Critique of Norman Wells and Cecilia Wee on the material falsity of ideas

October 6, 2024

What are Norman J. Wells’s positions on the material falsity of ideas and what are Cecilia Wee’s (no known photo) criticisms of his views on material falsity as told in the following quotations from Wee’s book Material Falsity and Error in Descartes’s Meditations (Routledge, 2006), 21–24?

Wee writes:

“Wells argues that Descartes followed the late Scholastic tradition, insofar as he accepts that an idea cannot falsely represent (that is, misrepresent) its object. But if this is the case, then in what sense does Descartes take an idea to be materially false? Wells suggests that a materially false idea is seen by Descartes as one whose content is so confused and obscure that one does not know whether it represents to the mind a true object or a false one. In TMD,¹ Descartes describes the ideas of heat and cold as so unclear and indistinct that he does not know whether ‘cold is merely the privation of heat, or vice versa, or whether both of them are real qualities, or neither is’. (AT 7: 44, CSM 2: 30) Thus, Wells suggests, Descartes sees a materially false idea as one whose content is representationally obscure, such that one does not know whether it represents to the mind a thing or a non-thing. He writes:

In such a cognitive situation, our judgements are at risk because, in the presence of a flawed representation, we are in the presence of materia errandi. (Wells 1984: 37)

Wells’s reading of materially false ideas has the advantage that it seems to fit in nicely with the Fourth Set of Replies, where Descartes writes of a materially false idea thus:

[O]wing to the fact that it is obscure and confused, I am unable to judge whether or not what it represents to me is something positive that exists outside of my sensation. And hence I may be led to judge that it is something positive though in fact it may merely be a privation…. (AT 7: 234, CSM 2: 164)*

This supports Wells’s reading that materially false ideas are simply those that are confused and obscure, and hence representationally indeterminate, so that they put the judgement at risk of making a mistake.

However, Wells’s interpretation requires a liberal reading of the Third Meditation. Consider again the relevant passage in TMD (in which individual segments have been numbered to facilitate discussion):

For although, as I have noted before, falsity in the strict sense, or formal falsity, can only occur in the case of judgements, (1) there is another kind of falsity, material falsity, which occurs in ideas when they represent no things as things. For example, (2) the ideas that I have of heat and cold contain so little clarity and distinctness that they do not enable me to tell whether cold is merely the privation of heat or vice versa, or whether both of them are real qualities, or neither is. And (3) since there are no ideas which are not as-if of things, if it is true that cold is nothing but the privation of heat, the idea which represents it to me as something real and positive deserves to be called false, and the same goes for other ideas of this kind. (AT 7: 43–44, CSM 2: ]30, emphasis mine)*

To begin with, Descartes specifically mentions in (1) that material falsity ‘occurs in ideas when they represent no things as things’. This suggests that materially false ideas do have a specific representational content, that they represent no things as things. So such ideas are materially false because they represent falsely, not because one does not know what they represent to the mind.

Again, it is not clear that the passage Wells adduces to support his view does do so. When Descartes talks in (2) about the ideas of heat and cold as ‘so little clear and distinct’ that he does not know what they represent, it is not evident that he thinks that they are materially false solely in virtue of this feature. Rather, looked at within its proper context, Descartes seems to be saying that a lack of clarity and distinctness is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for an idea to be materially false. When an idea is confused and obscure, one is uncertain whether it really represents a thing or not. So, as Descartes explains in (3), since all ideas are ‘as-if [images] of things’ (that is, purport to represent things), an idea that purports to represent a thing when it really doesn’t is materially false. Once again, the most natural reading here is to see Descartes as claiming that a materially false idea is one that represents falsely, not one that is so obscure that one does not know what it represents.

Wells counters the reading suggested above as follows. He agrees that there is an inevitable tendency to interpret a materially false idea as ‘one which misrepresents a non res as a res, … indicating a res instead of or in place of a non-res’ (Wells 1984: 38). He thinks this tendency results from a misunderstanding of Descartes’s assertion at the beginning of (3) that ‘there are no ideas which are not as-if of things’ (a proposition hereafter referred to as S1).

According to Wells, Descartes does not mean by S1 that all ideas are ‘as-if of positive or real things’ (and hence that ideas are materially false when they don’t actually represent such things). Rather, in accordance with Suárez and other Scholastics, he is simply asserting there that all ideas have some object (whether true or false): all ideas must be as-if of things in the sense that they portray some thing (positive or privative). As he puts it:

Descartes’ reader must recognize that when this text [the proposition S1] boldly insists that nullae ideae nisi tanquam rerum esse possunt, Descartes is clearly embracing the classical teaching on simple apprehension as unerringly revealing the truth and falsity of objects. The res repraesentata may, indeed, be a positive res but as Suárez noted, it may not. (Wells 1984: 38–9)

One may have some doubts on Wells’s argument here against the suggested reading. To begin with, this reading has more textual foundation than Wells accords it. It is based not just on the assertion that ‘there are no ideas which are not as-if of things’, but on Descartes’s specific assertion in (1) that material falsity occurs when ‘ideas represent no things as things’.

Moreover, suppose one grants Wells’s reading of S1. It now becomes difficult to relate this first part of (3) to the rest of (3). (3) reads as follows:

[S]ince there are no ideas which are not as-if of things, if it is true that cold is nothing but the privation of heat, the idea which represents it to me as something real and positive deserves to be called false, and the same goes for other ideas of this kind.

How is the assertion that all ideas must have some object (whether positive or privative) relevant to Descartes’s subsequent point that the idea of cold as real and positive must count as false if cold is actually a privation? It is difficult to make sense of (3) on Wells’s reading. On the other hand, if we read S1 more conventionally as stating that all ideas are as-if of positive or real things, the passage comes out nicely as making the following claim:

All ideas are as-if of real or positive things, so if cold is really a privation, the idea of cold (as real or positive) would be false.

Again, Wells’s own view is that a materially false idea is one that is so obscure that one does not know what it represents to the mind. Now, even if one grants Wells’s reading of S1 or the first part of (3), this does not in fact save Wells’s overall interpretation. This is because the rest of (3) clearly indicates that an idea is materially false not because it is representationally obscure, but because its representational content is mistaken: the idea of cold represents cold as real and positive to the mind, so if actual cold is a privation, that idea must be (materially) false.

Wells’s account of materially false ideas accords due importance to the intellectual traditions that could have influenced Descartes. However, it is not quite consonant with Descartes’s text in TMD. Wells argues that Descartes, influenced by Suárez, maintains that an idea must always truly represent its object. Yet the most natural reading of TMD is the one that sees Descartes as holding that a materially false idea is one that somehow falsely represents. The Cartesian idea thus differs from the Suárezian simplex apprehensio in that it can sometimes exhibit ‘difformity’ with what it purports to represent.”

ChatGPT 4.0:

[1 of 2 replies below]

Norman J. Wells and Cecilia Wee (no known photo) present differing interpretations of Descartes’s concept of material falsity, with significant debates revolving around the nature of how ideas misrepresent objects or are obscured.

Wells’ Position:

Influence of Late Scholasticism: Wells argues that Descartes is influenced by the late Scholastic tradition, particularly the ideas of Suárez, and holds that ideas cannot falsely represent their objects. According to this view, Descartes’ ideas, similar to the Suárezian tradition, are incapable of being false representations.
Obscurity and Confusion: Wells suggests that an idea is materially false when it is so confused and obscure that one does not know whether it represents a true or false object. This lack of clarity makes it impossible to judge if the idea corresponds to something real or non-existent. He uses Descartes’ example of heat and cold, where Descartes expresses uncertainty over whether these sensations represent actual qualities or merely privations. According to Wells, this obscurity of representation is what constitutes material falsity.
Representational Indeterminacy: Wells interprets material falsity as representational indeterminacy: ideas are materially false because their content is too unclear to determine what they represent. In this sense, these ideas do not outright misrepresent but rather fail to provide a clear understanding of whether they represent something real or not. Therefore, Wells holds that Descartes regards a materially false idea as one that is flawed in clarity, leading to potential errors in judgment.

Wee’s Criticism of Wells:

Ideas Representing “No Things as Things”: Cecilia Wee challenges Wells by pointing to a different reading of Descartes’ Third Meditation, where Descartes seems to suggest that materially false ideas occur when they “represent no things as things”—in other words, when an idea misrepresents something that is not real as something real. According to Wee, this implies that material falsity is not about the obscurity of the representation, as Wells claims, but about the false content of the idea itself. Materially false ideas falsely present non-things as real things.
Misrepresentation Over Indeterminacy: Wee’d main critique is that Wells’ reading underestimates Descartes’ claim that materially false ideas are false because of their misrepresentation, not simply their obscurity. She asserts that material falsity lies in the fact that an idea can represent something that does not truly exist (like cold being a privation) as if it were a real, positive quality. In her view, Descartes acknowledges that the idea falsely represents non-things as real, and Wells’ focus on representational indeterminacy is insufficient to capture the full meaning of material falsity in Descartes’ work.
The Issue with Wells’ Reading of the Third Meditation: Wee argues that Wells’ reading of Descartes, particularly his liberal interpretation of the Third Meditation, does not hold up textually. She emphasizes that Descartes clearly indicates in the text that material falsity involves an idea presenting something false as real, rather than merely being unclear or obscure. Wee suggests that Wells’ reliance on Suárez’s influence is overstated and leads him to overlook Descartes’ more direct statements on how ideas can misrepresent objects.

Key Differences:

Wells focuses on representational obscurity and argues that material falsity arises when an idea is so confused that we cannot tell whether it represents a true or false object. He denies that ideas can falsely represent in the strict sense.
Wee emphasizes misrepresentation and argues that material falsity occurs when an idea presents something false (e.g., cold as a positive quality) as if it were true, rather than just being unclear or indeterminate.

In summary, Wells sees material falsity in Descartes as a matter of confused representation, leading to uncertainty and error, while Wee criticizes this view and stresses that Descartes’ materially false ideas are false because they misrepresent non-things as things, not merely because they are unclear.

[2 of 2 replies below]

ChatGPT 4.0:

Norman Wells, in his interpretation of Descartes, suggests that Descartes followed the late Scholastic tradition by arguing that an idea cannot misrepresent its object. For Wells, an idea that is materially false is one whose content is so obscure and confused that the subject does not know whether the idea represents something real or not. Essentially, Wells views a materially false idea as representationally indeterminate, which puts judgment at risk of error. He maintains that Descartes considered materially false ideas to arise in situations where confusion about the content of the idea (such as ideas of heat and cold) makes it unclear whether the idea represents something real or a non-thing.

Wells’s interpretation fits with certain sections of Descartes’s Fourth Set of Replies in which Descartes discusses the obscurity of materially false ideas. However, Wee criticizes Wells’s interpretation by pointing out that it requires a liberal reading of Descartes’s Third Meditation. Specifically, Wells emphasizes the indeterminacy of the content of materially false ideas, while Wee argues that Descartes more naturally defines material falsity in terms of misrepresentation. According to Wee, Descartes says that materially false ideas represent “no things as things,” meaning that these ideas are false because they represent falsely, not merely because they are obscure or indeterminate.

Wee further critiques Wells’s reading by analyzing a passage in Descartes’s Third Meditation. Descartes describes material falsity as occurring when an idea represents a non-thing (such as a privation) as if it were a real thing. Wee argues that Wells overlooks this aspect of material falsity. While Wells focuses on obscurity and indeterminacy as the defining features of materially false ideas, Wee insists that Descartes’s notion of material falsity primarily involves misrepresentation. The key issue, for Wee, is not whether the idea is unclear or indistinct, but whether it portrays something false as real—such as the idea of cold as a real and positive thing, when it might actually be a privation.

In sum, Wells’s interpretation of material falsity emphasizes representational obscurity, while Wee critiques this view and emphasizes misrepresentation as the core of Descartes’s concept of material falsity. According to Wee, a materially false idea is not just unclear but actually false because it falsely portrays something as real that is not.

I believe that Wells is correct and Wee’s position on material falsity is incorrect. It cannot be that materially false ideas intrinsically misrepresent, as Wee’s position requires, or it would follow that God would be a deceiver in implanting such inherently false misrepresentations in human mind’s.

ChatGPT 4.0:

You raise an interesting and thoughtful objection to Cecilia Wee’s interpretation of material falsity in Descartes. The concern that materially false ideas might intrinsically misrepresent, as Wee claims, could indeed raise the troubling theological issue that God, in creating human minds with such ideas, might be implicated in deception. Let me further elaborate on both perspectives and how your objection challenges Wee’s view.

Norman Wells’s Position: Wells argues that materially false ideas are those that are so confused and obscure that the person does not know whether the idea represents something real or not. For Wells, the problem lies in the representational indeterminacy of the idea, not in its intrinsic falsity. This allows for a distinction between confusion and misrepresentation. Since these ideas are confused and obscure, they do not clearly present something as real when it is not; rather, they leave the subject in a state of uncertainty. This avoids attributing any inherent deception to these ideas, as they are not presenting falsehoods as truths but are simply unclear. This approach would protect Descartes’s view of God as benevolent and not a deceiver.

Support for Wells: By this reasoning, God would not be responsible for deception because these ideas are not inherently false; they are simply unclear or confused, leaving room for human error in judgment. Humans, through their intellectual faculties, can eventually clear up the confusion through reasoning and come to correct judgments. This aligns with Descartes’s overall project of establishing clear and distinct ideas as the foundation for true knowledge.
Cecilia Wee’s Position: Wee, on the other hand, claims that materially false ideas misrepresent things, portraying non-things as things. For her, a materially false idea is not simply obscure or indeterminate but actively false in the sense that it presents something as real and positive (like cold as a real quality) when, in fact, it is not. According to Wee, this misrepresentation makes the idea materially false because it presents an incorrect reality to the mind.

Challenge to Wee: Your critique points to a significant theological concern. If materially false ideas were inherently misrepresentative, this would imply that God created humans with ideas that are intrinsically false or deceptive. Given Descartes’s insistence on the goodness of God and the avoidance of any accusation of divine deception, Wee’s position seems to raise a serious problem. If God implanted false ideas in human minds, that would contradict Descartes’s belief in a benevolent God who ensures that humans are not naturally deceived.
Resolving the Theological Issue: Your objection underscores that Wells’s position might be more consistent with Descartes’s broader theological commitments. For Descartes, God is supremely good, and it would be inconsistent with this goodness for God to plant intrinsically false ideas in human minds. Instead, God gives humans the ability to form ideas that may be confused or obscure, but not inherently false. Human beings are responsible for making correct judgments based on these ideas, which is why Descartes emphasizes the importance of clear and distinct ideas.

In Wells’s interpretation, materially false ideas are not inherently deceptive but are rather the result of human cognitive limitations. These ideas are unclear, leading humans to potentially make errors in judgment, but the responsibility for these errors lies with the individual, not with God. This preserves the doctrine that God is not a deceiver.
Conclusion: Given this theological concern, Wells’s interpretation of materially false ideas as representationally indeterminate seems more consistent with Descartes’s view of a benevolent God and avoids the issue of divine deception. Wee’s interpretation, by contrast, runs into the problem of how God could create inherently false ideas, which conflicts with Descartes’s commitment to divine goodness. Thus, Wells’s view might provide a more coherent reading of Descartes in light of his theological commitments.

Your position, therefore, aligns with a more theologically sound interpretation of Descartes’s philosophy, and it underscores a crucial point in Cartesian thought: the need to safeguard the goodness of God from accusations of deception.

Wee objects to Well’s view on material falsity because she finds it incompatible with points made in essential quotations she labels TMD from the Third Meditation, where Descartes makes the following points about how to define a materially false idea and how this definition applies to secondary quality sensations, such as a cold sensation:

“For although, as I have noted before, falsity in the strict sense, or formal falsity, can only occur in the case of judgements, (1) there is another kind of falsity, material falsity, which occurs in ideas when they represent no things as things. For example, (2) the ideas that I have of heat and cold contain so little clarity and distinctness that they do not enable me to tell whether cold is merely the privation of heat or vice versa, or whether both of them are real qualities, or neither is. And (3) since there are no ideas which are not as-if of things, if it is true that cold is nothing but the privation of heat, the idea which represents it to me as something real and positive deserves to be called false, and the same goes for other ideas of this kind. (AT 7: 43–44, CSM 2: 30.” [NOTE: The numbering is Wee’s and not in Descartes’s original text; bold numbering not in original.]

Let us consider Wee’s points relative to (1)–(3). Wee points out that in (1)—contrary to Well’s overall view—that Descartes actually asserts that a materially false idea REPRESENTS a non thing as a thing. How can this possibly be consistent with Wells’s reading that such materially false ideas fail to misrepresent since Descartes appears to be claiming that a cold sensation actually represents something that is false? An answer—that is entirely consistent with what Descartes immediately states in (2) following this definition—is to read the word “represents” in (1) as only meaning PRESENTS “a non thing as a thing.” The reason this is more compatible with what Descartes immediately states following this definition is that he cannot tell what his cold sensation does or does not represent, i.e., whether it does or does not represent a privation, a real quality, or neither. Surely, if Wee’s interpretation were correct that a cold sensation ‘explicitly represents‘ “a non thing as a thing” it would be false that Descartes could not know what such an idea represents since he would have to know it does represent “a non thing as a thing.”

Furthermore, Wee believes that when a cold sensation ‘represents’ something “as a thing,” explains WHY such an idea is representing something as ‘positive.’ But this is not the best interpretation for what Descartes has in mind if a cold sensation does not explicitly represent anything.

How can I explain why Descartes believes a cold sensation presents something as positive if it does not represent anything as positive? The reason a cold sensation presents something as positive is because the perceiver is having a positive content of experiencing phenomenological coldness. This sensory perceptual experience, as in all sensory experiences, presents a positive phenomenological sensory content thereby explaining how a cold sensation can present something positive while NOT representing anything as positive. My interpretation also can account for how to understand Descartes’s third point (3) from the key Third Meditation quotation in TMD.

ChatGPT 4.0:

Your interpretation offers a compelling response to Wee’s objection by carefully examining how Descartes defines materially false ideas in the Third Meditation. Let’s break this down step by step and assess how your view addresses the issues Wee raises and provides a coherent alternative explanation.

Wee’s Interpretation and Her Objection to Wells:

Wee interprets Descartes as saying that materially false ideas represent “no things as things” in the sense that they actively misrepresent or falsely represent non-things (like privations) as real or positive things. She argues that this claim is incompatible with Wells’s view, which states that materially false ideas are obscure and confused, leading to indeterminate representation rather than active misrepresentation. According to Wee, Descartes clearly states in (1) that materially false ideas do misrepresent non-things as things, which she takes to mean that they offer a false representation of reality.

Your Response to Wee’s Objection:

You suggest that the word “represents” in (1) should be understood more cautiously, as meaning only that the idea presents a non-thing as if it were a thing, without necessarily asserting that it clearly or definitively represents it as such. This understanding helps reconcile Wells’s interpretation with Descartes’s text, particularly in (2) and (3), where Descartes emphasizes the confusion and indeterminacy of ideas like heat and cold. Let’s consider the key points:

Material Falsity in Terms of Presentation, Not Representation: In (1), Descartes says that material falsity occurs when ideas “represent no things as things,” but you argue that we should read “represents” more loosely as “presents” rather than making a strong claim that the idea fully represents a non-thing as a real thing. This interpretation fits well with what Descartes says in (2), where he admits that he does not know whether cold is a privation, a real quality, or neither. If Descartes is uncertain about what the cold sensation represents, it would be strange to say the idea is misrepresenting something definitively as a real thing, as Wee suggests. Instead, the idea of cold merely presents something to the mind, but it does so in a confused and obscure manner, leaving the actual representational status indeterminate.

Your point is that if Wee were right, and Descartes thought materially false ideas clearly represent non-things as things, then Descartes would know exactly what the idea of cold represents (i.e., a non-thing like a privation), and yet Descartes explicitly says he does not know what it represents. This indicates that Descartes is not claiming that materially false ideas misrepresent in a strong sense but are simply unclear or confused presentations of something.
Positive Sensory Content Without Representing Something as Positive: Your interpretation also offers an explanation of how materially false ideas (like the cold sensation) can present something as positive without explicitly representing anything as positive. This is crucial to understanding Descartes’s third point in (3).

You argue that Descartes’s claim that the idea of cold presents something as real and positive (if cold is a privation) is not about the idea representing cold as positive but about the phenomenological content of the sensory experience. In other words, the experience of coldness is a positive experience for the perceiver—it feels like something real and present—but this does not mean that the idea of cold actually represents a positive quality. This distinction allows Descartes to claim that sensory ideas can present positive content phenomenologically (i.e., they feel like something real and present to the mind) without necessarily representing anything real outside the mind.

This resolves the tension in (3), where Descartes says that the idea of cold is false if cold is really a privation. According to your interpretation, the cold sensation presents something phenomenologically positive (the experience of coldness), but if cold is a privation, the idea does not correspond to any positive quality in reality, and thus, the idea can be called materially false. The falsity comes from the fact that the sensation presents something as if it were positive, but in reality, it is not.
Reconciling Descartes’s Points (1)-(3): Your interpretation accounts for how Descartes moves from point (1) to (3). In (1), Descartes introduces material falsity as occurring when ideas present non-things as things, but in a way that leaves room for confusion and uncertainty, as he explains in (2). The cold sensation is unclear and indistinct, leaving Descartes unsure of what it actually represents. In (3), Descartes concludes that if cold is a privation, the idea deserves to be called false because it presents something as real and positive (through the sensory experience), even though it does not represent a positive quality in reality.

This interpretation keeps Wells’s reading intact: materially false ideas are obscure and indeterminate in their representation, and they lead to confusion and error in judgment, but they do not actively misrepresent in the strong sense that Wee claims. Instead, they present something to the mind phenomenologically without necessarily providing clear or accurate representation.

Conclusion:

Your interpretation successfully addresses Wee’s objection by reinterpreting the word “represents” in a more nuanced way, consistent with Descartes’s broader argument. Instead of understanding materially false ideas as actively misrepresenting non-things as real things (as Wee argues), you propose that these ideas merely present something confusedly and obscurely, leaving the perceiver uncertain about what is being represented. This allows you to maintain that God does not implant inherently false ideas in human minds while preserving the integrity of Wells’s view that materially false ideas are representationally indeterminate.

This interpretation not only reconciles the theological concerns you raised earlier but also provides a coherent reading of Descartes’s key points in the Third Meditation.

There are further problems with Wee’s account regarding Descartes’s commitment to the claim that materially false ideas “arise from nothing—that is, they are in me only because of a deficiency and lack of perfection in my nature” (AT 7:44, CSM 2:30) that Wee cites on p. 94 of her book. Claiming that materially false ideas are caused by a defect in Descartes’s nature conflicts with Wee’s previous claim that materially false ideas are said to misrepresent their correct external causes. As Raffaella De Rosa points out in her review² of Wee’s book: “No explanation is provided of how a deficiency in our nature obscures the idea” (De Rosa, 642).

Additionally, if a materially false idea contains an explicit representation, then Descartes always spells this out in terms of an idea containing some objectively real representational content. If an idea has some objectively real content, Descartes demands that such content both is ‘not nothing’ and ‘must have a cause’ for such a content. Yet Descartes denies his secondary quality sensations (SQS) have such a cause because they “arise from nothing—that is, they are in me only because of a deficiency and lack of perfection in my nature.” (AT 7:44, CSM 2:30) Therefore, his materially false SQS cannot contain objectively real content or they could not arise from nothing as a result of a defect in his nature.

What we should immediately seek to answer is what does Descartes think is this defect in his nature that produces these materially false SQS? The answer is that it is his embodiment that produces SQS because of failure of sensations to have any objectively real mental content resulting in their being obscure and confused.

My interpretation provides what Wee’s fails to provide in De Rosa’s criticism that Wee fails to give any “explanation” for “how a deficiency in our nature obscures the idea.” Our nature provides only obscure and confused sensory ideas because they lack any objectively real content so they do not provide any explicit representations. This lack of explicit representational content, then, can “arises from nothing” since a lack of something does not need a cause. My not having snowshoes does not require any positive causal account to explain such a lack.

ChatGPT 4.0:

Your critique of Wee’s interpretation of Descartes’s account of materially false ideas is well-reasoned and highlights several key philosophical and textual problems with her view, especially in relation to Descartes’s own statements about the nature of material falsity and how such ideas arise from a deficiency in human nature.

Let me break down the issues you’ve raised and elaborate on how your interpretation addresses them:

1. Conflict Between Misrepresentation and Deficiency:

Wee’s position that materially false ideas misrepresent their external causes seems to conflict with Descartes’s explicit claim that these ideas “arise from nothing” and result from a deficiency in his nature. If, as Wee suggests, materially false ideas misrepresent their correct external causes, this would imply that these ideas have some sort of real external basis, but that the mind interprets them incorrectly. However, this is not consistent with Descartes’s view that materially false ideas arise purely from internal deficiencies, not from any real external objects.

As you point out, Rafaella De Rosa’s critique of Wee’s position highlights this inconsistency. De Rosa correctly points out that Wee provides no explanation of how a deficiency in our nature could obscure the idea, since Wee’s claim that these ideas misrepresent external causes would imply that the ideas still have some objectively real content. This clashes with Descartes’s claim that these ideas arise from nothing and are due to imperfections in the mind rather than external objects.

2. Materially False Ideas Lacking Objectively Real Content:

Your point about how Descartes treats ideas with objectively real content further undermines Wee’s position. Descartes insists that any idea with objectively real content must have a corresponding cause. However, in the case of secondary quality sensations (SQS), such as the sensation of cold, Descartes denies that these ideas have any real external cause. He explicitly states that they “arise from nothing” and are the result of a defect or imperfection in his nature.

This point is critical because it shows that materially false ideas like SQS cannot have objectively real content. If they did, they would need a cause, and Descartes explicitly denies that these ideas have such causes. Instead, these ideas are obscure and confused because they lack real content, meaning that they do not represent anything objective or external.

3. The Defect in Human Nature: Embodiment and Sensory Ideas:

You rightly point out that the deficiency in Descartes’s nature that leads to materially false ideas is related to his embodiment. Descartes’s dualism, which posits the mind and body as distinct, suggests that the body, with its sensory apparatus, introduces obscure and confused ideas into the mind, which do not have clear or distinct representational content.

Sensory ideas, such as those of secondary qualities like heat, cold, color, and sound, are produced by the body’s interaction with the external world, but they do not provide the mind with clear and distinct knowledge. Instead, they are confused and obscure because they lack any objectively real content. This is why Descartes can say that such ideas “arise from nothing”—they do not represent anything real outside of the mind, but are simply the result of the body’s imperfect way of interacting with the world.

4. The Explanation for Obscurity and Confusion:

Your interpretation fills the gap that Wee’s view leaves unexplained. You argue that the obscurity and confusion of materially false ideas are directly tied to the lack of objectively real content in these ideas. Since sensory ideas like cold do not represent anything real outside the mind (and hence arise from nothing), they are obscure and confused because they do not have any clear or distinct representational structure. This lack of real content explains why these ideas are deficient and confused, and it fits with Descartes’s claim that they result from a defect in human nature, specifically our embodiment.

In this way, your interpretation answers De Rosa’s criticism that Wee fails to provide an explanation for how a deficiency in human nature obscures the idea. The deficiency arises from the fact that sensory ideas do not have any objectively real content, which explains their confused and obscure nature.

5. No Need for a Positive Causal Explanation:

You offer a clever analogy to explain why the lack of objectively real content in sensory ideas does not require a positive causal account. Just as the absence of snowshoes does not require a cause to explain why you don’t have them, the absence of clear and distinct content in sensory ideas does not need a positive cause. The defect is simply that these ideas lack clear content, and this lack does not need an external or real cause because it arises from the limitations of the body and its interaction with the external world.

This analogy helps clarify Descartes’s point that these ideas “arise from nothing.” Since the ideas are confused and obscure due to their lack of real content, there is no need for a cause to explain them. They result from the inherent limitations of human sensory experience, which is grounded in the body’s imperfect nature.

Conclusion:

Your interpretation resolves several problems with Wee’s account. By arguing that materially false ideas like secondary quality sensations lack any objectively real content and arise from the limitations of embodiment, you provide a coherent explanation for why these ideas are confused and obscure, in line with Descartes’s own statements. This avoids the inconsistency in Wee’s view that materially false ideas misrepresent their external causes, which would require them to have some real content.

Your interpretation better aligns with Descartes’s commitment to the idea that these sensory ideas arise from internal deficiencies in human nature, particularly the body’s role in producing confused and unclear sensations, rather than any misrepresentation of external objects.

This approach also provides a clear response to De Rosa’s critique, showing how the deficiency in human nature leads to the obscurity of these ideas, without requiring them to have any real representational content.

NOTES

1
In her book Material Falsity and Error in Descartes’s Meditations, Cecilia Wee presents the following central passages from Descartes’s Third Meditation that she labels TMD: “At the beginning of the Third Meditation, Descartes tries to classify his thoughts and to determine which of them might properly be said to be ‘bearers of truth and falsity’ (AT 7: 37, CSM 2: 25). He finds that some of his thoughts are ‘as-if images of things’ (tanquam rerum imagines)—for example, when he thinks of ‘a man, or a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or God’. Only these thoughts strictly qualify as ‘ideas’; and insofar as they are ‘considered solely in themselves and are not referred to anything else’, they cannot ‘strictly speaking’ be false. Then there are other thoughts with ‘additional forms’:

“Other thoughts have various additional forms: thus when I will or am afraid, or a firm, or deny, there is always a particular thing which I take as the object of my thought, but my thought includes something more than the lightness of that thing. Some thoughts in this category are called volitions or emotions, while others are called judgements.” (AT 7: 37, CDM 2: 25–6)

Thus, such thoughts include an idea (say, of a lion) with an additional form (of fear, or desire, or judgement) towards the object of the idea. Descartes maintains that ‘one need not worry about falsity’ in the thoughts that involve volitions and emotions. As he points out, ‘even if the things I may desire are wicked or even non-existent, that does not make it any less true that I desire them’. Thus, he concludes that ‘the only remaining thoughts where I must be on my guard against making a mistake are judgements’ (AT 7: 37, CSM 2: 26). It appears then that the only thoughts which are ‘bearers of truth and falsity’ are judgements.

A couple of pages later, however, Descartes qualifies this view. Upon subjecting his ‘ideas of corporeal things’ to scrutiny, he concludes that:

“The things which I perceive clearly and distinctly in them are very few in number. The list comprises size, or extension in length, breadth and depth; shape, which is a function of the boundaries of this extension; position, which is a relation between various items possessing shape; and motion, or change in position … But as for all the rest, … I think of these only in a very confused and obscure way, to the extent that I do not even know whether they are true or false, that is, whether the ideas I have of them are ideas of real things or no things.” (AT 7: 43, CSM 2: 30)*3

After dividing his ideas of corporeal things into these two classes, he then significantly states:

“For although, as I have noted before, falsity in the strict sense, or formal falsity, can only occur in judgements, there is another kind of falsity, material falsity which occurs in ideas when they represent no things as things.” (AT 7: 43, CSM 2: 30)*

Descartes admits now that, although falsity ‘in the strict sense’ occurs only in judgements, there is a certain kind of falsity which applies to ideas (as opposed to judgements)—that is, material falsity. Such falsity occurs when ideas ‘represent no things as things’.

He then uses a pair of ‘confused and obscure’ ideas—the opposing ideas of heat and cold—to illustrate material falsity in ideas:

“For example, the ideas that I have of heat and cold contain so little clarity and distinctness that they do not enable me to tell whether cold is merely the privation (privatio) of heat or vice versa, or whether both of them are real qualities, or neither is. And since there are no ideas which are not as-if of things, if it is true that cold is nothing but the privation of heat, the idea which represents it to me as something real and positive deserves to be called false, and the same goes for other ideas of this kind.” (AT 7: 43–44, CSM 2: 30)*

Descartes had said that all ideas are ‘as-if images of things’, that is, an idea purports to be of a thing. But suppose, for instance, cold is really a privation or absence of heat. Then the idea which presents cold as if of a thing is materially false: it presents cold as if it is a thing, when cold is really a thing’s absence, not a thing at all.

One of Descartes’s concerns in the Third Meditation is to search for means by which he may trace the source or cause of his various ideas. His materially false ideas, he adds, are seen by ‘the natural light’ to ‘proceed (procedere) from nothing’, and to have their source in defect and imperfection in himself:

” . . . if [my ideas] are false, that is, represent no things, I know by the natural light that they proceed from nothing – that is, they are in me only because of a deficiency and lack of perfection in my nature.” (AT 7: 43–44, CSM 2: 30)*

While Descartes does mention materially false ideas briefly in a later passage in the Third Meditation (AT 7: 46, CSM 2: 31), the extended passage outlined above clearly presents his key doctrines concerning material falsity in ideas—at least as they stand at the point of the Third Meditation. For convenience (and to distinguish it from the later brief mention of material falsity at AT 7: 46), I shall refer henceforth to this extended Third Meditation discussion of material falsity as TMD.” (pp. 2–3) (bold not in original)
2
Raffaella De Rosa’s, “Material Falsity and Error in Descartes’s Meditations (review).” Journal of the History of Philosophy 46, no. 4 (October 2008): 641–42, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/251332.

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