{"id":46187,"date":"2026-06-29T14:32:05","date_gmt":"2026-06-29T14:32:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/drdavidcring.net\/descartes-ideas\/?p=46187"},"modified":"2026-08-31T03:10:18","modified_gmt":"2026-08-31T03:10:18","slug":"strict-and-broad-ideas-in-dtoi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/drdavidcring.net\/descartes-ideas\/idea\/strict-and-broad-ideas-in-dtoi\/","title":{"rendered":"Strict and Broad Ideas in DTOI"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Introduction<\/mark><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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Descartes\u2019s use of the word \u201cidea<\/em>\u201d is undeniably non-univocal,1<\/a><\/sup>Descartes explicitly acknowledges the equivocal use of idea<\/em> in the Preface to the Reader<\/em>: \u201cI answer that the term \u2018idea\u2019 here is ambiguous. It can be taken either in the material sense, as an operation of the understanding, in which case it cannot be said to be more perfect than myself, or objectively, for the thing represented by this operation; and this thing, even if it is not supposed to exist outside my understanding, can nonetheless be more perfect than me in virtue of its essence.\u201d (AT VII 8<\/u><\/span><\/a>; CSM II 7<\/u><\/span><\/a>)<\/span><\/span> but this ambiguity is not itself an overlooked feature of his theory. Modern Cartesian commentators have recognized that Descartes sometimes uses idea<\/em> strictly for thoughts that are tanquam rerum imagines<\/em>, \u201cas it were the images of things\u201d (AT VII 37<\/a>; CSM II, 25<\/a>) [I prefer \u201cas if an image of a thing\u201d], while elsewhere employing the term much more broadly for what is immediately perceived in consciousness, including volitions, emotions, sensations, and other modes of thought.2<\/a><\/sup>For a clear contemporary recognition of these different uses, see Kurt Smith, \u201cDescartes\u2019 Theory of Ideas<\/a>,\u201d in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/em>, Fall 2025 ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2025), especially \u00a71, \u201cIdeas Understood as Modes of Thinking\u201d<\/u><\/span><\/a>. Smith discusses both Descartes\u2019s strict application of idea<\/em> to thoughts that are tanquam rerum imagines<\/em> and his broader formulations according to which an idea is whatever is immediately perceived by the mind. The interpretation defended here therefore does not claim that the strict and broad uses of idea<\/em> have gone unnoticed. The point of departure comes instead with the status of objective reality. In \u00a72, \u201cIdeas and the Formal-Objective Reality Distinction\u201d<\/u><\/span><\/a>, Smith states that ideas possess objective reality \u201cby their very nature.\u201d The present interpretation rejects that unrestricted conclusion and argues that objective reality belongs only to the content whereby a cognition internally represents a representatum<\/em>.<\/span>

<\/span> The strict\u2013broad distinction<\/a> developed here therefore does not purport to discover an ambiguity that Cartesian scholarship has missed. It uses that acknowledged ambiguity to expose a different and more consequential distinction that has not been adequately recognized: not all mental content falling within Descartes\u2019s broader use of idea<\/em> possesses objective reality<\/a>.3<\/a><\/sup>For a comparison of prominent interpretations of Cartesian ideas and objective reality, see my \u201cTable of Cartesian Commentators on the Status of Ideas<\/u><\/span><\/a>.\u201d<\/span>

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The central claim of this post is accordingly the non-universality of objective reality<\/a> within Cartesian thought<\/em><\/strong>. Consciousness, phenomenal presentation, intentional directedness, and even determinately having something as the subject matter of thought do not by themselves confer objective reality. Objective reality<\/a> is present only insofar as a cognition contains a representatum<\/em> with objective being<\/a>, such as a substance, principal attribute, true and immutable nature or essence, or mode. Other features of the same conscious state can be formally real determinations of thought without themselves being objectively real. The crucial question is therefore not simply whether a mental state qualifies as an idea<\/em>, since Descartes\u2019s broad use<\/a> makes that category extremely inclusive. The crucial question is which content within a cognition, if any, is objective-reality-bearing<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This point also prevents the distinction between strict<\/a> and broad ideas<\/a> from being misconstrued as a division of a single cognition into two numerically distinct ideas. Consider the fear of a lion. There need be only one occurrent mental state, the fear of a lion. Under Descartes\u2019s broad use<\/a> of idea<\/em>, that entire conscious state can be called an idea. Insofar as that same state internally represents a lion, however, it also satisfies Descartes\u2019s strict use of idea<\/em><\/a> and possesses objective reality<\/a> corresponding to the represented finite substance. Its fearful character does not thereby acquire objective reality. The fearfulness is formally real as a determination of the mental state, while the lion is represented with objective reality. Conversely, a sensation may phenomenally present coolness, pain, color, or some other sensory quality while containing no representatum<\/em> (item represented) that exists objectively in the idea. Its status as a broad idea<\/a> follows from its being an immediately conscious mode of thought, not from its possessing objective reality<\/a>. Thus the broad use of idea<\/em> extends beyond those cognitions in which something has objective being<\/a> as a representatum<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This distinction has substantial consequences for Descartes\u2019s theory of ideas. Treating objective reality<\/a> as universal across mental content4<\/a><\/sup>See my \u201cWhy Objective Reality Cannot Be Descartes\u2019s Universal Theory of Thought: Burman, Common Notions, and the Collapse of the Strict-Idea Model<\/u><\/span><\/a>.\u201d

<\/span><\/span> obscures his account of material falsity,5<\/a><\/sup>See my \u201cHow My DTOI Baseline Accounts for the Material Falsity of Secondary Quality Sensations<\/u><\/span><\/a>.\u201d

<\/span><\/span> encourages the conflation of phenomenal presentation with internal representation, and makes his treatment of sensations appear more representationally uniform than the texts warrant.6<\/a><\/sup>See my \u201cDo Cartesian Sensations Have Objective Reality?: Strict Ideas, Broad Ideas, and Material Falsity in Descartes\u2019s Theory of Ideas<\/u><\/span><\/a>.\u201d

<\/span><\/span> It also misidentifies what matters in the causal argument of the Third Meditation. The relevant causal demand does not arise merely because a conscious state is called an idea<\/em>. It arises when a representatum<\/em> has objective being<\/a> in an idea and thereby gives that idea a determinate degree of objective reality<\/a>, whose ontological rank fixes the minimum formal or eminent reality<\/a> Descartes requires of its adequate cause.7<\/a><\/sup>See my \u201cInfinite Objective Reality in a Finite Idea: Why Should It Require an Infinite Cause?<\/u><\/span><\/a>.\u201d

<\/span><\/span> Once objective reality<\/a> is restricted in this way, sensations can remain genuine ideas in Descartes\u2019s broad sense<\/a> without the sensory qualities they phenomenally present thereby possessing objective being<\/a> in the idea, while strict ideas<\/a> of substances, principal attributes, true and immutable natures<\/a> or essences<\/a>, and modes contain objective reality<\/a> because their representata<\/em> possess objective being in the intellect at determinate ontological ranks.8<\/a><\/sup>See my \u201cWhere Objective Reality Occurs in Cartesian Thought: OR-Bearing Representata and Non-OR-Bearing Content<\/u><\/span><\/a>.\u201d

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The purpose of my post is therefore not primarily to establish that Descartes uses idea<\/em> in strict<\/a> and broad<\/a> senses. That ambiguity is already recognized. The more significant thesis is that the extension of idea<\/em> beyond its strict representational use does not carry objective reality<\/a> with it. Descartes\u2019s broad category of conscious thought is more extensive than the domain of objective reality. Recovering that asymmetry provides the conceptual framework<\/em><\/strong> for explaining why only some content within Cartesian cognition is objective reality representational content<\/a> (OR<\/a><\/strong>) and for giving a more precise account of representation, sensation, material falsity, and the role of objective reality<\/a> throughout Descartes\u2019s theory of ideas (DTOI<\/a><\/strong>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Why this key quotation matters in the Third Meditation<\/mark><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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\u201cSome of my thoughts are, as it were, the images of things, and it is only in these cases that the term \u2018idea\u2019 is strictly appropriate\u2014for example, when I think of a man, or a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or God. Other thoughts have various additional forms: thus, when I will, or am afraid, or affirm, or deny, there is always a particular thing which I take as the object of my thought, but my thought includes something more than the likeness of that thing<\/strong>. Some thoughts in this category are called volitions or emotions, while others are called judgments.\u201d (Meditations on First Philosophy<\/em>, Third Meditation: AT VII 36\u201337<\/a>; CSM II, 25\u201326<\/a>; bold not in original)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Quaedam ex meis cogitationibus tanquam rerum imagines esse videntur, quibus solis proprie ideae nomen competit: ut cum hominem, vel Chimaeram, vel Coelum, vel Angelum, vel Deum cogito. Aliae vero alias quasdam formas praeterea habent: ut cum volo, cum timeo, cum affirmo, cum nego, semper quidem aliquam rem ut objectum meae cogitationis apprehendo, sed aliquid etiam amplius quam istius rei similitudinem cogitatio mea continet. Et ex hoc genere cogitationum aliae voluntates, aliae affectus, aliae judicia vocantur<\/em>. (AT VII 36\u201337<\/a>):<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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The phrase \u201ctanquam rerum imagines<\/em>\u201d (\u201cas if images of things\u201d) carries the famous \u201cas if\u201d [tanquam<\/em>] qualifier that signals Descartes is speaking analogically: ideas in the strict sense<\/a> are like<\/strong><\/em> images, not literally<\/em> pictures in the mind. The \u201cadditional forms\u201d (alias quasdam formas praeterea<\/em>) mark a non-representational<\/em><\/strong> aspect of one and the same thought. Willing, fearing, affirming, and denying are not second ideas added to a first. They are further forms included in a single cogitatio<\/em> that already takes something as its object.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The reasoning can be reconstructed as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  1. Strict ideas are those thoughts that are \u201cas it were the images of things.\u201d (AT VII 37<\/u><\/span><\/a>; CSM II, 25<\/u><\/span><\/a>)<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. In willing, fearing, affirming, and denying, there remains a \u201cparticular thing\u201d taken as the object of thought. (AT VII 37<\/u><\/span><\/a>; CSM II, 26<\/u><\/span><\/a>) <\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. Descartes distinguishes the \u201clikeness of that thing\u201d from the \u201csomething more\u201d included in willing, fearing, affirming, or denying. (AT VII 37<\/u><\/span><\/a>; CSM II, 26<\/u><\/span><\/a>)<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  4. Objective reality is subsequently attributed to ideas insofar as they represent things, with its degree determined by what is represented: substance, mode or accident, or infinite substance. (AT VII 40<\/u><\/span><\/a>; CSM II, 27\u201328<\/u><\/span><\/a>)<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  5. Consequently, in a fear of a lion, the lion falls on the \u201clikeness\u201d or thing-representing side of Descartes\u2019s distinction. That is precisely the content to which his ensuing doctrine of objective reality applies.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  6. The fear itself falls on the other side of the distinction: it is the \u201csomething more\u201d added to the likeness. It is therefore not another likeness of another thing and does not introduce another objectively real representatum<\/em>.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
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    Descartes surgically restricts the term \u2018idea\u2019 strictly<\/em> to those thoughts that possess objective reality<\/a> (internal<\/em> representational content) because \u201cimage-like\u201d thoughts can later be weighed for their degrees of objective perfection and subjected to the causal adequacy principle<\/strong> (a cause must contain at least as much reality or perfection as it imparts to its effect). In a fear, a volition, an affirmation, or a denial, the additional form of fearing, willing, affirming, or denying is not itself representational. Objective reality, when present, belongs only to the representing aspect of that same thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The key quotation foreshadows the later discussion of material falsity (and ideas\/sensations of secondary qualities) and the \u201cstrict idea<\/a> model.\u201d Descartes does not limit his use of idea only strictly but often broadens its use to contents of awareness when thinking.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Michael<\/a> Moriarty\u2019s<\/a> \"An Oxford World\u2019s Classics translation<\/a> (2008, p. 25) renders the key opening quotation almost identically: \u201csome of my thoughts are as it were the images of things,\u201d preserving the \u201cas it were\u201d and the strict-proper-use of idea. The rest of the paragraph follows the same logical architecture as CSM, though with slightly more contemporary phrasing in the list of \u2018additional forms.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    This quotation is foundational for my interpretation. Let me draw out why it\u2019s so damaging to the weaker universal representational thesis that all ideas are representational.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    Descartes\u2019s taxonomy of thought here is tripartite, not merely bipartite (strict or broad ideas):<\/mark><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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    1. Strict representational ideas<\/u><\/span><\/a><\/strong>\u2014ideas strictly so called, or thoughts that are tanquam rerum imagines<\/em>, \u201cas if images of things.\u201d These alone properly bear the name \u201cidea\u201d in Descartes\u2019s narrow<\/em> sense. They contain an internal representatum<\/em> and therefore carry objective reality<\/u><\/span><\/a>. Examples include the ideas of God, mind, body, extension, triangle, a chimera<\/a>, and a particular person or object. AT VII 36\u201337<\/u><\/span><\/a>; CSM II 25\u201326<\/u><\/span><\/a>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    2. Simple non-representational presentations<\/strong>\u2014conscious mental modes whose intrinsic phenomenal or affective character is immediately presented to awareness but which contain no internal representatum<\/em> and therefore no objective reality<\/u><\/span><\/a>. Secondary-quality sensations such as cold, pain, color, sound, taste, and smell belong here on the DTOI interpretation. So may generalized fear, free-floating anxiety, or joy considered simply as felt states, when no determinate object is represented. Such states can still possess phenomenal character, affective directedness, bodily location, practical significance, or external causal relations without internally representing a thing through objective reality.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    3. Object-directed broad-sense thoughts<\/strong>\u2014volitions, emotions, and judgments that are single thoughts with an additional form. A fear of a lion, a willing to raise one\u2019s arm, an affirming that snow is white, and a denying that bodies exist are each one thought, not a pair of ideas. The representing aspect of that thought may be tanquam rerum imago<\/em> and therefore bear objective reality<\/u><\/span><\/a>. The additional form of fearing, willing, affirming, or denying does not. Descartes accordingly says that such a thought \u201cincludes something more than the likeness of that thing.\u201d AT VII 36\u201337<\/u><\/span><\/a>; CSM II 25\u201326<\/u><\/span><\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
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      This taxonomy classifies kinds and structures of thought<\/em>, not three coordinate species of strict ideas<\/a>, and not a catalogue in which one mental state is assembled from two ideas. The first category consists of strict ideas<\/a> that contain objective reality<\/a>. The second consists of simple conscious presentations that lack objective reality<\/a> altogether. The third consists of single thoughts that take an object and also include an additional non-representational form.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Descartes is therefore explicitly committed to the claim that not every feature of a thought is representational in the objective-reality<\/u><\/span><\/a>-bearing sense. The act of willing, fearing, affirming, or denying is not itself another image-like representation of the object, and it is not a second idea packed inside the first. It is a further form of one and the same thought. The representing aspect and the additional form must be distinguished even though they are not two ideas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      If Descartes already acknowledges a non-representational form within an object-directed thought, then the universal principle that \u201call thought is representational\u201d cannot be extracted from this passage. What the passage supports is a more discriminating account:<\/p>\n\n\n\n