality must (a) be a \u2018real\u2019 and actually existing thing and (b) that being \u2018real\u2019 requires those items to be \u2018mind-independent.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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But the Sun, or the simple natures that constitute it, also presumably possess formal reality<\/strong>, which is the kind of reality a thing possesses insofar as it is a real or actual thing<\/em><\/strong>. If by \u201creal\u201d Descartes in part means exists independently of a finite mind<\/em>, as Wahl and Lennon contend, then the Sun, or the simple natures that constitute it, insofar as they possess formal reality, exist independently of the finite mind<\/strong>.7<\/a><\/sup>Kurt<\/span><\/a> Smith<\/span><\/a>, \u201cDescartes\u2019s Theory of Ideas<\/span><\/a>,\u201d \u201c5. The Rules<\/em>: Simple Natures and the Concepts of Clarity and Distinctness<\/a>,\u201d Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/a><\/em>, First published March 14, 2007; substantive revision August 3, 2021, last paragraph.

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Smith uses the phrase \u2018real or actual\u2019 and then distinguishes between the two as he understands \u2018real\u2019 to require mind-independent existence (as Russell<\/a> Wahl<\/a>8<\/a><\/sup>The article of Wahl\u2019s defending that \u2018real\u2019 equals mind independence is \u201cHow Can What I Perceive Be True?<\/a>,\u201d History of Philosophy Quarterly<\/em>, 12, no. 2 (1995): 185\u201394.

<\/span> and Thomas<\/a> Lennon<\/a>9<\/a><\/sup>The article of Lennon\u2019s defending that \u2018real\u2019 equals mind independence is \u201cThe Eleatic Descartes<\/a>,\u201d Journal of the History of Philosophy<\/em>, 45, no. 1 (2007): 29\u201345.

<\/span> contend) while \u2018actual thing\u2019 requires any kind of existence whether mind-independent or not. However, such an understanding that formal reality requires both actual existence as well as \u2018real\u2019 mind-independent<\/em> existence cannot be correct since ideas are not independent of minds, for Descartes<\/a>, and ideas can have formal reality. The conclusion must then be that formal reality ONLY requires actual existence, but the items with such a property do not need to be \u2018real\u2019 when that term demands independence from a mind, as pointed out in the critique of Vincenzo<\/span><\/a> Ciccarelli<\/a><\/span> above.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In his Glossary entry for \u201cobjective\u201d Jonathan Bennett explains what he understands it to mean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Objective:<\/strong> When Descartes speaks of the ‘objective being’ of an idea<\/strong> he is referring to its representative content<\/strong>, the being that is its object<\/strong>, the item that it is about<\/strong>.10<\/a><\/sup>Jonathan Bennett, \u201cGlossary<\/a>,\u201d in \u201cLetters written in 1645\u20131650<\/a>,\u201d earlymoderntexts.com<\/a>, 12.

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David<\/a> Bourget<\/a> \"An explains Descartes’s application of formal and objective in relationship to causation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Descartes proceeded to apply this general causal principle to the specific case of ideas. He claimed that just as, in general, everything that comes to be must have some cause that contains at least as much as is to be found in the thing that comes to be, so every idea must have some cause. Ideas are, after all, also things that come to be. Moreover, this cause must not just be adequate to account for the coming to be of the idea considered formally as an idea<\/strong>; it must also be adequate to account for how the idea has come to have the content that it does, that is, to depict or represent the object that it represents<\/strong>. To do that, the cause of the idea must actually or literally contain at least as much as is represented by the idea. Descartes put this point by saying that the cause of the idea must formally<\/em> contain at least as much as is to be found objectively in the idea<\/strong>. The cause could not just objectively<\/em> contain the qualities that the idea contains objectively, since to be objectively in a thing means that the thing is an image or picture of sorts<\/strong>. If the qualities that are pictured by the idea are themselves only pictured by the object that causes the idea, then that merely pushes the question back. If the cause itself is just a picture or image, then there must be some more remote cause that it is copying, picturing, or imaging. Ultimately, there must be some cause that actually or literally (that is, formally<\/strong>) contains the properties that are being represented. [bold not in original]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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(M\/O) Material\/Objective distinction<\/mark><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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(M\/O) Material\/Objective:<\/mark><\/strong> Descartes sometimes opposes the term \u2018material\u2019 to \u2018objective\u2019 when referring to ideas, as he does when he writes in the \u201cPreface to the Meditations.\u201d Here are three translations from the \u201cPreface\u2019s\u201d fourth paragraph done by ChatGPT 4.0, John Cottingham, and Elizabeth S. Haldane:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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ChatGPT 4.0 translation from Latin<\/a>:<\/strong> 4. The fourth point is that, from the fact that I have the idea of a thing more perfect than myself, it does not follow that the idea itself is more perfect than me, and much less that what is represented by this idea exists. But I respond here that there is an equivocation in the term idea: for it can be understood either materially, as an operation of the intellect, in which sense it cannot be said to be more perfect than me, or objectively, for the thing represented by this operation<\/strong>, which thing, although not assumed to exist outside the intellect, can nonetheless be more perfect than me by reason of its essence. How, however, it follows from this alone\u2014that the idea of a thing more perfect than myself is in me\u2014that this thing truly exists, will be explained in detail in the following. [bold not in original]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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John Cottingham\u2019s translation<\/a>:<\/strong> \u201d\u2018Idea\u2019 can be \u2018taken materially\u2019, as an operation of the intellect . . . . Alternatively, it can be \u2018taken objectively,\u2019 as the \u2018thing represented by that operation\u2019.\u201d (CSM II: 7; AT VII: 8).<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Taking the idea \u2018materially,\u2019 as opposed to objectively, means \u2018considering it as simply a thought or mode of the mind,\u2019 without regard to its status as a representation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Elizabeth Haldane\u2019s translation<\/a>:<\/strong> But I reply that in this term ‘idea’ there is here something equivocal, for it may either be taken materially<\/strong>, as an act of my understanding<\/strong>, and in this sense it cannot be said that it is more perfect than I; or it may be taken objectively<\/strong>, as the thing which is represented by this act<\/strong>, which, although we do not suppose it to exist outside of my understanding, may, none the less, be more perfect than I, because of its essence.11<\/a><\/sup>Ren\u00e9 Descartes, “Preface to the Reader,\u201d<\/a><\/span> Descartes Philosophical Works<\/em>, vol. I, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane, 138. This work is in the public domain<\/span><\/a> in the United States.

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An idea ‘taken objectively’ occurs when considering the mental act as having a representative content by means of the objective reality found in the idea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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In his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/a><\/em> article on Descartes\u2019s theory of ideas<\/a>, <\/strong>Kurt<\/a> Smith<\/a> <\/strong>\"An, <\/strong>explains the material\/objective distinction and agrees with what I said about it above. The passages in bold in the Smith quotation below were not in the original:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The term \u201cidea\u201d can be used to refer to a specific kind of act or operation of the mind<\/strong>\u2014here, it is the act of representing<\/strong>. In this sense, the idea is simply an existent mode of the mind<\/strong>. In light of the formal-objective reality distinction<\/strong><\/em>, since the formal reality of an idea (a mode<\/strong>) is derived from the formal reality of the mind (its substance), it follows that its level of formal reality cannot be greater than that of the mind. This is what Descartes means when claiming that his ideas, understood as operations of his mind, cannot be \u201cmore perfect\u201d than his mind. When using \u201cidea\u201d to refer to an operation of the mind, \u201cidea\u201d is expressing what he calls the material<\/em> sense<\/strong>. Sometimes he will say, as he does in the above quoted passage, that when understanding an idea to be an operation of the mind<\/strong> that it is taken materially<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alternatively, the term \u201cidea\u201d can be used to refer to that which is presented or exhibited directly to the mind<\/strong> by way of the mental operation. When using \u201cidea\u201d to refer the object exhibited directly to the mind<\/strong>, \u201cidea\u201d is expressing what he calls the objective sense<\/em><\/strong>. Sometimes he will say, as he does in the above quoted passage, that when understanding an idea as the object immediately presented<\/strong> to the mind (by way of a mental operation), the idea is taken objectively<\/strong><\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consider again the idea of God. When taking this idea materially<\/strong><\/em>, the idea is understood as an operation of the mind<\/strong>. When taking this very same idea objectively<\/strong><\/em>, the idea is understood as that which is presented directly to the mind<\/strong><\/em> by way of this operation.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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Paul Hoffman<\/a> \"An, in footnote 44 from his \u201cDirect Realism, Intentionality and the Objective Being of Ideas<\/a>\u201d (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly<\/em>, 83 (2002): 163\u201379) explains the material\/objective distinction as a difference in contrast between an idea as an act of aware<\/em>ness (\u2019material<\/strong><\/em>\u2019) versus the content of that idea (\u2019objectively<\/strong>\u2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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44<\/sup> I am attributing two views to Descartes and Arnauld that might seem inconsistent. First, I am claiming that they think the distinction between an idea taken materially<\/strong> as an act of awareness<\/strong><\/em> and an idea taken objectively<\/strong> as the content of that act of awareness<\/em><\/strong> is merely a distinction of reason. Second, I am claiming that they think an idea taken object-ively is one and the same object as the object that exists in the external world, although not as it exists formally in the external world, but rather objectively as it exists in the mind. Michael Ayers (1998) in “Ideas and Objective Being,” in Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (eds.) The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy<\/em>, Volume II Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1067 argues that if the distinction between the object as it exists formally in the world and as it exists objectively in the mind is also understood to be a distinction of reason, then the views are inconsistent because “on ordinary realist assumptions, there cannot be one thing, the idea, which is really identical both to the mode of thought [i.e. to the act of awareness] and to the real object.” My way out of this dilemma is to assert that even though an idea taken objectively is one and the same object as the object that exists in the external world, the object as it exists objectively in the mind is really distinct from that same object as it exists formally in the external world. Descartes himself makes the same assertion (AT IV 350, CSMK 281). While I acknowledge that it might sound contradictory at first, I do not see that it is objectionable in the end to say that the same object can have two different ways of being such that as it exists in one way it is really distinct from itself as it exists in another way. The apparent contradiction is to say that things that are really distinct are nevertheless the same. But what this comes to is that two things which can exist separately turn out to be different ways of being the same thing, and I, agreeing with Descartes, do not see that that is contradictory.” [bold and bold italic not in original]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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There is a Cartesian philosopher who disagrees with the standard interpretation\u2014and almost universally accepted way of understanding Descartes’s material\/objective distinction\u2014and that is John Arndt Hanson<\/a> \"An in his 2021 University of Notre Dame dissertation \u201cDescartes on Representation, Presentation, and the Real Natures<\/a>.\u201d Hanson argues that the standard interpretation of the material\/objective distinction has been misinterpreted because that interpretation assumes that the material mode does not concern any particular (representational) content of that idea. Hanson states his approach to the material\/objective distinction in the abstract to his dissertation:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Author\u2019s Abstract<\/mark><\/strong><\/a>: This dissertation concerns two controversial aspects of Descartes\u2019 philosophy<\/strong>. The first<\/strong> is the meaning of the distinction between the material and objective senses of the word \u201cidea.\u201d<\/strong> . . . <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the first chapter, I take up the material sense<\/strong>, and argue against those interpretations which see it as a category for the contentless ontology of ideas<\/strong>. I argue that the textual evidence points to the material sense<\/strong> being Descartes\u2019 category for phenomenological description of how things seem to be to a given mind when it has a given idea<\/strong>. In particular, I argue that he deploys the material sense in his discussions of abstractions and that this points to the material sense being a category for content that lacks existential implication for the extramental world<\/strong>. . . . <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the third chapter<\/strong>, I take up the objective sense<\/strong>, and the widespread interpretation<\/strong> of this sense of ideas as concerning current presentational or phenomenological content<\/em><\/strong>. I suggest that this account struggles<\/strong> with cases where there is stability in the object of thought paired with changes in the associated phenomenology<\/strong>. I propose that we ought to reject a straightforward equation of the objective sense with current presentational content<\/strong>, and instead adopt a scheme according to which what has objective being in an idea is the sum total of thinkable, essential features of the object<\/em><\/strong>, and that when an idea is clear and distinct, what we perceive has objective being in the idea<\/strong>. [bold and bold italic not in original]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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Lorne Falkenstein<\/a> in his class notes<\/a> (10.4) describes what makes an idea have formal and objective reality. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

By way of further explaining this concern, Descartes appealed to a point made just a few paragraphs earlier: that our ideas are like pictures or images of things. It must be stressed that this is merely a simile and is not to be taken literally. Sensations of smells, tastes, sounds, hot and cold, and hardness and softness are all ideas for Descartes, but they are obviously not pictures in any literal sense. The point that Descartes was trying to make by saying that ideas are like pictures is that, like pictures, they are of or about something<\/strong>. A picture of Caesar is<\/em> something if it is an oil painting, it consists of coloured oils on canvas but it is also of<\/em> something an ancient Roman general. We say, colloquially, that Caesar is in the picture insofar as the picture is of Caesar, but this is not literally true. Caesar is in his tomb in Italy, and all that is literally in the picture is coloured oil on canvas. In the medieval tradition in which Descartes was educated the metaphorical notion of Caesar\u2019s being in the picture was explained by saying that Caesar is \u2018in\u2019 the picture as the object that the painter intended the picture to represent. In other words, Caesar is in the picture, not literally, but intentionally or objectively (that is, as an intentional object). Descartes meant to draw our attention to the fact that much the same thing can be said about ideas. An idea of an apple, for example, is an idea of something that is red and cool and solid. But the idea is not itself red or cool or solid. These simple natures are in the idea intentionally or objectively rather than literally. They are the objects the idea is intended to represent, not properties of the idea itself. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes conveyed this notion by remarking that over and above their formal reality<\/strong>, as things of a certain kind, namely ideas formed by thinking things<\/strong>, our ideas picture or represent something else, and this represented object<\/strong> is their objective reality<\/strong>. Contemporary usage has made Descartes\u2019s point less perspicacious than it was in the 17th century. Today, when we speak of something as being \u2018objective\u2019 we often mean to say that it has some sort of perceiver-independent or mind-independent status. But this is not at all what Descartes had in mind when he used the expression \u201cobjective reality.\u201d For Descartes, objective reality is the reality that is represented by an idea the object the idea is intended to represent. Rather than referring to what exists outside of the mind, it refers to what is \u2018in\u2019 our ideas in the special, intentional sense. Whether this \u2018reality\u2019 also exists in external objects outside of the idea is another question and is certainly not something Descartes wanted to imply when he used the phrase, \u2018objective reality.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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(M\/F) Material\/Formal distinction<\/mark><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Descartes explicitly discusses the material\/formal distinction when replying to Arnauld in the Fourth Replies concerning God. Descartes writes as follows about this distinction:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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When Arnauld says “if cold is merely an absence, there can’t be an idea of cold that represents it to me as a positive thing,”<\/strong> it’s clear that he is dealing solely with an idea taken formally<\/strong>. Since ideas are forms of a kind<\/strong>, and aren’t composed of any matter, when we think of them as representing something<\/strong> we are taking them not materially<\/em> but formally<\/em><\/strong>. But if we consider ideas not as representing<\/strong> this or that but simply as intellectual events<\/strong>, then we can be said to be taking them materially<\/em><\/strong>; but in that case no question arises about whether they are true or false of their objects.12<\/a><\/sup>Ren\u00e9 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes<\/em>, Vol II, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 130.

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In this passage, Descartes distinguishes between ideas taken “materially,” meaning the idea as an intellectual event or occurrence in the mind, versus ideas taken “formally,” which are ideas taken as representations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes in the above quotation makes the material\/formal distinction for ideas as actualized mental events (material) versus ideas as representations (formal).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The notion that ideas have both actual existence in the mind (as thoughts or mental events) and a representational aspect by means of the objective reality of a idea was crucial to Descartes’s understanding of knowledge and perception.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Let’s take an example used by him when he discusses his idea of the sun.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When we have a thought of the sun (the mental act itself), this thought has formal reality because it is an existent thought; it is an act of thinking, and this act is real insofar as it is in a mind. However, this use of formal is not the distinction Descartes makes when he contrasts a material versus a formal understanding or aspect of an idea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Instead, when contemplating the representational features of an existent thought this is to consider the content of that thought from what Descartes terms its ‘formal’ perspective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, Descartes’s distinction between material versus formal is the difference between an act of thinking versus the representational content of that thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the material\/formal distinction, the “material” refers to the actual existence of an idea in the mind, i.e., the act of thinking, while “formal” refers to the representational features of the idea. Therefore, in the example of the unicorn:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The “material reality” of the idea of the unicorn would be the actual thought process or mental state that is occurring. This is the existence of the idea in my mind, the act of thinking about a unicorn.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The “formal reality,” in the context of the material\/formal distinction, of the idea of the unicorn would be the representational features of the idea, such as the concept of a creature with a single horn, a horse-like body, etc. It is not the actual existence of the thought, but what the thought represents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes talks ideas in a way that can be interpreted as a distinction between the idea as a mode of the mind and the representational content of the idea from the Third Meditation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The only remaining sense for ‘materially false’ as applied to an idea is the one I am presenting here, namely ‘providing subject-matter for error.’ Whether cold is something positive or merely an absence makes no difference to my idea of cold, which remains the same as it always was. It is this idea which, I claim, can provide subject-matter for error if cold is in fact an absence and doesn’t have as much reality as heat; for if I consider the ideas of cold and heat just as I received them from my senses, I can’t tell that one of them represents more reality to me than the other.13<\/a><\/sup>Ren\u00e9 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes<\/em>, Vol II<\/a>, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 130\u201331<\/a>.

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However, similar themes can be found scattered throughout his work. For instance, in the Third Meditation, Descartes discusses the nature of ideas as thoughts (intellectual events, akin to the “material” sense) and their representational content (akin to the “formal” sense).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes’s general philosophy of mind, particularly his dualistic understanding of mind and body, also indirectly touches upon similar themes. For Descartes, the mind has an independent existence and thoughts (ideas in the “material” sense) are its modes or states. These ideas, when considered in their representational aspect, can be seen to align with the “formal” sense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes defines an idea as the form of a thought in the Second Rplues in geometrical form. What does he mean here by form and why does Descartes think that the nature of an idea is to be a form of a thought?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Descartes’s understanding, thoughts (which include everything of which we are immediately aware, such as feelings, perceptions, volitions, and intellectual ideas) exist in the mind as modes, or particular states or ways of being.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, when Descartes refers to an intellectual idea as the “form” of a thought, he means that it is a specific kind of thought characterized by its ability to represent something. The “form” of the thought is whatever one is aware of concerning the content or object of that thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why does Descartes conceive of ideas in this way? One reason seems to be that he wants to account for the conscious content of a person’s mind and the fact that our thoughts are often “about” something. By defining ideas as the “forms” of thoughts, Descartes categorizes and distinguishes between different types of thoughts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Descartes makes a distinction between material and formal ways of viewing the features of ideas. An idea in the ‘material’ sense means considering an idea as a mode of the mind as an actual thought or act of cognition. In this distinction, ‘formal’ does not concern itself with formal reality, or actual existence, as it does in the formal\/objective distinction, but rather considers an idea regarding its representational features. These representational aspects may or may not include objectively real mental contents. If secondary quality sensations lack objectively real mental content they can nevertheless be representational by virtue of being signs for particular configurations of matter in motion without the need for any objectively real mental content. Gary<\/a> Hatfield<\/a> \"\"<\/a> [[file:GaryHatfieldHeadshot.jpeg|frame|right| [http:\/\/philpapers.org\/profile\/63802 Professor Gary Hatfield] \u2014 [http:\/\/philosophy.sas.upenn.edu\/people\/gary-hatfield University of Pennsylvania Philosophy] |link=http:\/\/philosophy.sas.upenn.edu\/people\/gary-hatfield |alt=A color headshot of Gary Hatfield.]] even makes a good case for a representational feature of secondary quality sensations being based on resemblance![http:\/\/www.sas.upenn.edu\/~hatfield\/ Gary Hatfield,] [http:\/\/www.google.com\/books\/edition\/Routledge_Philosophy_Guidebook_to_Descar\/69OohGdB6j0C?hl=en&gbpv=1&printsec=frontcover “Chapter 10. “Legacy and Contributions,”] [http:\/\/www.google.com\/books\/edition\/Routledge_Philosophy_Guidebook_to_Descar\/69OohGdB6j0C?hl=en&gbpv=1&printsec=frontcover ”The Routledge Guidebook to Descartes’ Meditations”] (New York: Routledge, (originally published 2002, revised 2014), 331.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, for example, applying this understanding of the material\/formal distinction the ‘material’ refers to the actual existence of an act of the mind, i.e., a thinking event, while ‘formal’ refers to the representational features of this idea. Therefore, in the example of a unicorn \ud83e\udd84 , the ‘materiality’ of the idea of the unicorn \ud83e\udd84 would be the actual thought process or mental state that occurs. This is the existence of an idea in my mind, the act of thinking about a unicorn \ud83e\udd84 . The ‘formal’ dimension in the context of the material\/formal distinction, would be its representational features, being the represented characteristics of a unicorn \ud83e\udd84 .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In response to Arnauld’s objections in the Fourth Replies, Descartes explains the material\/formal distinction as follows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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When Arnauld says “if cold is merely an absence, there can’t be an idea of cold that represents it to me as a positive thing,” it’s clear that he is dealing solely with an idea taken formally<\/strong>. Since ideas are forms of a kind, and aren’t composed of any matter, when we think of them as representing something we are taking them not materially but formally<\/strong>. But if we consider ideas not as representing this or that but simply as intellectual events<\/strong>, then we can be said to be taking them materially<\/strong>; but in that case no question arises about whether they are true or false of their objects. The only remaining sense for ‘materially false’ as applied to an idea is the one I am presenting here, namely ‘providing subject-matter for error.’ Whether cold is something positive or merely an absence makes no difference to my idea of cold, which remains the same as it always was. It is this idea which, I claim, can provide subject-matter for error if cold is in fact an absence and doesn’t have as much reality as heat; for if I consider the ideas of cold and heat just as I received them from my senses, I can’t tell that one of them represents more reality to me than the other.14<\/a><\/sup>Ren\u00e9 Descartes, Fourth Replies<\/span><\/a>, trans. Jonathan<\/span><\/a> Bennett<\/span>, (Internet, 2017), 65\u201366, <\/a>http:\/\/www.earlymoderntexts.com\/assets\/pdfs\/descartes1642.pdf<\/span><\/a>.

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In his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/a><\/em> article on Descartes’s theory of ideas<\/a>, Kurt<\/span><\/a> Smith<\/span><\/a> explains the material\/objective distinction and agrees with what I said about it above.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The term \u201cidea\u201d can be used to refer to a specific kind of act or operation of the mind\u2014here, it is the act of representing. In this sense, the idea is simply an existent mode of the mind. In light of the formal-objective reality distinction, since the formal reality of an idea (a mode) is derived from the formal reality of the mind (its substance), it follows that its level of formal reality cannot be greater than that of the mind. This is what Descartes means when claiming that his ideas, understood as operations of his mind, cannot be \u201cmore perfect\u201d than his mind. When using \u201cidea\u201d to refer to an operation of the mind, \u201cidea\u201d is expressing what he calls the material sense. Sometimes he will say, as he does in the above quoted passage, that when understanding an idea to be an operation of the mind that it is taken materially.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alternatively, the term \u201cidea\u201d can be used to refer to that which is presented or exhibited directly to the mind by way of the mental operation. When using \u201cidea\u201d to refer the object exhibited directly to the mind, \u201cidea\u201d is expressing what he calls the objective sense. Sometimes he will say, as he does in the above quoted passage, that when understanding an idea as the object immediately presented to the mind (by way of a mental operation), the idea is taken objectively.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consider again the idea of God. When taking this idea materially, the idea is understood as an operation of the mind. When taking this very same idea objectively, the idea is understood as that which is presented directly to the mind by way of this operation.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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(E\/F) Eminent\/Formal distinction<\/mark><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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An example that I don’t know what Descartes might say about it regards the production of paint colors in relationship to whether or not the material involved requires analysis in terms of eminent causation. If red pain and blue paint are mixed together to produce purple paint color. Neither the red nor the blue paint had the property of being purple so this suggests eminent causation. Does red paint have a higher or eminent causal power to produce purple paint?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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John Cottingham A Descartes Dictionary<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cause, formal vs. eminent:<\/strong> When explicating the principle that ‘there must be at least as much in the cause as in the effect’ (see CAUSE ) , Descartes observes that ‘a stone, for example, which did not previously exist, cannot begin to exist unless it is produced by something which contains, either
formally or eminently [formaliter vel eminenter<\/em>] everything to be found in the stone’ (AT VII 41; CSM II 28). The later French version adds the following gloss: ‘that is, the cause will contain in itself the same things as are in the stone or other more excellent things’ (AT IXA 32) . In the scholastic terminology which Descartes makes use of here, to possess something ‘formally’ means to possess it in the literal and strict sense, in accordance with its definition, while to possess something ’eminently’ is to possess it in some higher or grander form, in virtue of its enj oyment of a superior degree of perfection. Thus, as Descartes says somewhat enigmatically in the Second Replies: ‘Something is said to exist eminent(y in an object when, although it does not exactly correspond to our perception of it, its greatness is such that it can fill the role of that which does so correspond’ (AT VII 161; CSM II, 114) . Compare the following analogy: ‘Who can give three coins to a beggar? Either a poor man who has (formally) the coins in his purse, or a rich banker who has (eminently) far greater assets in his account.’ Q . M. Beyssade, “The idea of God and the proofs of his existence,” in John Cottingham (ed.), ”The Cambridge Companion to Descartes”).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The difficulty which Descartes faces in employing this terminology in his proof of God’s existence is that, on the one hand, he wants to keep to the relatively simple principle, the cause resembles the effect, to demonstrate that his idea of a perfect being is indeed caused by a really perfect God; he takes it, in other words, that he has a clear idea of the deity, since his idea of God (the effect) is a kind of image or stamp of the divine essence that caused it – the ‘mark of the craftsman stamped on his work’ (AT VII 51 : CSM II 35) . But, on the other hand, the notion o f ’eminent’ causation tells us that there may be many features in an effect which are not in any direct and self\u00ad evident sense ‘derived’ from the essence of the cause: thus God is, on the traditional view, the ’eminent’ cause of the extended physical universe, even though he is not himself extended or physical. And this in turn seems to imply that we may not, after all, have a clear and distinct idea of God, since God’s causal powers, and indeed his ultimate nature, are of a wholly different order of reality, beyond our comprehension.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For more on these tensions, see INFINITE.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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In his glossary for translations from Descartes\u2019s correspondence, Jonathan Bennett provides his analysis of the eminent versus formal distinction agreeing with the standard understanding of the meaning of these terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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eminently, formally:<\/strong> These are scholastic technical terms<\/strong> that Descartes adopts for his own purposes. To say that something has (say) intelligence ‘formally’<\/strong> is just to say that it is intelligent<\/strong>; to say that it has intelligence ’eminently’<\/strong> is to say that it has intelligence in some higher form that doesn’t involve its being straightforwardly intelligent<\/strong>. The distinction comes into play through the doctrine that whatever is present in an effect is also present in its cause. Obviously something can be caused to be rigid by a cause that isn’t itself rigid; and God presumably doesn’t straightforwardly have many of the qualities he causes other things to have\u2014he isn’t square or muddy or (for that matter) given to telling bad jokes. So the doctrine takes the form ‘Whatever is present in an effect is also present formally or eminently in its cause. Descartes’s only explanation of this terminology is to say that x has F-ness \u2018eminently\u2019<\/strong> means<\/code> x has the power to cause things to have F-ness’<\/strong>, which you’ll notice turns the doctrine into a triviality.15<\/a><\/sup>Jonathan Bennett, \u201cGlossary<\/a>,\u201d in \u201cLetters written in 1645 \u20131650<\/a>,\u201d earlymoderntexts.com<\/span><\/a>, 11.

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While Bennett undoudtedly understands Descartes\u2019s eminent\/formal distinction, he nevertheless has an infelicitous way of expressing it when he remarks \u201dx has F-ness \u2018eminently\u2019 <\/code><\/strong>means<\/code> x has the power to cause things to have F-ness\u201d since that definition for eminent causation is identical to the one defining formal causation. The crucial difference between the two causation types is that whereas a formal cause of X must contain X itself, the eminent cause of X must NOT contain X but rather is capable of causing X even when lacking X.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Descartes makes a distinction between an eminent cause versus a formal cause. Define eminent versus formal for Descartes and supply verbatim quotations with proper reference citations from his philosophical writings. Why does Descartes make such a distinction?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The distinction between “eminent” and “formal” causes is a part of Descartes’ ontology and is deeply intertwined with his metaphysics and epistemology. The terms themselves are used by Descartes to describe different types of causality and to help elucidate his views on God’s existence and nature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Descartes’ philosophical system, a formal cause is something that possesses the properties of the effect in the same way that the effect does. For example, the heat of a fire is the formal cause of the heat in a heated room because both the fire and the heated room possess the property of heat in the same way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other hand, an eminent cause is something that contains the cause of the effect in a higher degree, or eminently. For instance, God, as an omnipotent being, is said to be the eminent cause of all things. Even though God does not physically contain all properties of creation in a formal sense, He possesses them in a higher or eminent sense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While we might not have the exact verbatim quotations from Descartes on this topic due to translation discrepancies, some passages that discuss these ideas can be found in Descartes’ “Principles of Philosophy” and “Meditations on First Philosophy”. Here are a couple of paraphrased passages that illustrate the idea:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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In the Principles of Philosophy<\/em>, Part I, \u00a717, Descartes writes something like:
“The cause I here understand to be that which contributes to the production of anything; and in which (by the strict method of demonstration used in geometry) ought to be contained either formally or eminently all that is to be found in the thing produced.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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Similarly, in “Meditations on First Philosophy,” Meditation III, Descartes wrote something akin to:
“And although an idea may give rise to another idea, this regress cannot, nevertheless, be infinite; we must in the end reach a first idea, the cause of which is, as it were, the archetype in which all the reality [or perfection] that is found objectively [or by representation] in these ideas is contained formally [and in act].”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The reason why Descartes makes such a distinction is largely due to his desire to prove the existence of God. According to Descartes, the idea of God, which is the idea of a supremely perfect being, must have a cause that contains all the perfections of God either formally or eminently. Since no finite being can be the cause of this idea, it must come from God Himself. Thus, the distinction between formal and eminent causes serves as a cornerstone for his argument for God’s existence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To expand further, the terms formal and eminent are part of a wider philosophical discussion on causality. To recap, when Descartes talks about “formal reality,” he is referring to the reality of something as it exists. In contrast, the “eminent reality” refers to the higher level or degree of existence that something can possess.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In his argument for the existence of God, Descartes uses these concepts of formal and eminent to claim that the cause of an idea must have as much reality as the content of the idea itself. The idea of God, an infinitely perfect being, has such a degree of reality that only God, existing formally or eminently, could be the cause of this idea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The central purpose of the distinction between formal and eminent causes, then, is to support Descartes’ claim that certain ideas (like that of God) could only have originated from a source that possesses the same level of reality as the idea itself – in this case, an infinite level.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This argument is part of Descartes’ larger project in his Meditations, which is to establish a firm foundation for scientific knowledge. By using the distinction between formal and eminent causes, Descartes aims to prove the existence of God, who then serves as the guarantor of the truth of clear and distinct ideas and hence, the reliability of our cognitive faculties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here’s another relevant passage from the Meditations:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“I myself am not perfect, then how could I have possibly been the cause of this idea? For if I had derived it from myself, then I should neither doubt nor want, nor lack anything at all; for I should have given myself all the perfections of which I have any idea, thus making myself God.” (Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditation III)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This passage highlights how Descartes utilizes his notions of formal and eminent causality to further his argument for the existence of God. By arguing that he himself, an imperfect being, could not be the formal or eminent cause of the idea of a perfect God, Descartes positions God as the only possible source of this idea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To further develop the topic, Descartes’ distinction between formal and eminent causes can also be understood as an effort to resolve the apparent contradiction in his own thinking about the reality of ideas. On one hand, Descartes acknowledges that ideas are less real than physical things because they are not physically present. On the other hand, he also believes that certain ideas, like the idea of God, possess a high degree of reality because they represent absolute perfection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By introducing the concept of eminent causality, Descartes can argue that these highly perfect ideas must originate from a source that contains their attributes in an eminent way. This allows him to maintain that although ideas are in one sense less real than physical objects, in another sense (in their representation of perfection), they are more real and must have a correspondingly real cause.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another crucial aspect of Descartes’ theory is that he uses the concept of formal and eminent causes to distinguish between finite and infinite substances. For Descartes, a finite substance (like a human) can be the formal cause of other finite things or ideas. But the idea of an infinite substance (like God) cannot be formally caused by any finite substance. The infinite substance, or God, must be the eminent cause of the idea of Himself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is discussed in Meditation Three, where Descartes wrote something akin to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“And indeed, it is not necessary that I ever light upon any thought of God; but whenever I do choose to think of the first and supreme being, and bring forth the idea of God from the treasure house of my mind as it were, it is necessary that I attribute all perfections to him, even if I do not at that time enumerate them all or take them into account one by one.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This passage encapsulates Descartes’ belief that humans, being finite substances, can not formally cause the idea of an infinite God. Only God, an infinite substance, can be the eminent cause of the idea of Himself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, the distinction between formal and eminent causes allows Descartes to reconcile his ontological commitments about the nature of ideas and substances with his metaphysical and epistemological goal of establishing a solid foundation for knowledge. It is a key component of his argument for the existence of God, which in turn serves as the linchpin for his entire philosophical system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The distinction between formal and eminent causality is also foundational to Descartes’ arguments regarding mind-body dualism, the nature of knowledge, and the existence and nature of the physical world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regarding mind-body dualism, for example, one could argue that the mind is the eminent cause of the body. While the body can be affected by physical forces (formal causes), the mind is the eminent cause in that it contains the possibilities of the body’s states in a higher degree. For Descartes, the mind, a thinking substance, and the body, an extended substance, are distinct kinds of substances and can exist independently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moving onto knowledge, the concept of formal and eminent causes helps establish the certainty of knowledge. Descartes posits that our clear and distinct ideas must have a reliable source, and that source must contain the reality of those ideas formally or eminently. Since God is a supremely perfect being, he cannot be a deceiver, hence, our clear and distinct ideas (our knowledge) can be trusted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, regarding the existence and nature of the physical world, Descartes employs the concepts of formal and eminent causality in his proof for the existence of material things. In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes argues that the vivid and detailed ideas he has of material objects couldn’t come from him, and so they must come from some external objects in the world. These external objects are the formal causes of his perceptions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, the distinction between formal and eminent causes plays a crucial role in many areas of Descartes’ philosophical system, from metaphysics and epistemology to mind-body dualism and the nature of the physical world. It’s a pivotal part of his ontological and epistemological arguments, helping him to make claims about the existence and nature of God, the mind, and the physical world, and providing a basis for the possibility of certain knowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Continuing on the implications of the distinction between formal and eminent causes, it’s worth mentioning how it contributes to Descartes’ theory of innate ideas and the nature of the self.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes is famous for his view that certain ideas are innate, meaning that they are present in the mind from birth. His argument for this relies on the concept of formal and eminent causation. The idea of God, for instance, is often considered by Descartes to be an innate idea. Because humans are finite beings, we cannot be the formal cause of the idea of an infinite God. Only God, as an infinite being, could be the eminent cause of the idea of Himself, which exists innately within us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The concept of the self or the thinking thing (the “I”) is also grounded in this framework. For Descartes, the thinking thing is the formal cause of its thoughts but the idea of God (a perfect, infinite being) present in the mind must have been caused eminently by God Himself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A quote from Descartes in his “Meditations on First Philosophy,” Meditation II, encapsulates his belief about the existence of the self:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and also imagines and senses.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This emphasis on thinking as the essence of the self shows that Descartes considers the thinking thing (the self) as a formal cause of its thoughts. However, for Descartes, even though the self can be the formal cause of its thoughts, the eminent cause of the self\u2019s existence and its capacities to perceive and understand is God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In conclusion, the distinction between formal and eminent causes is deeply ingrained in Descartes’ philosophy. It has far-reaching implications for many of his key theories, including the existence of God, the nature of reality, the reliability of knowledge, the existence of the self, and the relationship between the mind and the body. This distinction allowed Descartes to construct his philosophical system in a way that upholds his dualist metaphysics while also allowing for the possibility of certain knowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As we delve deeper into Descartes’ philosophical system, we can further see the impact of the formal and eminent causality distinction in areas such as his interpretation of sensory perception, his understanding of truth and error, and the development of his moral philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When it comes to sensory perception, Descartes considers our sense perceptions as essentially thoughts and places them within his framework of formal and eminent causation. This approach allows him to explain how sensory perceptions can often be misleading. In his “Meditations on First Philosophy,” Meditation VI, Descartes discusses how the senses, while usually reliable about things close to us, can give false information about objects at a distance or under different conditions. This deception is not the result of a flaw in our design by God (the eminent cause), but it is instead a result of the misuse of our faculty of judgment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This leads us to Descartes’ understanding of truth and error. In his “Meditations on First Philosophy,” Meditation IV, Descartes discusses how errors occur not from our perceptions or our understanding (both of which are gifts from God), but rather from the misuse of our free will (judgment), when we affirm or deny something without a clear understanding. The faculty of judgment is something humans possess formally, and they are responsible for the errors they make, not God (the eminent cause).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, the concepts of formal and eminent causation also underpin Descartes’ moral philosophy. For Descartes, virtues are habits that we form through the repeated use of our free will, making us the formal cause of our virtues. God, however, as the eminent cause, is the source of the very possibility of virtue. He provides us with the free will and understanding we need to cultivate virtue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To sum up, the distinction between formal and eminent causes provides the framework for understanding many of the central tenets of Descartes’ philosophy. This distinction allows Descartes to present a robust and interconnected philosophical system that explains the nature of God, the self, reality, knowledge, sensory perception, truth, error, and moral virtue. By maintaining this distinction, Descartes establishes a clear and consistent structure for his metaphysical, epistemological, and moral theories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In continuing this discussion, we can also consider the role of formal and eminent causation in Descartes’ account of existence and essence. In “Meditations on First Philosophy,” Descartes delves into the topic of the essence of things, which he contends can be understood through clear and distinct perception.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In his third meditation, for instance, Descartes argues that existence cannot be separated from the essence of God. In this case, God is both the formal and eminent cause of His existence because He embodies existence in the most perfect and highest degree. In other words, God’s essence (what He is) necessitates His existence. This can be considered a variant of the ontological argument for God’s existence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For created beings, like humans and physical objects, their existence and essence are distinct. Descartes, as a substance dualist, believes that the essence of mind is thought, and the essence of body is extension. However, their existence must have an eminent cause, which Descartes identifies as God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes’ view on causality also contributes to his theory of continuous creation. He contends that God doesn’t just create substances at a certain point in time, but must continuously create them at each moment they exist. This means that God is not just the initial cause of the existence of things, but the continuous eminent cause of their being.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the realm of knowledge, Descartes applies the concepts of formal and eminent causation to differentiate between degrees of reality in ideas. As discussed earlier, ideas of substance have more formal reality than those of modes or accidents, but the idea of infinite substance (God) has the most formal reality. This hierarchy of ideas and the principles of causation underpin Descartes’ method of doubt and his quest for certain knowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In sum, the distinction between formal and eminent causation permeates Descartes’ philosophical work, offering an explanatory framework for his various arguments and theories. Whether used to argue for the existence of God, explain the nature of human and physical world, or validate the possibility of certain knowledge, these concepts are integral to understanding Descartes’ philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To further delve into the subject, we can also examine how Descartes’ distinction between formal and eminent causes contributes to his views on the interaction between mind and body, a central issue in his philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes is a substance dualist, meaning he believes that the mind and body are two distinct types of substances. The mind is a thinking thing and has the essence of thought, while the body is an extended thing and has the essence of extension.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although Descartes conceives of mind and body as distinct, he also maintains that they interact with each other in the living human being. This is evident in sensations, passions, and other mental events that appear to be influenced by the body. Conversely, our voluntary actions demonstrate the mind’s influence over the body.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In explaining this mind-body interaction, Descartes faces a significant challenge. If mind and body are fundamentally different substances, how can they interact causally? Descartes proposes that this interaction happens in the pineal gland in the brain, but he does not provide a detailed mechanism for this interaction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The concepts of formal and eminent causation may offer some insight here. As a finite substance, the mind can be seen as the formal cause of its thoughts and volitions, which can influence the body. Similarly, the body, as another finite substance, can be seen as the formal cause of its movements and sensations, which can affect the mind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, it’s important to note that God, as the eminent cause, sustains both mind and body in existence and allows for their causal interaction. Without God’s continuous creation, the interaction between these distinct substances would not be possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, while the concepts of formal and eminent causation don’t solve the mind-body interaction problem entirely, they provide a crucial metaphysical framework for understanding the possible relationship between mind and body in Descartes’ dualistic philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In conclusion, Descartes’ distinction between formal and eminent causes serves as a key theoretical tool in his philosophical system. It shapes his arguments about God, self, reality, knowledge, mind-body interaction, and more. By understanding these concepts, we can gain a deeper insight into Descartes’ philosophical thought and his impact on the history of philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

David Bourget explains why eminent causality is a real problem for zdescsrtes’s ‘containment’ theory of causation whereby the cause must contain the effect in itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Eminent causality:<\/strong>  <\/em>Descartes\u2019s causal principle has an untoward implication. God is supposed to have created the world. But the world is composed of extended bodies. If the cause of an effect is supposed to contain at least much reality as is found in the effect, then it would appear to follow that God must also be extended. But extension is not one of the attributes traditionally ascribed to the Christian God, who is rather supposed to be purely spiritual. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes was not the only Christian philosopher who had to confront this theological difficulty. Any Christian philosopher who shared Descartes\u2019s views on causality and that included virtually all the philosophers of the medieval period had the same problem. The containment model of causality appears to contradict Christian theology. According to the containment model, if God created extended bodies, God must contain extension. According to Christian theology, God cannot be extended. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rather than reject the one or the other of these doctrines, Descartes and his medieval predecessors tried to have things both ways by claiming that, though God does not contain extension, he does contain things that are more perfect than extension. Extension was supposed to flow from these more perfect qualities without contradicting the principle that the cause must contain at least as much as is to be found in its effect. But it is not clear that this notion can be invoked without giving up the containment model of causality. If a supposedly more eminent or perfect or real being can produce something it does not itself contain, then, however mean or ignoble that result may be when compared to what is actually present in the more eminent or perfect or real being, it is still something that is not present in the more eminent or perfect or real being. It must therefore have come to be out of nothing, in violation of the containment model. In the final analysis, the notion of eminent causality is nothing more than what Bacon would have called an Idol of the Theatre: a piece of jargon used to paper over the existence of a fundamental theoretical inconsistency.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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How does the concept of formal in the eminent formal distinction relate to Descartes’s use of the term ‘formal’ in other contexts, such as in Descartes’s distinction between objective reality and formal reality, or his distinction between material versus formal, and supply verbatim quotations (no paraphrasing) with proper reference citations?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes uses the term ‘formal’ in several contexts throughout his philosophical writings. Although the meanings in different contexts are related, they are not identical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Material and Formal:<\/strong> The distinction between material and formal appears in Descartes’ philosophical work in relation to truth and falsity. In his Principles of Philosophy<\/em>, Part I, Article 35, he states:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“The falsity of judgments, however, or mental assertions, consists simply in this, that we affirm what is false to be true. For instance, if we imagine a goat or a chimera, that is, form the idea of a goat or of a chimera, without making any judgment regarding it, there is no error in such a case, nor any falsity, indeed, but only some thing; whereas if we affirm or deny anything of such a thing, then we run the risk of going into error.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

In this context, the term ‘material’ refers to an error’s content or what it is about, while ‘formal’ refers to the error in judgment itself. An error is material when it concerns the content of the idea, whereas an error is formal when it involves affirming or denying something without clear and distinct perception.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In both cases, the term ‘formal’ refers to the reality or truth of something in itself, whether that be the existence of a substance or the truth of a judgment. Nevertheless, the contexts of these distinctions are different, one focusing on the ontological status of ideas and substances, and the other on the epistemological status of judgments or assertions. The precise meaning of ‘formal’ must be understood within these specific contexts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The term ‘formal’ also appears in Descartes’ distinction between formal and eminent reality, which we’ve discussed earlier. There, ‘formal’ denotes the actual existence or reality of a thing in itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In relation to his distinction between formal and objective reality, ‘formal reality’ refers to the reality of a thing by virtue of its actual existence, while ‘objective reality’ refers to the reality of an idea insofar as it represents a thing. He explains this in the Third Meditation:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\u201cAnd among these ideas, some appear to me to be innate, some adventitious, and others to be made by myself (factitious); for, as I have the power of understanding what is called a thing, or a truth, or a thought, it seems to me that I hold this power from no other source than my own nature; but if I now hear a noise, if I see the sun, or if I feel heat, I have all along judged that these sensations proceeded from certain things existing out of myself; and, in fine, it appears to me that sirens, hippogryphs, and the like, are formed out of my own mind (Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditation III, CSM II:25).\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Here, ‘formal reality’ is the actual existence that entities such as the sun, heat, or the self possess, as opposed to ‘objective reality,’ which refers to the reality an idea has by virtue of its being a representation of an object.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The distinction between material and formal falsity appears in Descartes’ works in the context of error. In Principles of Philosophy<\/em>, Descartes writes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“But if we had always before our eyes the infinite wisdom of the Creator, from whom nothing is hidden, we would certainly consider nothing to exist in the universe that we would not judge to be disposed and arranged in a manner that is most perfect and meritorious of choice. But because we do not always remember God, we make many judgments in which we are deceived. Therefore, the most general cause of our errors is that we do not refer all our judgments to God, but are precipitated by the bias of our own nature to judge of things from preconceived opinions” (Principles of Philosophy<\/em>, Part I, Article 43).<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

A ‘material’ falsity occurs when the content of a tends to incline the mind with such an idea into making false judgments, while a ‘formal’ falsity happens when making a judgment that is false of reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In both cases, the term ‘formal’ is associated with actual existence or the essence of a thing itself (either an entity or an error in judgment). The term is used to describe the reality of a thing in itself, as it exists independently of our thoughts or perceptions about it. The specifics of what ‘formal’ signifies, however, depend on the particular context and the contrast it is being used in. It’s clear that the term ‘formal’ is quite versatile in Descartes’ philosophy, serving to articulate a variety of key distinctions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The term ‘formal’ also has a crucial role in Descartes’ understanding of truth and falsity. He explains the nature of truth in the Fourth Meditation, where he uses the concept of ‘formal’ in contrast to ‘material’. Descartes argues that when we have a clear and distinct perception, the judgment we make based on it is true, that is, it has ‘formal’ truth. However, when we make judgments without a clear and distinct perception, we may commit an error.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He explains:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“Whence do error and falsity arise, since these are privations, it seems, and therefore cannot come from God? If I ever go wrong, this happens despite the fact that God has given me a great propensity towards the truth; and it must be admitted that the faculty of knowing which I got from God is not in itself deceptive, but contains formally all the clear and distinct perceptions by which I am led to the truth. But the faculty of asserting or denying, which comes from my freedom, is indifferent in respect of truth and falsity; and it is in this respect, not in respect of the understanding, that I can be deceived. For if I had an infinite understanding, like God, I would always perceive truth and be immune from error” (Fourth Meditation, CSM II: 38).<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Here, Descartes is asserting that God has given him (and by extension, all humans) the faculty of understanding, which when used correctly, leads us towards truth – ‘formal’ truth. However, the freedom to make judgments, to assert or deny, is where the potential for error – ‘material’ falsity – lies. We err when we make judgments beyond the scope of our clear and distinct perceptions. Thus, ‘formal’ in this context refers to the true essence of things as they are perceived with clarity and distinctness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In all these cases, ‘formal’ generally signifies the actual, intrinsic, or essential nature of something, whether it refers to existence (as in formal versus objective reality), truth (as in formal truth versus material falsity), or cause (as in formal versus eminent cause). However, the exact meaning of ‘formal’ can only be fully understood in the specific context of each of these distinctions. It’s a key term in Descartes’ philosophical vocabulary, enabling him to articulate his unique views on a wide range of philosophical issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes makes a distinction between material and formal ways of viewing the features of ideas. An idea in the ‘material’ sense means considering an idea as a mode of the mind as an actual thought or act of cognition. In this distinction, ‘formal’ does not concern itself with formal reality, or actual existence, as it does in the formal\/objective distinction, but rather considers an idea regarding its representational features. These representational aspects may or may not include objectively real mental contents. If secondary quality sensations lack objectively real mental content they can nevertheless be representational by virtue of being signs for particular configurations of matter in motion without the need for any objectively real mental content.

Professor Gary Hatfield at the University of Pennsylvania even makes a good case for a representational feature of secondary quality sensations being based on resemblance![36]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, for example, applying this understanding of the material\/formal distinction we get that the ‘material’ refers to the actual existence of an act of the mind, i.e., a thinking event, while ‘formal’ refers to the representational features of this idea. Therefore, in the example of a unicorn \ud83e\udd84 , the ‘materiality’ of the idea of the unicorn \ud83e\udd84 would be the actual thought process or mental state that occurs. This is the existence of an idea in my mind, the act of thinking about a unicorn \ud83e\udd84 . The ‘formal’ dimension in the context of the material\/formal distinction, would be its representational features, being the represented characteristics of a unicorn \ud83e\udd84 .<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In response to Arnauld’s objections in the Fourth Replies, Descartes explains the material\/formal distinction as follows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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When Arnauld says “if cold is merely an absence, there can’t be an idea of cold that represents it to me as a positive thing,” it’s clear that he is dealing solely with an idea taken formally. Since ideas are forms of a kind, and aren’t composed of any matter, when we think of them as representing something we are taking them not materially but formally. But if we consider ideas not as representing this or that but simply as intellectual events, then we can be said to be taking them materially; but in that case no question arises about whether they are true or false of their objects. The only remaining sense for ‘materially false’ as applied to an idea is the one I am presenting here, namely ‘providing subject-matter for error.’ Whether cold is something positive or merely an absence makes no difference to my idea of cold, which remains the same as it always was. It is this idea which, I claim, can provide subject-matter for error if cold is in fact an absence and doesn’t have as much reality as heat; for if I consider the ideas of cold and heat just as I received them from my senses, I can’t tell that one of them represents more reality to me than the other.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

The distinction between ‘material’ and ‘formal’ as it pertains to the features of ideas that you describe is consistent with Descartes’ philosophy, as it further illustrates the nuanced ways in which he employs these terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When an idea is considered in the ‘material’ sense, it is seen as an act of cognition or thinking \u2014 a mode of the mind. In contrast, the ‘formal’ sense of an idea pertains to its representational features, or how it depicts its object. This distinction becomes particularly pertinent when dealing with complex ideas such as those of secondary qualities, which might not directly correspond to any objective feature of reality, yet still hold representational value by acting as signs or indications of certain physical states. Gary Hatfield’s interpretation that even these ideas could have a representational aspect based on resemblance adds further depth to this understanding of ‘formal’.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the context of your example of a unicorn, the ‘material’ aspect of the idea is the actual act of thinking about the unicorn, whereas the ‘formal’ aspect pertains to the idea’s representational content \u2014 the specific attributes and qualities that characterize a unicorn in our thoughts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes’ response to Arnauld’s objections in the Fourth Replies further illustrates this distinction. Here, Descartes notes that whether an idea is taken materially or formally can significantly affect the kind of questions we ask about it. Taken materially, an idea is considered purely as a mental event, independent of its representational content. Thus, questions about its truth or falsity vis-\u00e0-vis its object do not arise. Taken formally, however, an idea is seen in its role as a representation of something else, which invites questions about its accuracy or truthfulness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes further clarifies that a materially false idea provides the ‘subject-matter for error.’ This indicates that it is through our acts of cognition (ideas taken materially) that we are susceptible to error, particularly when these ideas do not have a clear and distinct basis. Consequently, our ideas of secondary qualities like cold and heat, though derived from our senses, may lead us into error if we do not critically evaluate their objective reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Continuing the analysis, it’s important to understand that the distinction between ‘material’ and ‘formal’ as applied to ideas contributes to Descartes’ broader epistemological project, especially his theory of error and his pursuit of certain knowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes’ theory of error, as mentioned earlier, revolves around the misuse of the will in affirming or denying things that the understanding has not clearly and distinctly perceived. In his Meditations, he contends that error occurs not from a defect in our faculties of understanding or will per se, but from the way we use our will beyond the limits of our understanding. This is particularly relevant when considering ideas ‘materially’ – as acts of cognition that provide the ‘subject-matter for error.’<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the case of the idea of cold, as Descartes discusses in the Fourth Replies, if cold is indeed an absence (as opposed to a positive entity), then our idea of cold can lead to error if we consider it as having as much reality as heat. This discrepancy between the reality of what is represented (taken ‘formally’) and our cognitive act (taken ‘materially’) demonstrates how a materially false idea can lead us into error.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By distinguishing between the material and formal aspects of ideas, Descartes provides a framework for understanding how we can be misled by our perceptions and ideas. It also offers a strategy for avoiding error by understanding the distinct roles of our cognitive faculties and the limits of our knowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This distinction reinforces Descartes’ method of doubt, where he suspends judgment on all things that are not entirely certain and indubitable. By clearly distinguishing between the representational features of an idea (‘formal’) and the cognitive act of entertaining that idea (‘material’), we can better evaluate the certainty of our knowledge and guard against potential errors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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