{"id":46187,"date":"2026-06-29T14:32:05","date_gmt":"2026-06-29T14:32:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/drdavidcring.net\/descartes-ideas\/?p=46187"},"modified":"2026-08-04T00:10:25","modified_gmt":"2026-08-04T00:10:25","slug":"strict-and-broad-ideas-in-dtoi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/drdavidcring.net\/descartes-ideas\/idea\/strict-and-broad-ideas-in-dtoi\/","title":{"rendered":"Strict and Broad Ideas in DTOI"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Introduction<\/mark><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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Few interpretive issues in Descartes\u2019s theory of ideas have generated more confusion than his use of the word idea<\/em>. Modern commentators (and probably all earlier ones too!) frequently assume that the term has a single, univocal meaning throughout his writings and consequently conclude that every Cartesian idea is intrinsically representational, contains objective reality, or functions as an internal image of something.1<\/a><\/sup>See my \u201cTable of Cartesian Commentators on the Status of Ideas<\/u><\/span><\/a>.\u201c<\/span>

<\/span> Yet Descartes himself repeatedly employs idea<\/em> in more than one sense. Sometimes he uses it narrowly (strict ideas<\/a>) for thoughts that are tanquam rerum imagines<\/em>\u2014\u201cas if images of things\u201d\u2014whose defining feature is that they internally represent a substance, attribute, nature or essence, or mode. At other times he employs idea<\/em> far more broadly (broad ideas) for any<\/em> immediate conscious modification of thought, including sensations, passions, volitions, and other mental acts that need not contain an internal representatum<\/em> at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The failure to distinguish these two senses has produced a remarkable number of interpretive difficulties. It encourages the assumption that every conscious state must possess objective reality<\/a>, obscures Descartes\u2019s explanation of material falsity, conflates phenomenal presentation with internal representation, and makes his treatment of sensations appear inconsistent. Once the distinction between strict<\/a> and broad ideas<\/a> is recovered, many of these puzzles either disappear or become substantially easier to explain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The purpose of this post is therefore not merely lexical. It argues that the strict\u2013broad distinction provides the conceptual framework<\/em><\/strong> within which Descartes\u2019s theory of ideas becomes internally coherent. Strict ideas<\/a> are the bearers of objective reality because they contain an internally represented representatum<\/em>. Broad ideas<\/a>, by contrast, are conscious modes of thought whose primary role may simply be to present themselves phenomenologically or to function as law-governed signs without internally representing anything through objective reality. Recognizing this distinction clarifies why only some Cartesian ideas enter the causal argument of the Third Meditation, why sensations can remain genuine ideas while lacking objective reality representational content<\/a> (OR<\/a><\/strong>), and why the representational structure presupposed throughout Descartes\u2019s theory of ideas (DTOI) differs fundamentally from the interpretation commonly attributed to Descartes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Why this passage matters in the Third Meditation<\/mark><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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\u201cSome of my thoughts are, as it were, the images of things, and it is only in these cases that the term \u2018idea\u2019 is strictly appropriate\u2014for example, when I think of a man, or a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or God. Other thoughts have various additional forms: thus, when I will, or am afraid, or affirm, or deny, there is always a particular thing which I take as the object of my thought, but my thought includes something more than the likeness of that thing. Some thoughts in this category are called volitions or emotions, while others are called judgments.\u201d (Meditations on First Philosophy<\/em>, Third Meditation: AT VII 36\u201337<\/a>; CSM II, 25\u201326<\/a>)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Quaedam ex meis cogitationibus tanquam rerum imagines esse videntur, quibus solis proprie ideae nomen competit: ut cum hominem, vel Chimaeram, vel Coelum, vel Angelum, vel Deum cogito. Aliae vero alias quasdam formas praeterea habent: ut cum volo, cum timeo, cum affirmo, cum nego, semper quidem aliquam rem ut objectum meae cogitationis apprehendo, sed aliquid etiam amplius quam istius rei similitudinem cogitatio mea continet. Et ex hoc genere cogitationum aliae voluntates, aliae affectus, aliae judicia vocantur<\/em>. (AT VII 36\u201337<\/a>):<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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The phrase \u201ctanquam rerum imagines<\/em>\u201d (\u201cas if images of things\u201d) carries the famous \u201cas if\u201d [tanquam<\/em>] qualifier that signals Descartes is speaking analogically: ideas in the strict sense<\/a> are like<\/strong><\/em> images, not literally<\/em> pictures in the mind. The \u201cadditional forms\u201d (alias quasdam formas praeterea<\/em>) mark the non-representational<\/em><\/strong> overlay\u2014volitions, emotions, and judgments\u2014that turns a bare idea into a full mental act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Descartes surgically restricts the term \u2018idea\u2019 strictly<\/em> to those thoughts that possess objective reality<\/a> (internal<\/em> representational content) because \u201cimage-like\u201d thoughts can later be weighed for their degrees of objective perfection and subjected to the causal adequacy principle<\/strong> (a cause must contain at least as much reality or perfection as it imparts to its effect). Volitions, fears, affirmations, and denials, by contrast, contain an extra formal component (the act of willing, fearing, etc.) that is not itself representational.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The passage foreshadows the later discussion of material falsity (and ideas\/sensations of secondary qualities) and the \u201cstrict idea<\/a> model.\u201d Descartes does not limit his use of idea only strictly but often broadens its use to contents of awareness when thinking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Michael<\/a> Moriarty\u2019s<\/a> \"An Oxford World\u2019s Classics translation<\/a> (2008, p. 25) renders the key opening quotation almost identically: \u201csome of my thoughts are as it were the images of things,\u201d preserving the \u201cas it were\u201d and the strict-proper-use of idea. The rest of the paragraph follows the same logical architecture as CSM, though with slightly more contemporary phrasing in the list of \u2018additional forms.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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This passage is foundational for my interpretation. Let me draw out why it\u2019s so damaging to the weaker universal representational thesis that all ideas are representational.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Descartes\u2019s taxonomy of thought here is tripartite, not merely bipartite (strict or broad ideas):<\/mark><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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  1. Strict representational ideas<\/u><\/span><\/a><\/strong>\u2014ideas strictly so called, or thoughts that are tanquam rerum imagines<\/em>, \u201cas if images of things.\u201d These alone properly bear the name \u201cidea\u201d in Descartes\u2019s narrow<\/em> sense. They contain an internal representatum<\/em> and therefore carry objective reality<\/u><\/span><\/a>. Examples include the ideas of God, mind, body, extension, triangle, a chimera<\/a>, and a particular person or object. AT VII 36\u201337<\/u><\/span><\/a>; CSM II 25\u201326<\/u><\/span><\/a>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. Simple non-representational presentations<\/strong>\u2014conscious mental modes whose intrinsic phenomenal or affective character is immediately presented to awareness but which contain no internal representatum<\/em> and therefore no objective reality<\/u><\/span><\/a>. Secondary-quality sensations such as cold, pain, color, sound, taste, and smell belong here on the DTOI interpretation. So may generalized fear, free-floating anxiety, or joy considered simply as felt states, when no determinate object is represented. Such states can still possess phenomenal character, affective directedness, bodily location, practical significance, or external causal relations without internally representing a thing through objective reality.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. Composite intentional acts<\/strong>\u2014volitions, emotions, and judgments that combine a strict idea<\/u><\/span><\/a> with an additional formal act. Fearing a lion, willing to raise one\u2019s arm, affirming that snow is white, and denying that bodies exist each contain a representational idea as one constituent while adding the non-representational form of fearing, willing, affirming, or denying. Descartes accordingly says that such thoughts \u201cinclude something more than the likeness of that thing.\u201d AT VII 36\u201337<\/u><\/span><\/a>; CSM II 25\u201326<\/u><\/span><\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
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    This taxonomy classifies kinds and structures of thought<\/em>, not three coordinate species of strict ideas<\/a>. The first category consists of strict ideas<\/a> that contain objective reality<\/a>. The second consists of simple conscious presentations that lack objective reality<\/a> altogether. The third consists of complex acts that unite a strict representational idea with an additional non-representational formal element.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Descartes is therefore explicitly committed to the claim that not every constituent or feature of thought is representational in the objective-reality<\/u><\/span><\/a>-bearing sense. The act of willing, fearing, affirming, or denying is not itself another image-like representation of the object. It is a genuine formal constituent added to the representational idea. The representational nucleus and the additional formal act must therefore be distinguished even when they occur together within a single complex thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    If Descartes already acknowledges non-representational constituents within composite mental acts, then the universal principle that \u201call thought is representational\u201d cannot be extracted from this passage. What the passage supports is a more discriminating account:<\/p>\n\n\n\n