{"id":35168,"date":"2026-01-04T16:32:17","date_gmt":"2026-01-04T16:32:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/drdavidcring.net\/descartes-ideas\/?p=35168"},"modified":"2026-06-14T18:33:03","modified_gmt":"2026-06-14T18:33:03","slug":"how-my-dtoi-baseline-accounts-for-material-falsity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/drdavidcring.net\/descartes-ideas\/orientation\/how-my-dtoi-baseline-accounts-for-material-falsity\/","title":{"rendered":"How My DTOI Baseline Accounts for Material Falsity"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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[NOTE:<\/strong> See Glossary<\/a> below for definition of all technical terms.<\/span> Hyperlinks are in magenta<\/strong><\/span> or blue or underlined blue hyperlinks<\/u><\/span><\/span>. Click a hyperlinked technical term, then click the blue circle with a white up-arrow \"An in the lower-right corner to jump back to the top of the post. Also see \u201cDTOI & Non-DTOI Baselines For AI Models<\/a>.\u201d For more Cartesian glossary entries consult The Cambridge Descartes Lexicon<\/em><\/a>.]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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A DTOI-style \u201csatisfying answer\u201d to the low-determination question<\/mark><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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The core move is to deny that \u201cmaterial falsity<\/a>\u201d is a predicate that applies only where an idea determinately specifies an object (idea-r-int\/idea-or<\/a>). On the DTOI baseline, in the secondary quality instances, material falsity<\/a> is instead a property of certain idea-s<\/a> (sensation) episodes precisely because they are empty of content with respect to extra-mental essences while still being phenomenally positive and teleologically action-guiding. Their \u201cfalsity\u201d is therefore not content-falsity<\/strong> (false objective being<\/a>) but error-matter<\/strong>: they furnish the mind with the kind of experiential \u201cstuff\u201d that naturally leads it to treat what is not in bodies as if it were there.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Put as a compact thesis:<\/mark><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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MF on DTOI<\/mark><\/strong> = (phenomenal positivity + underdetermined extra-mental reference + built-in inclination to reclassify the sensation as idea-r-int<\/a>) \u2192 \u201cnon-thing as thing,\u201d without any internally false represented object.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That already supplies the satisfying answer: low determination is not a bug that blocks material falsity<\/a>; it is one of the enabling conditions of material falsity<\/a>\u2014because it is exactly what makes the idea apt to be mistakenly upgraded into an object-specifying representational item.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Step 1: <\/strong>Re-state the problem in the right register<\/mark><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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The \u201clow-determination question<\/strong>\u201d can be posed in a misleading way:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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How can an idea be called false if it does not determinately specify any object?<\/mark><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

On DTOI, this assumes (wrongly) that falsity here must be like propositional falsity, i.e., failure of a determinate content to match reality. But Descartes\u2019s \u201cmaterial falsity\u201d is not introduced to capture a mismatch between a determinate represented object and the world. It is introduced to capture how certain sensory modes can be the source of error even though, strictly speaking, error is in judgment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So the question becomes:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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How can a sensory mode that lacks idea-r-int<\/a> nevertheless be intrinsically error-prone in a way that warrants calling it \u201cmaterially false\u201d?<\/strong><\/mark><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This is the question Descartes can answer satisfyingly, on DTOI terms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Step 2: <\/strong>The DTOI taxonomy does the heavy lifting<\/mark><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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Use the baseline labels:<\/p>\n\n\n\n