{"id":32008,"date":"2025-10-16T17:26:29","date_gmt":"2025-10-16T17:26:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/drdavidcring.net\/descartes-ideas\/?p=32008"},"modified":"2025-10-16T17:26:30","modified_gmt":"2025-10-16T17:26:30","slug":"questions-for-kurt-smith-and-dr-david-c-ring","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/drdavidcring.net\/descartes-ideas\/idea\/questions-for-kurt-smith-and-dr-david-c-ring\/","title":{"rendered":"Questions for Kurt Smith and Dr. David C. Ring"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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1.<\/strong> What exactly does \u201cidea\u201d mean in Descartes\u2019s texts, and is it legitimate to treat \u201cidea\u201d as having both a strict\/representational and a non-strict\/awareness sense?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n


* You (Ring) adopt a two-tiered sense of \u201cidea\u201d in order to resolve the triad. But is that indexical distinction genuinely present in Descartes\u2019s usage (or defensible by his method), or is it a modern maneuver?<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* Could this be seen as splitting hairs or smuggling in an illicit distinction? <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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2. Is Smith right to insist that Descartes accepts (1) \u201cideas are representational\u201d and (3) \u201csensations are not representational,\u201d thereby rejecting (2)?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n


* Is it uncontroversial that Descartes always treats all ideas as representational in the strong, objective-reality sense?<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* Or might there be exceptional cases in which he allows something like \u201cidea\u201d to function more loosely (so that (2) is plausible without contradiction)? <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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3.<\/strong> Does the dream \/ evil-genius argument conclusively show that a sensation must be purely mental (a mode of mind) and not a corporeal-mental hybrid?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n


* Ring uses the identity of the phenomenal experience in dreaming to argue against Smith\u2019s \u201ccorporeal-mental modal complex.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* But could Smith reply that the hybrid view only aims to describe how sensations normally function in embodied human experience, not in hypothetical purely mental simulations?<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* If so, does that concede too much to Ring? <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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4.<\/strong> If sensations are non-representational in the strict sense, can they still play a genuine \u201crepresentational\u201d or \u201csignifying\u201d role (via lawful natural signs) and does that count as a form of representation compatible with Descartes?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n


* Ring\u2019s (P1) proposes that sensations are representational in a weak (indexical) sense: \u201clawfully connected natural signs to \u2026 configurations of matter in motion.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* Is this move philosophically stable? Does it reintroduce a representational content that undermines the \u201cnon-representational\u201d claim in (3)?<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* Does Descartes ever conceive of sensations as \u201csigns\u201d in precisely this weaker way? <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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5.<\/strong> How should we construe the ontology of sensations: mode of the mind, mode of the union, or some hybrid?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n


* The choice seems to shape whether one must treat the body component as constitutive.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* Could there be a middle ground: sensations as modes of the union (or the composite) which nevertheless reduce to mental modes in certain contexts?<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* Would that approach preserve the triadic consistency or reintroduce tensions? <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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6.<\/strong> How does Descartes\u2019s doctrine of material falsity bear on whether sensations are representational ideas or not?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n


* If sensations are materially false ideas (i.e. representing something that doesn\u2019t conform to the external object), does that not already presuppose that sensations contain representational content (even if false)?<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* Can Ring\u2019s distinction between strict and non-strict ideas accommodate the status of materially false sensations in Descartes?<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* Does rejecting (2) force us to reconceive materially false ideas? <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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7.<\/strong> Could the notion of \u201cthe idea of a sensation\u201d (a reflective, representational idea about one\u2019s sensation) serve to mediate between pure sensations and proper ideas?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n


* Perhaps what we call \u201csensory ideas\u201d in Descartes are properly these reflective ideas, not the raw sensation themselves.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* Does this move vindicate Smith\u2019s rejection of (2) while still giving sense to talk of ideas of sensations?<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* Would that conception still leave some residual tension in the triad? <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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8.<\/strong> If we accept Ring\u2019s resolution, what criteria distinguish when an idea is \u201cstrict (representational)\u201d versus \u201cnon-strict (object of awareness)\u201d in practice?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n


* Is there a principled, Descartes-style test for when \u201cidea\u201d is used in one sense or the other?<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* Might that risk circularity or ad hoc splitting of usages?<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* How would one respond to a critic who accuses this of quietly reintroducing an equivocation? <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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9. Is there textual warrant in Descartes for the assertion that sensations \u201ccontain no objectively real representational content\u201d (i.e. are not tanquam rerum imagines<\/em>)?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n


* Ring\u2019s position hinges on that denial.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* But are there passages that seem to ascribe representational content even to sensory ideas (for example, in the Passions<\/em>, or in the Principles<\/em>)?<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* How should one weigh those against the stronger claims? <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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10.<\/strong> Assuming the triad is resolved by rejecting (2) in the strict sense, are there other lurking contradictions or tensions introduced elsewhere in Descartes\u2019s system (e.g. in the relation between the mind and body, or the role of God as guarantor) by this move?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n


* For instance, does it undermine how Descartes uses sensation to ground his proof that God is no deceiver?<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* Or does it affect the coherence of the union of mind and body, insofar as he sometimes seems to treat sensations as bridging the two?<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

* Could Smith press a dialectical \u201csecond round\u201d by showing that rejecting (2) destabilizes some other Cartesian commitments? <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Below are compact, verbatim passages (with standard scholarly references and page numbers) that appear to ascribe some representational direction to sensory items\u2014e.g., speaking of sensations as referred to external objects or as of something in bodies. I give CSM and AT references and include stable, accessible URLs that reproduce the same English wording. <\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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  1. Principles of Philosophy<\/em> I, \u00a770<\/strong> <\/mark><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
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    \u201cIt is clear, then, that when we say that we perceive colours in objects, this is really just the same as saying that we perceive something in the objects whose nature we do not know, but which produces in us a certain very clear and vivid sensation which we call the sensation of colour.\u201d (CSM I: 218; AT VIIIA: 34. Accessible in secondary literature quoting the CSM text verbatim:) <\/span> <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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    1. Passions of the Soul<\/em> I, \u00a723 (surrounding Descartes\u2019s tripartite distinction)<\/strong> <\/mark><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
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      \u201cThus, when we see the light of a torch and hear the sound of a bell, the sound and the light are two different actions which, simply by arousing two different movements in some of our nerves and, through them, in our brain, give the soul two different sensations. And we refer these sensations to the subjects we suppose to be their causes in such a way that we think we see the torch itself and hear the bell, and not that we have sensory perception merely of the movements coming from these objects.\u201d (CSM I: 337; AT XI: 346.) <\/span> <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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      1. Passions of the Soul<\/em> I, \u00a725<\/strong> <\/mark><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
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        \u201cNow all our perceptions\u2014those that we relate to objects outside us and those that we relate to the various states of our body\u2014are indeed passions with respect to our soul, taking \u2018passion\u2019 in its most general sense; but we usually restrict the term \u2018passion\u2019 to signify only perceptions that relate to the soul itself.\u201d (CSM I: 337; AT XI: 347\u2013348) <\/span> <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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        1. Principles of Philosophy<\/em> I, \u00a768 (useful for the contrast Descartes draws between sensations as thoughts and our tendency to take them as in objects)<\/strong> <\/mark><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
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          \u201cIn order to distinguish what is clear in this connection from what is obscure, we must be very careful to note that pain and colour and so on are clearly and distinctly perceived when they are regarded merely as sensations or thoughts. But when they are judged to be real things existing outside our mind, there is no way of understanding what sort of things they are. If someone says he sees colour in a body or feels pain in a limb, all he is really saying is that he sees or feels something in the body or limb, though he does not know what it is.\u201d (CSM I pagination around \u00a768; AT VIIIA context for \u00a768.) <\/span> <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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          These are the clearest places\u2014in the Principles and the Passions\u2014where Descartes explicitly talks as if sensory items are referred to external subjects or as of something in bodies, even while he immediately constrains what (if anything) they genuinely resemble or present in the objects. <\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          What is it about any of these quotations that supports that a cold sensation contains a representation of anything about external physical objects or of a perceiver\u2019s physical body?<\/strong> <\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          None of the four verified passages you asked about actually supports the claim that a cold sensation\u2014or any secondary-quality sensation\u2014contains a representation of an external or bodily state in Descartes\u2019s own sense of objective reality. <\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          Here\u2019s why, case by case: <\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          1. <\/strong>Principles<\/em> I.70<\/strong> <\/mark><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          \u201cWe perceive something in the objects whose nature we do not know, but which produces in us a certain very clear and vivid sensation which we call the sensation of colour.\u201d (AT VIIIA 34; CSM I 218) <\/span> <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

          The grammar might sound representational (\u201cwe perceive something in the objects\u201d), but Descartes immediately empties that phrase of intentional content: what we perceive in the objects is unknown in nature. The sensation of colour is the only item clearly and distinctly known; the \u201csomething in the objects\u201d is merely the hidden cause. Thus, the quotation denies rather than affirms that the sensation itself represents that cause. It establishes an epistemic correlation, not a representational containment. <\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          2. <\/strong>Passions<\/em> I.23<\/strong> <\/mark><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          \u201cWe refer these sensations to the subjects we suppose to be their causes in such a way that we think we see the torch itself and hear the bell\u2026\u201d (AT XI 346; CSM I 337) <\/span> <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

          The verb \u201crefer\u201d (rapportons) describes an act of judgment or inclination, not a representational structure internal to the sensation. Descartes\u2019s next clause\u2014\u201cwe think we see the torch itself\u201d\u2014marks this as a cognitive misdirection of the will, not a property of the sensation\u2019s content. The sensation\u2019s formal being is just a mode of thought; the reference is the soul\u2019s interpretive act. So this passage explicitly separates presentation (the feeling) from representation (the mental act of taking-as). <\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          3. Passions<\/em> I.25<\/mark><\/strong> <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          \u201cAll our perceptions \u2026 are indeed passions with respect to our soul\u2026 but we usually restrict the term \u2018passion\u2019 to signify only perceptions that relate to the soul itself.\u201d (AT XI 347\u201348; CSM I 337) <\/span> <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

          Here Descartes re-classifies sensations as passions of the soul\u2014i.e., internal affections, not depictions. To say that some \u201crelate to objects outside us\u201d simply describes the ordinary direction of attention, not representational content. Their ontological status is as modes of the soul, not as ideas containing objects. <\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          4. Principles<\/em> I.68<\/mark><\/strong> <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          \u201cPain and colour and so on are clearly and distinctly perceived when they are regarded merely as sensations or thoughts. But when they are judged to be real things existing outside our mind, there is no way of understanding what sort of things they are.\u201d (AT VIIIA 33\u201334; CSM I 217) <\/span> <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

          This is the strongest evidence against representational containment. Sensations are \u201cclearly and distinctly perceived\u201d qua sensations precisely because they have no obscure representational reference. The confusion arises only when we \u201cjudge them to be real things outside our mind.\u201d Hence, Descartes distinguishes the phenomenal givenness (formally real mode) from any representational content (objective reality)\u2014explicitly denying the latter. <\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          Conclusion<\/mark><\/strong> <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          Each text shows only: <\/span> <\/p>\n\n\n\n