{"id":25119,"date":"2025-06-17T03:18:02","date_gmt":"2025-06-17T03:18:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/drdavidcring.net\/descartes-ideas\/?p=25119"},"modified":"2025-06-28T22:57:53","modified_gmt":"2025-06-28T22:57:53","slug":"googles-gemini-comes-around-to-dr-rings-interpretation-of-descartess-theory-of-ideas","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/drdavidcring.net\/descartes-ideas\/objective-reality-2\/googles-gemini-comes-around-to-dr-rings-interpretation-of-descartess-theory-of-ideas\/","title":{"rendered":"Google\u2019s Gemini Comes Around\u00a0to Dr. Ring\u2019s Interpretation\u00a0Of Descartes\u2019s Theory Of Ideas"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Introduction written by Google\u2019s Gemini – Flash 2.5 and slightly revised by Dr. Ring<\/mark><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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Ren\u00e9 Descartes’s theory of ideas is foundational to his philosophical system, yet it presents intricate distinctions that demand careful scrutiny. A central question arising from his work concerns how to understand both “strict ideas”\u2014those functioning “as if an image of a thing” (tanquam rerum imagines<\/em>)\u2014and broader “non-strict ideas,” understood as direct objects of awareness and the forms of any thought. This post aims to explore the multifaceted nature of Cartesian ideas, specifically addressing the distinction between strict and non-strict ideas and the subtleties of objective vs. formal reality. While Descartes himself offers definitions that seem to support such divisions, the application of these categories, particularly concerning the concept of “objective reality<\/a>,” proves to be highly complex. This academic post will argue that Descartes distinguishes between these types of ideas, but more critically, it challenges the widespread assumption that all non-strict ideas inherently possess objectively real representational content, particularly when confronted with the immediate awareness of objectless phenomenal experiences like pain or anxiety.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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According to Descartes\u2019s philosophy, are there both strict ideas<\/strong> (AT VII: 36; CSM II: 25), which are as if an image of a thing (in Latin: tanquam rerum imagines<\/em>),1<\/a><\/sup>Here is the passage at (AT VII: 36; CSM II: 25) referencing strict ideas: \u201cFirst, however, considerations of order appear to dictate that I now classify my thoughts into definite kinds, and ask which of them can properly be said to be the bearers of truth and falsity. Some of my thoughts are as it were the images of things, and it is only in these cases that the term ‘idea’ is strictly appropriate<\/strong>\u2014for example, when I think of a man, or a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or God.\u201d<\/span> (bold mine)

<\/span> and non-strict ideas<\/strong>, which are the direct objects of awareness and the forms of any thought (AT VII: 160\u201361; CSM II: 113)?2<\/a><\/sup>In the Second Replies to Objections<\/em> (AT VII: 160\u201361; CSM II: 113\u201314) Descartes provides definitions for key terms in a geometrical fashion.
      I<\/strong>. Thought.<\/strong> I use this term to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately aware of it. Thus all the operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses are thoughts. I say ‘immediately’ so as to exclude the consequences of thoughts; a voluntary movement, for example, originates in a thought but is not itself a thought.
      II.<\/strong> Idea.<\/strong> I understand this term to mean the form of any given thought, immediate perception of which makes me aware of the thought. Hence, whenever I express something in words, and understand what I am saying, this very fact makes it certain that there is within me an idea of what is signified by the words in question. Thus it is not only the images depicted in the imagination which I call ‘ideas’. Indeed, in so far as these images are in the corporeal imagination, that is, are depicted in some part of the brain, I do not call them ‘ideas’ at all; I call them ‘ideas’ only in so far as they give form to the mind itself, when it is directed towards that part of the brain.
      III.<\/strong> Objective reality of an idea.<\/strong> By this I mean the being of the thing which is represented by an idea, in so far as this exists in the idea. In the same way we can talk of ‘objective perfection’, ‘objective intricacy’ and so on. For whatever we perceive as being in the objects of our ideas exists objectively in the ideas themselves.
      IV.<\/strong> Whatever exists in the objects of our ideas in a way which exactly corresponds to our perception of it is said to exist formally<\/strong> in those objects. Something is said to exist eminently<\/strong> in an object when, although it does not exactly correspond to our perception of it, its greatness is such that it can fill the role of that which does so correspond.<\/span>


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Yes, according to Descartes’s philosophy, there is a distinction between ideas that are “as if an image of a thing” (in Latin: tanquam rerum imagines<\/em>) and other forms of thought that are direct objects of awareness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here’s a breakdown:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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