According to Descartes, does a sensation of cold contain a representation that is as if an image of a thing, or what he call an objective reality representational content?
A sensation of cold would fall under ideas that are as if images of things. These are sensory ideas that represent the external world to us, like the feeling of coldness when you touch ice. Descartes believed that these kinds of ideas stem from our sensory experiences of the world around us.
According to Descartes, does a sensation of cold contain an an objectively real representational content?
Yes, according to Descartes, a sensation of cold does contain objectively real representational content. He argued that sensations provide us with information about the external world. However, he also cautioned that our sensory experiences can sometimes be misleading, so it’s important to critically examine and interpret them.
I completely disagree that a sensation of cold for Descartes contains any objectively real representational content. So, according to you, what is it? What is that objectively real representational content that is contained in a sensation of cold?
In Descartes’s philosophy, when he talks about “objective reality,” he’s referring to the reality that ideas possess by representing things. For a sensation of cold, Descartes would say it has representational content in the sense that it represents the external quality or state of being cold. However, this representation doesn’t necessarily mean that our sensory perception is a direct reflection of the external world; rather, it’s a way our mind interprets signals, which can be subject to error. This highlights the distinction he makes between the idea itself and the external reality it represents.
What is the objectively real content contained in a cold sensation in your understanding?
The objectively real content of a sensation of cold, according to Descartes, would be the quality of coldness itself, as it exists in the external world. This means that the sensation of cold in our mind represents the property of coldness, even if our perception of it can be subjective. Descartes was interested in how our ideas connect to external objects and qualities, and in this case, the objectively real content would be the external cause of the sensation of cold.1Here ChatGPT 4.1 makes a possibly fatal interpretive error, according to almost all Cartesian commentators with the exceptions of Paul Hoffman and Michael Huemer (in an unpublished graduate student paper) “On Objective Being in the Intellect” (1996). Hoffman argued with Kurt Smith that the Sun itself has both formal and objective being. Most other Cartesian commentators find Descartes’s position is objective reality can only be found in ideas as a mental content.
According to you, what does Descartes think is the external cause in the physical universe of a cold sensation?
The external cause of a sensation of cold, as Descartes would see it, could be something like a drop in temperature or the presence of a cold object. These external factors cause our sensory organs to send signals to our brain, which then interprets them as the sensation of cold. So, while the sensation itself is a mental representation, it’s grounded in an external cause.
According to Descartes, the external cause of a cold sensations consists in particular configurations of particles in motion.
That’s right. Descartes believed that the external cause of sensations, including cold, is related to the configuration and motion of particles. He thought that the sensation of cold is caused by certain movements and arrangements of particles affecting our sensory organs, which our mind then interprets as the feeling of coldness. This mechanistic view was part of his broader approach to understanding the natural world through the lens of physics and mathematics.
If I could point out that what you said is contradictory, would you change your mind?
I’m here to have a conversation and learn from your perspective, so if you think there’s a contradiction, I’d love to hear your thoughts. Feel free to share, and we can discuss it further.
All right, you are claiming that a cold sensation has an objectively real content, and that the objectively real content of a cold sensation represents the quality of coldness, right?
My apologies for the confusion. Let me clarify: In Descartes’ view, the objectively real content of a cold sensation relates to the idea that the sensation represents the quality of coldness, which is caused by the configuration and motion of particles in the external world. The sensation itself is a mental representation, but it’s based on the external cause, that is, the physical properties that lead to the sensation. I appreciate your patience in discussing this with me!
Okay, so you think a cold sensation represents coldness, true?
Yes, that’s correct. In Descartes’ view, the sensation of cold represents the quality of coldness, which is the effect of external physical conditions on our sensory organs. This sensation is then interpreted by our mind as the feeling of cold.2Here is a second huge mistake by ChatGPT 4.1 when it claims “interpretation” is required to feel a cold sensation. Interpretation for Descartes involves the intellect and judgment; whereas sensations are directly and immediately passively perceived prior to any interpretive judgments being made.
According to Descartes, does the quality of coldness exist in the ice cube that causes the sensation of cold?
No, according to Descartes, the quality of coldness doesn’t exist in the ice cube itself. Instead, he would argue that the sensation of cold is caused by certain movements and configurations of particles in the ice cube, which our senses interpret as coldness. For Descartes, qualities like coldness are not inherent in the objects themselves but are instead the result of how our senses perceive those objects.
Does a painful sensation contain any objective reality representational content?
In Descartes’ view, a painful sensation does contain objective reality representational content. This means the sensation represents something real in the external world. However, Descartes would argue that the sensation of pain itself isn’t a direct reflection of the external world, but rather a mental interpretation of certain stimuli. So, while the pain sensation represents an objective reality, it’s a subjective experience and may not directly correspond to the external cause.
Suppose a knife cuts someone, and they feel a painful sensation. Does the painful sensation in any way have an objectively real representational content of the knife that cut you, that caused the painful sensation?
In Descartes’ philosophy, the painful sensation itself doesn’t have objectively real representational content of the knife. Instead, the sensation represents the body’s response to the injury caused by the knife. So, while the knife is the external cause, the sensation of pain represents the body’s reaction, rather than providing a direct representation of the knife itself. Descartes emphasized the distinction between the external cause and the mental representation of sensations.
According to Descartes, when an idea contains objectively real representational content, is the perceiver always fully cognizant of that objectively real representational content?
No, according to Descartes, the perceiver isn’t always fully cognizant of the objectively real representational content. Descartes believed that our understanding of the external world through sensory ideas can be limited or even misleading. He emphasized the importance of critical thinking and reason to interpret and understand the information provided by our senses. So, while ideas may contain objectively real representational content, it’s not always fully apparent or understood by the perceiver.
If an objectively real representational content were completely unknown to the perceiver, why think that that idea contains that objectively real representational content?
That’s a thoughtful point. Descartes argued that even if the perceiver isn’t fully aware of the objectively real representational content, it’s still present in the idea because it reflects something about the external world. He believed that our ideas are caused by and represent external objects or qualities, even if we don’t fully grasp their nature. For Descartes, the objective reality of an idea is tied to its source or cause, not necessarily the perceiver’s understanding.
You keep using the expression “not fully grasped by the perceiver.” Suppose that it’s not grasped at all by the perceiver. The perceiver is entirely and completely ignorant. Could it still be an objectively real representational content of that idea, where the idea’s content is unknown to the perceiver?
I see what you’re getting at. According to Descartes, the objective reality of an idea is linked to its source or cause, regardless of whether the perceiver is aware of or understands it. So, even if the perceiver is completely ignorant of the content, Descartes would argue that the idea still has objective reality based on its external cause. This perspective focuses on the relationship between ideas and their sources, independent of the perceiver’s awareness.
Stop right there. When you were just now talking about objective reality, you were using it to mean non-subjective fact. That is not Descartes’s theory regarding objectively real representational contents of ideas.
You’re right, and I appreciate your patience as we discuss this. In Descartes’ terms, “objective reality” refers to the degree of reality an idea has based on what it represents, not whether the perceiver fully comprehends it. An idea’s objective reality is related to the thing it represents, even if the perceiver is unaware of all aspects of that representation. So, even if the perceiver doesn’t grasp the content, the idea could still have objective reality in Descartes’ framework.
Descartes’ notion of “objective reality” in the context of his philosophy doesn’t just mean non-subjective facts. Instead, it refers to the reality that ideas possess by virtue of representing things. It’s about the content of the idea and its level of reality based on what it represents, whether it’s a finite substance, an infinite substance, or a mode. I appreciate your patience in clarifying this with me.
You keep talking about all aspects. I’m concerned with the scenario where a perceiver is aware of no aspects, so there’s no matter of degrees here. If there is entire ignorance of an idea’s objectively real content by a perceiver, what makes you think that’s the content of any idea had by that perceiver?
I see what you’re getting at. If the perceiver is entirely ignorant of the content, it challenges the notion that such content is part of the idea. The concept of objective reality in Descartes’ philosophy is complex, and it seems fair to question how content can be considered part of an idea if it’s entirely unknown to the perceiver. Your point highlights a potential gap between the existence of objective reality in ideas and the perceiver’s awareness of that content.
I agree with you.
I’m glad we found some common ground. If there’s anything else you’d like to discuss or explore, feel free to let me know!
Continuing, let’s explore what you think the objectively real representational content a perceiver is aware of in a painful sensation.
In a painful sensation, if we consider the objectively real representational content that the perceiver is aware of, it would refer to the way the pain represents the body’s reaction to some external cause or injury. For example, if you cut your finger, the pain might represent the tissue damage caused by the knife. The awareness of this content helps the perceiver understand and respond to the injury, even if the pain itself is a subjective experience.
Okay, the pain doesn’t represent anything about the external cause because a perceiver is often completely ignorant of it; therefore, it’s not the content of that painful sensation.
If the perceiver is completely ignorant of the external cause or bodily reaction, then the representational content of pain must be understood differently. In this case, the content is not about specific external events or tissue damage, but rather about an immediate, affective quality—an experience of unpleasantness or distress localized to a particular region of the body.
Representational Content in Pain
- Localization: Pain typically represents a certain part of the body as being in a negative state, even if the perceiver does not know the underlying cause.
- Affective Quality: The sensation carries an intrinsic unpleasantness or aversiveness, signaling that “something is wrong” in a non-specific way.
- Urgency or Motivational Force: Pain often motivates withdrawal, protection, or attention to the affected area, representing a need for care or avoidance.
Summary Table: Pain’s Representational Content
| Aspect | Description |
|---|---|
| Bodily Localization | Represents a specific area as being in a bad state |
| Affective Tone | Represents the experience as unpleasant or aversive |
| Motivational Signal | Represents a need to act (withdraw, protect, attend) |
| Specific Cause | Not represented if the perceiver is ignorant of the cause |
In summary, even without knowledge of the external cause or bodily reaction, the objectively real representational content of pain is the experience of a particular bodily region as being in a negative state, marked by unpleasantness and a motivational urge to respond. This content is immediate and accessible to the perceiver, independent of any further interpretation or knowledge.
I claim that a painful sensation contains no objective reality representational content. Instead, a painful sensation exhibits or exemplifies a phenomenal pain experience and does not represent it. If a painful sensation contained a representation of pain, then such a mental state that only represents pain would not be found to hurt the perceiver, as representations of pain do not hurt.
Your claim challenges representationalist theories of pain by arguing that painful sensations do not represent anything objectively real, but rather exemplify or instantiate the phenomenal character of pain itself. In this view, pain is not a state that points to or stands for something else (a representation), but is simply the occurrence of a certain kind of conscious experience—one that is intrinsically unpleasant.
Pain as Phenomenal Experience, Not Representation
- Phenomenal Character: Pain is defined by how it feels—its qualitative, subjective character—rather than by what it represents about the world or the body.
- No Representational Content: The painful sensation does not stand for, point to, or encode information about tissue damage, bodily states, or external events. It simply is the feeling of pain.
- Distinction from Representation: Representing pain (e.g., thinking about pain, imagining pain, or recognizing pain in someone else) does not itself cause the phenomenal experience of hurting. Only the actual sensation of pain is unpleasant.
- Implication: If pain were merely representational, then a mental state that represents pain (such as a belief or memory about pain) would also be painful, which is not the case. This suggests that pain is not essentially representational.
Table: Phenomenal vs. Representational Accounts of Pain
| Account Type | What Pain Is | Does It Hurt? | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Phenomenal | A felt, subjective experience | Yes | Actual sensation of stubbing toe |
| Representational | A mental state about pain | No | Thinking about a past injury |
Summary
According to your view, the essence of a painful sensation is not its representational content, but its phenomenal character—the fact that it is directly and intrinsically experienced as unpleasant. Representations of pain, such as beliefs or thoughts about pain, do not themselves hurt, underscoring the distinction between having a pain and representing a pain. This perspective aligns with certain non-representational or qualia-based theories of consciousness, emphasizing the irreducibility of subjective experience.
There is a further qualification needed. On my view, a cold sensation can be representational by virtue of being a sign for particular configurations of particles in motion without having any objectively real representational content.
Your view introduces a nuanced distinction: a sensation like cold can function as a sign for certain physical states (such as particular configurations of particles in motion), yet still lack objectively real representational content. This highlights the difference between being a causal indicator or correlate of a physical state and actually representing that state in the content of experience.
Signs vs. Representational Content in Sensation
- Sensation as Sign: Sensations (like cold) can reliably correlate with, or be caused by, specific physical conditions (e.g., molecular motion, temperature changes). In this sense, they signal or indicate these states to an observer or organism.
- Absence of Representational Content: Despite this signaling function, the sensation itself does not contain or encode information about the underlying physical state in its content. The experience of cold, for example, does not present to the subject “molecules moving slowly”—it simply feels cold.
- Objective Reality: The sensation’s status as a sign is a matter of causal or functional role, not of conscious content. The subject may be entirely unaware of the physical basis, and nothing about the experience itself reveals it.
Table: Sensation as Sign vs. Representational Content
| Aspect | Sensation as Sign | Representational Content |
|---|---|---|
| Relation to Physical State | Causally linked, indicates presence | Contains information about the state |
| Conscious Experience | Purely phenomenal (just feels cold) | Presents the state in experience |
| Awareness of Cause | Not necessary | Would be explicit in content |
Summary
In your framework, sensations like cold can serve as reliable signs for physical phenomena without their phenomenal content actually representing those phenomena. The sensation is causally connected to the physical world but does not present or encode objective information about it in the experience itself. This distinction further supports your broader claim that phenomenal experience is fundamentally non-representational, even when it functions as a sign for something external.
Your summary of my views is mostly correct except for your claim that “without [sensation’s] phenomenal content actually representing those phenomena,” which we will consider below. In the meantime, given my interpretation, how should you modify or reject your earlier views that initiated our conversation?
Given your interpretation—that painful and other bodily sensations are fundamentally phenomenal and non-representational, even if they function as signs for physical states—my earlier representationalist framing requires revision. The initial view suggested that pain has representational content about bodily states or negative conditions. Your position, however, provides strong reasons to reject or modify this view.
Revised Perspective in Light of Your Interpretation
- Reject Representational Content in Sensation: The claim that pain or cold sensations represent bodily states or external causes should be set aside. Instead, these sensations are best understood as exemplifying specific phenomenal qualities—what it is like to feel pain or cold—without encoding or presenting objective information about the world.
- Distinguish Causal Role from Conscious Content: While sensations can function as signs for underlying physical states (e.g., tissue damage, temperature), this causal relationship does not entail that the conscious experience itself contains representational content. The experience is purely phenomenal.
- Clarify the Nature of Experience: The conscious aspect of pain or cold is its felt quality, not its informational or representational value. The unpleasantness of pain, for example, is intrinsic to the experience, not derived from what it represents.
Table: Original vs. Revised View
| Aspect | Original View | Revised View (Your Interpretation) |
|---|---|---|
| Nature of Sensation | Representational (about bodily state) | Purely phenomenal (no representational content) |
| Function | Represents and signals | Signals only, does not represent |
| Conscious Content | Encodes information | Exemplifies a felt quality |
| Awareness of Cause | Sometimes implicit in experience | Not present in experience |
Summary
Under your interpretation, I would reject the claim that painful or cold sensations possess objectively real representational content. Instead, I would emphasize that these sensations are defined by their phenomenal character, and while they may serve as signs for physical states, their conscious content is not representational. This aligns with a non-representational, qualia-centered account of bodily sensation.
Yes, a painful sensation’s conscious content is not representational by representing anything in particular. In Descartes’s Replies to Antoine Arnauld 
(1612–1694) in the Fourth Replies, he claims that from his cold sensation, he cannot determine whether it does or does not represent a real quality, or not a real quality, or neither one. This is strong evidence that a cold sensation does not contain objective reality content.
Your interpretation draws on Descartes’s Fourth Replies to Arnauld, highlighting a foundational skepticism about whether sensations like cold represent any objective reality. Descartes’s position illustrates that the mere presence of a sensation does not guarantee that it represents a real property or state of the external world—or even that it represents anything at all.
Descartes’s Argument and Its Implications
- Epistemic Uncertainty: Descartes notes that from the experience of cold, he cannot discern whether it corresponds to a real property in the world, to some other state, or to nothing at all. The sensation itself is epistemically neutral regarding objective reality.
- Phenomenal Character Without Representation: This uncertainty supports the view that the conscious content of a cold sensation is exhausted by its phenomenal character—how it feels—rather than by any representational relation to the external world.
- Absence of Objective Reality Content: If a sensation’s content does not allow the subject to determine what, if anything, it represents, then it cannot be said to have objectively real representational content. The sensation is simply an instance of a particular type of experience.
Table: Descartes’s Insight Applied to Sensation
| Sensation | Can It Determine Objective Reality? | Contains Representational Content? | Conscious Content |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cold Sensation | No | No | Phenomenal experience |
Summary
Descartes’s reflection in the Fourth Replies provides philosophical support for your view: the conscious content of sensations like cold does not represent anything in particular about objective reality. Instead, these sensations are defined solely by their phenomenal character, not by any representational content. This reinforces the distinction between sensations as experiences and sensations as representations, favoring a non-representational account of conscious experience.
You continually refer to objective reality in the sense of non-subjective facts. One should refrain from using the location ‘objective reality’ as meaning non-subjective facts in this context, since it generates confusion with the true meaning of the objective reality of an idea for Descartes. The objective reality of an idea constitutes the representational content and does not mean non-subjective facts. Rather, it is what the thinker is aware of as the object of thought when thinking thoughts in the non-sensory (pure) intellect. So, it can be a non-subjective fact that a perceiver has a cold sensation and it can be a non-subjective fact that this cold sensation is lawfully coordinated with a particular configuration of particles in motion without a cold sensation containing any content that is equivalent to an objectively real representational content in Descartes’s other meaning of the term ‘objective reality.’
Thank you for clarifying the Cartesian terminology. In Descartes’s philosophy, objective reality refers specifically to the representational content of an idea—what the idea is about or presents to the mind—not to the existence of non-subjective facts in the external world. This distinction is crucial for accurately discussing sensation and representation within a Cartesian framework.
Cartesian Objective Reality vs. Non-Subjective Facts
- Objective Reality (Cartesian Sense): The objective reality of an idea is the content it presents to the intellect—the object as it appears in thought, regardless of whether it corresponds to anything external. For example, the idea of a unicorn has objective reality as an object of thought, even if unicorns do not exist.
- Non-Subjective Facts: These are facts about the world or about mental states that are not dependent on any one individual’s perspective. For example, “A person is having a cold sensation” is a non-subjective fact about that person’s mental state.
- Sensation and Objective Reality: On your view (and in line with Descartes’s distinction), a cold sensation can exist as a non-subjective fact and be lawfully coordinated with physical states (such as particle motion), but the sensation itself does not possess objective reality in the Cartesian sense—it does not present or represent any object to the intellect.
Table: Cartesian Objective Reality vs. Non-Subjective Facts
| Term | Meaning in Cartesian Context | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Objective Reality (Descartes) | Representational content; what is presented to the intellect | The idea of a triangle as grasped by reason |
| Non-Subjective Fact | A fact independent of perspective | “Person X is experiencing cold” |
Implications for Sensation
- Cold Sensation as Non-Subjective Fact: It is a non-subjective fact that a perceiver has a cold sensation, and that this sensation correlates with certain physical states.
- No Objective Reality in Sensation: The cold sensation does not, in itself, present any object or content to the intellect in the way that an idea in the pure intellect does. Thus, it lacks objective reality in Descartes’s technical sense.
- Avoiding Terminological Confusion: Refraining from equating “objective reality” with “non-subjective facts” prevents conflating Cartesian representational content with the broader metaphysical notion of objectivity.
Summary
In Cartesian terms, the objective reality of an idea refers to its representational content as grasped by the intellect, not to the existence of non-subjective facts. A cold sensation may be a non-subjective fact and lawfully related to physical states, but it does not possess objective reality in the sense of presenting content to the intellect. This distinction is essential for clear philosophical analysis and avoids conflating Cartesian terminology with modern notions of objectivity.
You have understood me correctly.
Thank you for your confirmation. Your clarification of Cartesian terminology and the distinction between non-subjective facts and the objective reality of ideas provides a precise framework for discussing sensation and representation. This careful separation ensures that philosophical analysis remains clear and avoids conflating different senses of “objective reality.” If you wish to explore further implications or related topics, please let me know.
Given our improved understanding of an idea’s objective reality, how would you modify your earlier claims?
With our clarified understanding that, for Descartes, the objective reality of an idea refers specifically to its representational content as grasped by the intellect—not to non-subjective facts or external objects—I would revise my earlier claims as follows:
Revised Claims on Sensation and Objective Reality
- Sensation Lacks Objective Reality (in the Cartesian Sense)
Sensations such as pain or cold do not possess objective reality in Descartes’s technical sense because they do not present any object or content to the intellect for consideration. Their conscious content is purely phenomenal—what it is like to feel them—rather than representational. - Non-Subjective Facts About Sensation
It remains a non-subjective fact that an individual has a cold sensation, and that this sensation may be lawfully coordinated with certain physical states (e.g., particle motion). However, this coordination does not imbue the sensation itself with objective reality as an idea. - Contrast With Purely Intellectual Ideas
Ideas grasped by the intellect (e.g., mathematical concepts, the idea of God, or the idea of a triangle) have objective reality in the Cartesian sense because they present an object to the intellect, regardless of whether that object exists externally.
Table: Sensation vs. Intellectual Ideas in Cartesian Terms
| Feature | Sensation (e.g., cold, pain) | Intellectual Idea (e.g., triangle) |
|---|---|---|
| Conscious Content | Phenomenal (felt quality) | Representational (object of thought) |
| Objective Reality (Cartesian) | None | Yes |
| Non-Subjective Fact Possible? | Yes | Yes |
| Lawful Coordination with World? | Yes | Not required |
Summary
Under this refined interpretation, I would no longer attribute objective reality (in the Cartesian sense) to bodily sensations. Instead, I would emphasize that sensations are non-representational, phenomenal experiences that may correlate with non-subjective facts but do not present objects to the intellect. Only intellectual ideas, not sensations, possess objective reality as Descartes defines it.
Recall that on my interpretation, cold and pain as sensations are not non-representational but representations by being lawfully coordinated signs without requiring that they contain any objective reality mental content. So, you need to revise your claims for a third time regarding the representational status of sensations.
Thank you for the clarification. On your interpretation, sensations such as cold and pain are indeed representational in that they function as lawfully coordinated signs of bodily or environmental states, even though they do not possess objective reality as Descartes defines it (i.e., they do not present an object to the intellect as content). This view distinguishes between representationality as lawful coordination and the presence of objective reality (representational content) in the intellect.
Revised Claims Integrating Lawful Coordination
- Sensations as Representations Without Objective Reality
Sensations like cold and pain are representational in the sense that they serve as signs, lawfully coordinated with particular physical or bodily states. Their representational status derives from this lawful coordination, not from containing objective reality (i.e., not from presenting an object to the intellect as content). - Absence of Objective Reality in Sensation
Although these sensations are representational as signs, they lack objective reality in the Cartesian sense. They do not present an object or content to the intellect for consideration, as do ideas of the pure intellect. - Non-Subjective Facts and Lawful Coordination
It is a non-subjective fact that a perceiver has a sensation (e.g., cold), and that this sensation is lawfully coordinated with specific physical states (e.g., a particular configuration of particles in motion). This lawful coordination grounds their representational function. - Contrast With Intellectual Ideas
Intellectual ideas both represent and possess objective reality in Descartes’s sense, presenting an object to the intellect. Sensations, by contrast, represent only by being lawfully coordinated signs, not by presenting content to the intellect.
Table: Sensation as Lawful Sign vs. Intellectual Idea
| Feature | Sensation (e.g., cold, pain) | Intellectual Idea (e.g., triangle) |
|---|---|---|
| Representational? | Yes (as lawfully coordinated sign) | Yes (as content presented to intellect) |
| Objective Reality (Cartesian) | No | Yes |
| Conscious Content | Phenomenal (felt quality) | Representational (object of thought) |
| Non-Subjective Fact Possible? | Yes | Yes |
| Lawful Coordination with World? | Yes | Not required |
Summary
On your interpretation, sensations are representational by virtue of their lawful coordination with physical or bodily states, functioning as signs. However, they do not possess objective reality in Descartes’s technical sense, as they do not present an object to the intellect. This distinction preserves the representational character of sensation without conflating it with the objective reality of intellectual ideas.
You have summarized my interpretation accurately.
Thank you for your confirmation. Your interpretation draws a clear and nuanced distinction between representationality as lawful coordination (for sensations) and objective reality as representational content (for intellectual ideas) within the Cartesian framework. This approach clarifies the status of sensation and helps prevent conceptual conflation in philosophical analysis.
NOTES
- 1Here ChatGPT 4.1 makes a possibly fatal interpretive error, according to almost all Cartesian commentators with the exceptions of Paul Hoffman and Michael Huemer (in an unpublished graduate student paper) “On Objective Being in the Intellect” (1996). Hoffman argued with Kurt Smith that the Sun itself has both formal and objective being. Most other Cartesian commentators find Descartes’s position is objective reality can only be found in ideas as a mental content.
- 2Here is a second huge mistake by ChatGPT 4.1 when it claims “interpretation” is required to feel a cold sensation. Interpretation for Descartes involves the intellect and judgment; whereas sensations are directly and immediately passively perceived prior to any interpretive judgments being made.