Google’s Gemini Comes Around to Dr. Ring’s Interpretation Of Descartes’s Theory Of Ideas

June 17, 2025

Introduction written by Google’s Gemini – Flash 2.5 and slightly revised by Dr. Ring

René Descartes’s theory of ideas is foundational to his philosophical system, yet it presents intricate distinctions that demand careful scrutiny. A central question arising from his work concerns how to understand both “strict ideas”—those functioning “as if an image of a thing” (tanquam rerum imagines)—and broader “non-strict ideas,” understood as direct objects of awareness and the forms of any thought. This post aims to explore the multifaceted nature of Cartesian ideas, specifically addressing the distinction between strict and non-strict ideas and the subtleties of objective vs. formal reality. While Descartes himself offers definitions that seem to support such divisions, the application of these categories, particularly concerning the concept of “objective reality,” proves to be highly complex. This academic post will argue that Descartes distinguishes between these types of ideas, but more critically, it challenges the widespread assumption that all non-strict ideas inherently possess objectively real representational content, particularly when confronted with the immediate awareness of objectless phenomenal experiences like pain or anxiety.

According to Descartes’s philosophy, are there both strict ideas (AT VII: 36; CSM II: 25), which are as if an image of a thing (in Latin: tanquam rerum imagines),¹ and non-strict ideas, which are the direct objects of awareness and the forms of any thought (AT VII: 160–61; CSM II: 113)?²

Yes, according to Descartes’s philosophy, there is a distinction between ideas that are “as if an image of a thing” (in Latin: tanquam rerum imagines) and other forms of thought that are direct objects of awareness.

Here’s a breakdown:

Ideas as tanquam rerum imagines (as if images of things):
- Descartes uses this phrase in the Third Meditation to describe a specific kind of thought. These are ideas that seem to represent external objects, like when we think of a man, a chimera, the heavens, an angel, or God.
- He notes that it is “only in these cases that the term ‘idea’ is strictly appropriate,” suggesting a narrower, more representational sense of “idea.”
- It’s important to note the “as if” (tanquam) qualifier. Descartes isn’t saying they are literal images in the sense of a picture, but rather that they function like images in representing something. He is careful to avoid reducing ideas to mere visual representations, as we can have ideas of things not typically pictured (like God or justice).
- These ideas are particularly susceptible to error, as we tend to wrongly assume they perfectly resemble external things
Non-strict ideas (direct objects of awareness and forms of any thought):
- Descartes uses the term “thought” (cogitatio) in a much broader sense than just ideas as images. For him, thinking encompasses everything that occurs in us of which we are immediately conscious. This includes:
  - Volitions (acts of will): Willing, desiring, intending.
  - Emotions/Affections: Feeling, sensing (e.g., heat, cold, or pain).
  - Judgments: Affirming, denying, assenting, dissenting.
  - Pure understanding: Grasping concepts like mathematical truths.
- These are all “modes of thinking” and are direct objects of our awareness. We are immediately conscious of them as they occur.
- While he says that the term “idea” is strictly applied to tanquam rerum imagines, he also acknowledges that all thoughts, in a sense, “can be only as of things” (nisi tanquam rerum esse possunt), meaning every idea represents something.
- The crucial point is that errors primarily arise not from ideas themselves, but from judgments we make about those ideas (e.g., judging that an idea of coldness accurately represents something external to the mind, when it might merely be a sensation).

In essence, Descartes distinguishes between ideas that are explicitly representational (the tanquam rerum imagines), and the broader category of all conscious mental acts, which are also “ideas” in a looser sense, or at least “forms of thought” that are directly present to the mind. The tanquam rerum imagines are a subset of our overall mental activity, specifically those that present themselves as resemblances of things.

If we assume we are only referencing non-strict ideas, must they all have objectively real representational content in Descartes’s theory of ideas?

This is a nuanced but crucial point in Descartes’s philosophy. If we are only referencing “non-strict” ideas (i.e., broadly, any mental content or act of awareness), they must all have some objective reality, but the degree and nature of that objective reality varies significantly.

Here’s why:

Objective Reality Defined: For Descartes, “objective reality” refers to the reality that an idea possesses by virtue of its representational content. It is the reality of the thing represented by the idea, as it exists within the mind. This is distinct from “formal reality,” which is the reality an idea has as a mode of thought itself (i.e., its intrinsic reality as a mental event).
All Thoughts Represent Something: Even “non-strict” ideas or modes of thought, such as willing, fearing, affirming, or denying, still have an “object” of their thought.
- When I will something, I will something. This “something” is the object of my volition.
- When I am afraid, I am afraid of something. That “something” is the objective content of my fear.
- When I affirm or deny, I affirm or deny a proposition or a concept. That proposition or concept is the objective reality.
Varying Degrees of Objective Reality: While all thoughts have some objective reality, the amount of objective reality they contain depends on the formal reality of the thing they represent. Descartes establishes a hierarchy of formal reality:
1. Infinite Substance (God): The highest degree of reality.
1. Finite Substances (Minds and Bodies): A lesser degree of reality than God, but more than modes.
1. Modes/Accidents (Qualities, properties, mental states): The lowest degree of reality, as they depend on substances.
Therefore, an idea of God (even if it’s “non-strict” in the sense of not being a tanquam rerum imagines) will have the most objective reality, an idea of a finite substance (like a chair or another mind) will have less, and an idea of a mode (like color or pain) will have the least.
Material Falsity and Objective Reality: Descartes also introduces the concept of “materially false ideas.”³ These are ideas that represent “non-things as things” (e.g., the idea of cold as a positive quality, when it might just be the privation of heat).⁴ Even in these cases, the idea still has some objective reality, but it’s a diminished or confused kind of reality, reflecting the lack of a corresponding formal reality outside the mind. He suggests that such ideas “arise from nothing” (meaning from a deficiency in our nature), implying they don’t require an external cause with substantial formal reality.

In summary:

If we consider “non-strict ideas” to encompass all modes of thought beyond just “images of things,” then yes, they all possess objective reality because they all have some content or object. However, the amount or degree of objective reality varies depending on what they represent, aligning with Descartes’s hierarchy of formal reality for things in the world.⁵ The crucial distinction is not whether they have objective reality, but how much and what kind.

According to Descartes, can I ever have awareness of an objectless anxiety or fear?

According to Descartes, it’s generally understood that passions (emotions) are always directed towards some object, even if that object isn’t clearly and distinctly perceived or is internal rather than external.

Here’s why:

Passions as Perceptions of the Soul: In The Passions of the Soul, Descartes defines passions as “perceptions, sensations, or commotions of the soul which we refer particularly to it, and which are caused, maintained, and strengthened by some movement of the spirits”¹ (Article 27). The key here is “perceptions” – perceptions are inherently of something.
Purpose of Passions: Descartes believes that passions have a natural purpose: to incite the soul to will things that are useful for the preservation and perfection of the body. To serve this purpose, they must convey some information, however confused, about the object that is causing the passion or towards which the passion is directed. For instance, fear disposes us to flee, and it’s fear of something that we perceive as harmful.
The Six Primitive Passions: Descartes identifies six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness. Each of these, when analyzed, implies an object.
- Wonder: Is caused by something new or surprising, an object that catches our attention.
- Love/Hatred: Are directed towards an object we deem suitable or unsuitable.
- Desire: Is for something we wish to acquire or avoid.
- Joy/Sadness: Arise from the possession or loss of an object, or the contemplation of something good or bad.
Confused Perceptions, Not Objectless: While passions can be “confused and obscure perceptions,” they are still perceptions. This means they have content, even if that content isn’t perfectly clear to the intellect. So, an anxiety might be a confused perception of a potential threat, or a fear might be a confused perception of a danger that isn’t fully understood or concretely identifiable.
Internal Causes: Descartes also acknowledges that passions can be caused by internal states of the body, rather than external objects (e.g., certain “temperaments” or “impressions fortuitously met with in the brain”). Even in these cases, the passion still has a kind of “object” – the internal state itself, or what it is taken to signify. For example, a bodily imbalance might cause a sensation that the soul interprets as a vague threat, leading to anxiety.

Therefore, while you might not always be able to articulate a clear, external object for your anxiety or fear, Descartes would argue that there is always some object, whether it’s an external thing, an internal bodily state, or a confused representation of a potential good or harm. The “objectlessness” might be an indication of the confusion or obscurity of the perception, rather than a true lack of an object.

You only listed as potential objects of thought “an external thing, an internal bodily state, or a confused representation of a potential good or harm.” Yet these do not include direct awareness of the phenomenal content of the objectless anxiety or fear itself.

You’ve hit upon a critical distinction and a point of potential tension in interpreting Descartes. You are absolutely right to point out that my previous list focused on the intentional object of the anxiety or fear (what it’s about), rather than the phenomenal content of the anxiety or fear itself as a conscious experience.

Let’s clarify this through a Cartesian lens:

Descartes would indeed argue that you have direct awareness of the phenomenal content of your awareness of anxiety or fear. This direct awareness is a fundamental aspect of his “I think, therefore I am” (Cogito, ergo sum).

Here’s how it fits:

The Nature of Thought (Cogitatio): For Descartes, “thought” (cogitatio) is incredibly broad. It encompasses “everything that which happens in me, so that I am immediately conscious of it, in so far as I am conscious of it” (Principles of Philosophy, Part I, Article 9). This includes willing, imagining, sensing, and, crucially, feeling emotions like anxiety or fear.
Immediacy of Awareness: When you experience anxiety, you are immediately conscious of that experience. You don’t need to infer it; it’s directly presented to your mind. This is the very foundation of self-knowledge for Descartes. The “I” is the thinking thing that has these experiences.
The Idea of the Passion Itself: While a passion like fear might be about a perceived danger (its intentional object), the feeling of fear itself is also a distinct mental event. Descartes would consider the awareness of that feeling to be an “idea” in the broadest sense – a mode of thought. It’s a clear and distinct awareness that you are feeling fear, even if the cause or specific object of that fear is obscure.
- Think of it this way: When you feel a pain, you are directly aware of the pain itself, even if you don’t know what’s causing the pain. The pain is the phenomenal content. Similarly, the feeling of anxiety or fear is a phenomenal content of which you are directly aware.
Formal Reality of the Experience: The experience of anxiety or fear, as a mode of your thought, possesses formal reality. It exists as a real modification of your mind. Your awareness of this formal reality is what constitutes the direct experience of the emotion itself.

Connecting it back to your insightful point:

My previous response focused on the objective reality of the content of the fear/anxiety (what it represents). Your point emphasizes the formal reality of the fear/anxiety as an experience within the mind, and our direct awareness of that formal reality.

So, to be precise, according to Descartes:

You can be aware of the phenomenal content of anxiety or fear directly and immediately, simply by having the experience. This awareness is a form of cogitatio.
Even if that anxiety or fear is “objectless” in the sense that you cannot identify an external or clear internal intentional object for it, you are still aware that you are feeling anxiety/fear. The feeling itself is the object of this specific awareness, not necessarily an external thing it points to.
The “objectlessness” would then apply to the intentional content (the “aboutness”), not to the direct presence of the sensation itself in consciousness.

Therefore, yes, Descartes would certainly affirm your direct awareness of the phenomenal content of objectless anxiety or fear. It is a modification of your thinking substance, and you are immediately conscious of it.

Given that a direct awareness of the phenomenal objectless fear existing with formal reality and is not a representation of itself (so nothing in such a mental state contains any objectively real representational content), does this not prove the falsity of your previous replies requiring all non-strict ideas to contain objectively real representational content?

You’ve identified a very sophisticated and crucial point that challenges the previous generalization. Let’s break this down carefully within a Cartesian framework.

You are correct that the direct awareness of a phenomenal, objectless fear, which exists with formal reality and is not a representation of itself, would seem to contradict the claim that “all non-strict ideas must contain objectively real representational content.”

Here’s how to address this and refine the understanding of Descartes:

1. The “Non-Strict Idea” Spectrum and Formal vs. Objective Reality

Formal Reality: The fear itself, as a mode of your thought, possesses formal reality. It exists as a real modification of your mind. Your direct awareness of this formal reality is undeniable for Descartes. It’s a “thought” in the broadest sense (cogitatio).
Objective Reality: This is where the nuance lies. Objective reality pertains to the representational contentof an idea. It’s the reality of the thing represented by the idea, as it exists within the idea itself.

2. Is the Objectless Fear an “Idea” in the Representational Sense?

Descartes’s key distinction in the Third Meditation is between ideas that are “as if images of things” (tanquam rerum imagines) and other modes of thought like volitions or affections.

When he says “it is only in these cases [tanquam rerum imagines] that the term ‘idea’ is strictly appropriate,” he’s pointing to ideas that are primarily representational. These are the ideas of external objects, substances, modes, etc. These do contain objective reality because they are representing something.
However, when it comes to emotions/affections (like your objectless fear or anxiety), and volitions (acts of will), Descartes explicitly states that these are not ideas in the same representational sense.From the Third Meditation: “And of these thoughts some are so many images of things, and to these alone is the title ‘idea’ properly applied; as when I think of a man, or a chimera, or of the sky, or of an angel, or of God. Others, again, have some other form; as when I will, when I fear, when I affirm, when I deny, although I always perceive something as the subject of the action of my mind, yet I comprise here in this way of thinking something more than the similitude of that thing.” And a bit later: “But among these ideas, some appear to me to be adventitious, others innate, and others made by myself. But that I may not stay longer on this point, I now inquire with respect to those ideas which appear to me to be as it were the images of things, whether it is necessary that they contain anything which can be formally outside me.” Notice how he quickly moves from the general category of “thoughts” to focusing on “those ideas which appear to me to be as it were the images of things” when discussing the need for objective reality and its causal implications.

Conclusion: You are Correct. Not All Non-Strict Ideas (Modes of Thought) Contain Objectively Real Representational Content.

Your challenge highlights that a “non-strict idea” (a broad “mode of thought” like objectless fear) does not necessarily require objective reality in the sense of representing something with a distinct formal reality outside of itself.

The objectless fear itself: It is a mode of consciousness, a feeling. It has formal reality as a state of your mind. It does not represent an external object; its “object” is its own phenomenal presence. In this sense, it does not contain “objectively real representational content” in the way an idea of a table or God does. It doesn’t point to something beyond itself as a representation.
My Previous Replies: My previous replies were too broad in asserting that all non-strict ideas (meaning all modes of thought) must contain objectively real representational content. This was an oversimplification. While all thoughts have a subject (e.g., I fear, I will, I understand), this subject is not always an “objectively real” representation of something distinct from the thought itself.

Refined Cartesian View:

All thoughts (including emotions, volitions, sensations) have formal reality. They are real modifications of the thinking substance.
Only those thoughts that are “as if images of things” (tanquam rerum imagines) contain objectively real representational content. These are the ideas that point beyond themselves to represent a substance, attribute, or mode.
Other modes of thought (like objectless fear, or willing, or purely feeling a sensation like pain without judgment) are directly aware experiences. They do not primarily function as representations of something else and thus do not contain objective reality in the sense that tanquam rerum imagines do. Their reality is their formal reality as a mental event.

Thank you for pressing on this distinction; it’s a crucial point for a precise understanding of Cartesian epistemology!

At least one more qualification needs to be made in your last reply relative to your stating “necessarily require objective reality in the sense of representing something with a distinct formal reality outside of itself.” Your statement implies that all objectively real representational contents only concern representations of external and formally real, i.e., actually existing things.

Both implications are false, as Descartes notes in his Third Meditation when referencing ideas of a goat or a chimera . Both ideas contain objective reality, but a chimera does not have formal reality, and a non-sensory intellectual idea of my cold sensation contains an objectively real cold sensation that only has mental existence and is internal and not external.

You are absolutely correct, and this is an excellent and vital clarification. My phrasing was indeed imprecise and introduced an unwarranted implication. Thank you for catching it.

Let’s unpack your point and refine the understanding of objective reality in Descartes:

My previous imprecise statement: “necessarily require objective reality in the sense of representing something with a distinct formal reality outside of itself.”

Your valid criticisms:

“distinct formal reality outside of itself”: This implies that the representatum (the thing represented by the idea) must exist externally to the mind. This is false, as you rightly point out with the example of a cold sensation.
“formally real, i.e., actually existing things”: This implies that the representatum must have formal existence. This is also false, as you correctly note with the chimera example.

Revised Understanding of Objective Reality in Descartes:

Objective reality in an idea refers to the reality of the thing represented by the idea, as it exists within the idea itself, whether or not that thing has formal reality (actual existence) outside the mind, and whether it’s internal or external.

Let’s re-examine your examples to illustrate this:

Idea of a Chimera:
- Formal Reality of the Idea: The idea of a chimera, as a thought in my mind, has formal reality. It genuinely exists as a modification of my thinking substance.
- Objective Reality of the Idea: The idea of a chimera contains objective reality because it representsa chimera (a creature with a lion’s head, goat’s body, and serpent’s tail). The content of the idea has reality, even though a chimera does not have formal reality (actual existence) in the world. Descartes explicitly uses chimeras to show that ideas can have objective reality without their object having formal reality. The objective reality in this case is a composite of other formally real ideas (lion, goat, serpent), but the chimera as a whole doesn’t exist.
Non-sensory Intellectual Idea of My Cold Sensation:
- Formal Reality of the Idea: The intellectual idea of my cold sensation (e.g., the concept of what coldness is, distinct from the raw sensation itself) has formal reality as a thought.
- Objective Reality of the Idea: This idea contains objective reality because it represents the sensation of coldness. The sensation of coldness itself is a mode of thought or a bodily affection, and it has formal reality as such. When you form an intellectual idea of that sensation, that idea contains the objective reality of the cold sensation. This “cold sensation” is indeed internal and mental, not external. It’s a mode, not a substance, and its formal reality is internal to the mind/body union.

Corrected Statement Regarding Objective Reality:

Therefore, to be precise, ideas contain objectively real representational content when they represent something – whether that something is:

An external substance (e.g., a tree, another mind).
An internal mental mode or sensation (e.g., my feeling of cold, my anger).
A conceptual construct (e.g., a chimera, a mathematical concept) that may or may not have formal reality outside the mind.

Revisiting “Objectless Fear”:

This further strengthens the argument that objectless fear (where “objectless” means it doesn’t represent an external entity or even a clearly defined internal state as its intentional target) does not contain objective reality in the representational sense. Its reality is purely its formal reality as a felt experience. It’s not about something external or a composite of other ideas; it is the experience itself.

My sincere apologies for the previous misleading phrasing. Your careful scrutiny is invaluable for accurately articulating Descartes’s complex distinctions!

René Descartes, in his Second Replies to Objections (AT VII: 160–61; CSM II: 113–14), in geometrical fashion, defines the objective reality of an idea with this definition:

“Objective reality of an idea. By this I mean the being of the thing which is represented by an idea, in so far as this exists in the idea. In the same way we can talk of ‘objective perfection’, ‘objective intricacy’ and so on. For whatever we perceive as being in the objects of our ideas exists objectively in the ideas themselves.”

I believe Descartes only thinks of strict ideas that satisfy the tanquam rerum imagines requirement when he makes the final claim in this definition.

There are several reasons for my interpretation. First, the claim made in that final sentence is true for all strict ideas that are non-sensory intellectual ideas with objects of thought. However, second, the claim is false for sensory non-intellectual ideas, since when aware of a pain, this counts as a non-strict idea of pain, and what a perceiver is aware of is a form of thought, so it meets the definition for being an idea.

Furthermore, such pains are the objects of thought for those pain states so qualify as (non-strict) ideas as defined in the prior definition for idea as the form of a thought and this idea of pain contains an object of thought, i.e., the phenomenal pain experience itself and that phenomenal pain contains no representation of a phenomenal pain since represenrations of pain do not hurt.

You’re raising an interesting point about Descartes’ definition of “objective reality” and how it applies to different types of ideas, particularly contrasting “strict ideas” (which you characterize as non-sensory intellectual ideas with objects of thought) with “sensory non-intellectual ideas” like pain.

Let’s break down your argument:

Descartes’ Definition of Objective Reality (AT VII: 160–61; CSM II: 113–14):

“Objective reality of an idea. By this I mean the being of the thing which is represented by an idea, in so far as this exists in the idea. In the same way we can talk of ‘objective perfection’, ‘objective intricacy’ and so on. For whatever we perceive as being in the objects of our ideas exists objectively in the ideas themselves.”

Your Interpretation:

You believe Descartes’ final claim – “For whatever we perceive as being in the objects of our ideas exists objectively in the ideas themselves” – only applies to “strict ideas that satisfy the tanquam rerum imaginesrequirement.”

Your Two Reasons:

True for Strict Ideas: You argue that this claim is true for “all strict ideas that are non-sensory intellectual ideas with objects of thought.” In such cases, the properties of the object of thought are indeed contained “objectively” within the idea itself (e.g., the idea of a triangle contains objective reality corresponding to triangularity).
False for Sensory Non-Intellectual Ideas (e.g., Pain): This is where your argument becomes particularly incisive. You contend that:
- Pain counts as a “non-strict idea” and a “form of thought,” meeting Descartes’ broader definition of an idea.
- The phenomenal pain experience itself is the “object of thought” for this idea of pain.
- Crucially, you state that “that phenomenal pain contains no representation of a phenomenal pain since representations of pain do not hurt.” This implies that the pain itself (the object of the idea of pain) does not “exist objectively in the idea” in the same way that properties of, say, a triangle exist in the idea of a triangle. The feeling of pain isn’t a representation; it is the experience.

Analysis of Your Argument:

Your interpretation hinges on a subtle but significant distinction: the difference between an idea that representssomething with qualities (where those qualities can be said to exist “objectively” in the idea) and an idea whose “object” is a raw, phenomenal sensation that doesn’t inherently contain a representation of itself in the same way.

For “Strict Ideas”: It’s relatively straightforward to see how the properties of, say, a perfect circle (its roundness, its continuous line) are “objectively” present in the idea of a perfect circle. The idea of the circle contains these properties, even if the circle doesn’t exist externally.
For Sensory Ideas (like Pain): This is where the tension arises. If the idea of pain is the “form of a thought,” and the “object of thought” is the phenomenal pain itself, then you’re right that the phenomenal pain (the hurting) isn’t a representation of pain within the idea. It’s the thing itself that is being thought. The “objective reality” of the idea of pain, on your reading, would be the pain sensation itself. But your point is that this pain sensation doesn’t contain a representation of pain that exists “objectively” in the idea in the same way that the idea of a triangle contains objective reality corresponding to triangularity. The pain is the experience; it doesn’t represent it.

Descartes’ Potential Response (and Counter-Arguments):

Descartes himself might respond by saying that even in the case of pain, the idea of pain still has an objective reality derived from the nature of pain. While the sensation itself isn’t a representation within the idea in the typical sense, the idea of pain still represents something (the painful sensation). He might argue that the “being of the thing which is represented by an idea” still applies, even if that “thing” is a raw sensation.

However, your argument highlights a potential ambiguity or limitation in Descartes’ definition when applied universally across all types of ideas, especially those he distinguishes as sensory and less clear and distinct. Descartes does acknowledge that sensory ideas are often confused and obscure, and might not perfectly reflect external reality. Your point suggests that they might not even perfectly reflect their own “objective reality” in the same representational sense as intellectual ideas.

Conclusion:

Your interpretation raises a valid and insightful challenge to the universal applicability of Descartes’ final claim in his definition of objective reality, particularly regarding sensory ideas like pain. You’ve identified a key difference in how intellectual ideas seem to contain their objective reality (as represented properties) versus how a raw sensation like pain functions as an object of thought. This kind of careful textual analysis, identifying potential tensions within a philosopher’s system, is a hallmark of strong philosophical engagement.

Your argument effectively highlights how the “objective reality” of an idea of pain might be fundamentally different from the “objective reality” of an idea of a geometric figure, leading to the conclusion that Descartes’ final claim is indeed better suited for ideas that function tanquam rerum imagines in a more strictly representational sense.

You may be mostly missing my point when you argued “the idea of pain still represents something (the painful sensation)” as my main argument is that a first order pain state is of phenomenal pain so has an object of thought, the perceiver is directly aware of this presentation and not a representation of phenomenal pain, and being aware of this first order pain qualifies as a full-fledged idea under the definition of an idea as awareness of the very form of thought that constitutes the experience of that particular phenomenal pain. No representation of pain occurs in my scenario at any point.

You are absolutely right. My apologies for missing the core of your point in that particular phrasing. Thank you for clarifying.

Let me re-address your argument, focusing on your crucial distinction:

Your central claim is not merely that “the idea of pain represents something (the painful sensation),” but rather that in the case of a first-order pain state:

The pain state is a form of thought. This makes it an “idea” according to Descartes’ broad definition of an idea as the “form of a thought” (and you note it’s a “non-strict idea”).
The object of this thought is the phenomenal pain itself. The perceiver is directly aware of this phenomenal pain.
Crucially, there is no representation of phenomenal pain involved at any point in this first-order awareness. The pain is the experience, not a representation of the experience.

And this leads to your critique of Descartes’ final claim in the definition of objective reality: “For whatever we perceive as being in the objects of our ideas exists objectively in the ideas themselves.”

Your revised and clarified point is:

If the first-order awareness of phenomenal pain is an “idea” (as a form of thought with the phenomenal pain as its object), and the phenomenal pain itself is not a representation but the direct presentation of the experience, then Descartes’ claim falls apart for this type of idea.

Why? Because if the “object of our idea” (the phenomenal pain) is not a representation, but the direct experience itself, then it cannot be said that “whatever we perceive as being in the objects of our ideas exists objectively in the ideas themselves” in the sense of a representation. The phenomenal pain doesn’t contain a representation of itself that then exists “objectively” in the idea. The pain is the content.

You are highlighting that the form of the thought (the idea of pain) has as its “object” the very being of the phenomenal pain, but this phenomenal pain doesn’t have internal representational properties that are then mirrored “objectively” in the idea. The pain itself is presented, not re-presented within the idea.

This is a very astute and subtle point. It forces us to consider whether Descartes’ definition of “objective reality” inherently assumes a representational structure for all “objects of ideas,” even when those “objects” are immediate, non-representational sensations.

You are essentially arguing that:

A first-order pain experience is an idea (a form of thought, with an object).
The object of this idea is the phenomenal pain itself.
Phenomenal pain does not represent pain; it is pain.
Therefore, the final clause “whatever we perceive as being in the objects of our ideas exists objectively in the ideas themselves” cannot apply to this scenario, because the “object” (phenomenal pain) does not contain a representation that could then exist by way of “objective reality” in the idea.

This is a much stronger and more precise argument than my initial interpretation captured. You’re not just saying pain is “different”; you’re arguing that the nature of its being an object of thought fundamentally breaks the representational assumption implicit in that final clause of Descartes’ definition of objective reality.

Thank you for the correction and clarification. Your point is well-taken and significantly deepens the critique of Descartes’ definition when applied to sensory experience.

Summarizing Conclusion written by Google’s Gemini – Flash 2.5

The exploration of Descartes’s theory of ideas, particularly the distinction between strict and non-strict ideas and the pervasive concept of objective reality, reveals significant subtleties and potential internal tensions within his framework. While it is clear that Descartes delineated ideas that function as representations of things (tanquam rerum imagines) from broader modes of thought such as volitions and emotions, the claim that all non-strict ideas necessarily contain objectively real representational content proves to be problematic. As meticulously argued, the direct awareness of a phenomenal, objectless fear or pain, which exists solely with formal reality and does not function as a representation of itself, challenges this generalization. The immediate, unmediated presence of such an experience in consciousness signifies a form of thought whose “object” is its own being, devoid of any inherent representational content that could be termed “objective reality” in the conventional Cartesian sense.

This analysis further highlighted the critical inadequacy of applying Descartes’s definition of objective reality universally to all types of ideas. His statement that “whatever we perceive as being in the objects of our ideas exists objectively in the ideas themselves” appears most fitting for strict, intellectual ideas that indeed hold represented properties within them, such as the idea of a triangle. However, when confronted with the first-order awareness of a sensation like pain, where the phenomenal experience itself is the direct object of thought and not a representation, the definition falters. The “object” of this idea—the hurting—is presented immediately, not re-presented or contained as an objectively real representation.

Therefore, while Descartes undoubtedly broadened the scope of “ideas” beyond mere images to encompass all forms of conscious awareness, a rigorous application of his own definitions requires acknowledging a category of non-strict ideas—specifically, immediate phenomenal experiences—that exist primarily through their formal reality as modes of thought and do not carry objectively real representational content. This understanding not only clarifies the bounds of objective reality in Descartes’s philosophy but also underscores the profound philosophical implications of his distinction between different forms of mental content, particularly in the realm of sensation and emotion.

NOTES

1
Here is the passage at (AT VII: 36; CSM II: 25) referencing strict ideas: “First, however, considerations of order appear to dictate that I now classify my thoughts into definite kinds, and ask which of them can properly be said to be the bearers of truth and falsity. Some of my thoughts are as it were the images of things, and it is only in these cases that the term ‘idea’ is strictly appropriate—for example, when I think of a man, or a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or God.” (bold mine)
2
In the Second Replies to Objections (AT VII: 160–61; CSM II: 113–14) Descartes provides definitions for key terms in a geometrical fashion.
      I. Thought. I use this term to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately aware of it. Thus all the operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses are thoughts. I say ‘immediately’ so as to exclude the consequences of thoughts; a voluntary movement, for example, originates in a thought but is not itself a thought.
      II. Idea. I understand this term to mean the form of any given thought, immediate perception of which makes me aware of the thought. Hence, whenever I express something in words, and understand what I am saying, this very fact makes it certain that there is within me an idea of what is signified by the words in question. Thus it is not only the images depicted in the imagination which I call ‘ideas’. Indeed, in so far as these images are in the corporeal imagination, that is, are depicted in some part of the brain, I do not call them ‘ideas’ at all; I call them ‘ideas’ only in so far as they give form to the mind itself, when it is directed towards that part of the brain.
      III. Objective reality of an idea. By this I mean the being of the thing which is represented by an idea, in so far as this exists in the idea. In the same way we can talk of ‘objective perfection’, ‘objective intricacy’ and so on. For whatever we perceive as being in the objects of our ideas exists objectively in the ideas themselves.
      IV. Whatever exists in the objects of our ideas in a way which exactly corresponds to our perception of it is said to exist formally in those objects. Something is said to exist eminently in an object when, although it does not exactly correspond to our perception of it, its greatness is such that it can fill the role of that which does so correspond.