Adobe Overview
The article by Norman J. Wells 
, “Material Falsity in Descartes, Arnauld, and Suarez,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 22, no. 1 (1984): 25-50 discusses the concept of material falsity in Descartes’ philosophy, particularly in relation to his debates with Antoine Arnauld and the influence of late Scholastic sources like Francisco Suarez 
.
What references does Wells make to Arnauld’s critiques as found in the Fourth Replies? Asked of Acrobat AI Assustant.
Norman J. Wells references several critiques made by Antoine Arnauld regarding Descartes’ position on material falsity. Key points include:
- Misrepresentation of Ideas: Arnauld interprets Descartes’ materially false ideas as instances of misrepresentation or misapprehension, where an idea represents one thing in place of another. For example, Arnauld claims that Descartes’ idea of cold, representing a positive being, fails to represent a privation and thus misrepresents it (Objs. 4; 7: 206.22-24, 207.11-12).
- Denial of False Ideas: Arnauld argues that no idea can be false on the pre-judgmental level. He states that an idea representing a positive being may not be an idea of cold but cannot be false because it truly represents its object (Objs. 4; 7: 207.9-10).
- Confusion Between Judgment and Idea: Arnauld accuses Descartes of confusing the judgmental level of intellectual knowledge with the pre-judgmental level of simple apprehension, transferring formal falsity from judgment to ideas (Objs. 4; 7: 206.18).
- Critique of Esse Objectivum: Arnauld challenges Descartes’ claim that the positive objective being (esse objectivum positivum) contained in an idea could be derived from the knowing subject, arguing that this undermines Descartes’ metaphysical principles, particularly the proof of God’s existence (Objs. 4; 7: 207.19-24).
- Material Falsity of Cold: Arnauld denies the possibility of a materially false idea of cold, asserting that if cold is a privation, it cannot be represented as a positive being (Objs. 4; 7: 206.22-24).
Wells critiques Arnauld’s interpretations, arguing that Arnauld misunderstands Descartes’ position by failing to distinguish between representing falsely (non-representation) and misrepresentation. Wells also highlights Descartes’ rejoinder, which clarifies that material falsity arises from the relationship between pre-judgmental ideas and judgment, not from misrepresentation on the pre-judgmental level.
Explain in detail with the example of a cold sensation Wells’s point that material falsity arises from the relationship between pre-judgmental ideas and judgment, not from misrepresentation on the pre-judgmental level.
Norman J. Wells uses the example of the sensation of cold to illustrate Descartes’ concept of material falsity and to clarify that it arises from the relationship between pre-judgmental ideas and judgment, rather than from misrepresentation on the pre-judgmental level. Here is a detailed explanation:
Pre-Judgmental Level of Ideas
On the pre-judgmental level, ideas are considered as intellectual operations or mental modes. These ideas, taken materially, do not inherently misrepresent or misapprehend their objects. For example, the idea of cold, as a sensory idea, does not misrepresent cold as a positive being or a privation. Instead, it simply fails to adequately represent its object, whether that object is a positive reality or a privation. This failure to represent adequately is what Descartes calls “material falsity.”
The Idea of Cold
In the case of cold, Descartes argues that the sensory idea of cold is obscure and confused. It does not clearly reveal whether cold is a positive reality (a res) or a privation (a non-res). This lack of clarity means that the idea of cold does not provide sufficient information for the mind to make a definitive judgment about its object. As Descartes states, “I cannot tell whether more reality is represented by the idea of heat than by the idea of cold” (Resp. 4; AT 7: 232.27–233.2). This deficiency in representation is what makes the idea materially false.
Judgmental Level
Material falsity arises when the mind moves from the pre-judgmental level of sensory ideas to the judgmental level. At this stage, the mind attempts to make a judgment about the object represented by the sensory idea. For example, the mind might judge that the idea of cold represents a positive reality (a res) when, in fact, cold is a privation (a non-res). This judgment is false because it attributes a positive reality to something that is not positive. However, the falsity lies in the judgment, not in the sensory idea itself.
Relationship Between Pre-Judgmental Ideas and Judgment
The material falsity of the idea of cold arises from the relationship between the pre-judgmental sensory idea and the judgment made about it. The sensory idea of cold, being obscure and confused, provides the “occasion” or “materia erroris” (material for error) for the false judgment. It does not cause the false judgment directly but creates the conditions under which the mind might misjudge. As Descartes explains, “I call [the idea] materially false only because, being obscure and confused, I cannot judge whether it represents something positive outside my sensation or not” (Resp. 4; 7: 234.10-18).
Not Misrepresentation
Wells emphasizes that material falsity is not a case of misrepresentation or misapprehension on the pre-judgmental level. The sensory idea of cold does not actively misrepresent a privation as a positive reality or vice versa. Instead, it fails to represent its object adequately, leaving the mind in a state of uncertainty. This uncertainty leads to the possibility of a false judgment, but the falsity lies in the judgment, not in the sensory idea itself.
Conclusion
Using the example of cold, Wells clarifies that material falsity arises from the interplay between the pre-judgmental sensory idea and the judgment made about it. The sensory idea of cold is materially false because it is obscure and confused, providing the occasion for a false judgment. However, it does not misrepresent or misapprehend its object on the pre-judgmental level. This distinction is crucial to understanding Descartes’ position and addressing the critiques made by Arnauld and others.
Why does a cold sensation fail to adequately represent its object, according to Wells?
What about a cold sensation makes it have an obscure and confused content?
Does Wells ever claim that the reason a cold sensation fails to represent is because it has no objectively real representational content?
According to Norman J. Wells, a cold sensation fails to adequately represent its object because it is obscure and confused, meaning it does not clearly reveal whether cold is a positive reality (a res) or a privation (a non-res). This lack of clarity prevents the mind from making a definitive judgment about the nature of cold. Wells explains that sensory ideas, such as the idea of cold, lack the clear and distinct intelligibility found in ideas like those of God, the self, or the triangle. Instead, sensory ideas are characterized by diminished intelligibility and representational deficiencies.
Why Does a Cold Sensation Fail to Represent Adequately?
- Obscurity and Confusion: Wells notes that sensory ideas, including the idea of cold, are “obscure and confused” because they do not provide sufficient information to determine whether their object is a positive reality or a privation. For example, Descartes states, “I cannot tell whether more reality is represented by the idea of heat than by the idea of cold” (Resp. 4; 7: 232.27-233.2). This failure to represent adequately is due to the sensory idea’s inability to clearly distinguish between a res and a non-res.
- Deficiency in Representational Content: Sensory ideas lack the clarity and distinctness required to reveal their objects as they truly are. Unlike clear and distinct ideas, which unerringly represent their objects, sensory ideas are flawed in their representational function. This deficiency leads to uncertainty and provides the occasion for false judgments.
What Makes a Cold Sensation Obscure and Confused?
Wells attributes the obscurity and confusion of sensory ideas to the limitations of human cognition and the finite nature of the human mind. He explains that sensory ideas are inherently deficient because they arise from sensory processes, which are less reliable and less intelligible than intellectual processes. This diminished intelligibility is a manifestation of the imperfection and limitation of human nature, as Descartes states: “Such obscurity arises only because my nature is not entirely perfect” (Resp. 4; 7: 234.19-235.4).
Does Wells Claim That a Cold Sensation Has No Objectively Real Representational Content?
No, Wells does not claim that a cold sensation fails to represent because it has no objectively real representational content. Instead, he argues that the cold sensation does have objectively real representational content, but this content is flawed or deficient. The sensory idea of cold represents a positive being (ens positivum) as its objective content, but it fails to adequately represent whether this being corresponds to a positive reality or a privation. This failure is not due to the absence of representational content but rather to the obscurity and confusion inherent in the sensory idea itself.
Conclusion
Wells emphasizes that the failure of a cold sensation to adequately represent its object is due to its obscure and confused nature, which stems from the limitations of human sensory cognition. While the cold sensation does have objectively real representational content, this content is flawed and deficient, leading to uncertainty and the possibility of false judgments. This nuanced understanding helps clarify Descartes’ concept of material falsity and addresses critiques that misinterpret it as a case of misrepresentation or the absence of representational content.
I deny that a cold sensation has any objectively real reality content where objective reality does not mean non-subjective facts, as you seem to be presupposing in your previous answer. Regardless, what would be Descartes’s answer to what is contained in a cold sensation as its objective reality mental content?
Descartes would argue that the objective reality contained in a cold sensation, as its mental content, is the sensory activity itself. In his framework, the “objective reality” of an idea refers to the representational content of the idea—what the idea is about or what it represents in the mind. This does not necessarily mean that the object represented exists extramentally (outside the mind); rather, it refers to the idea’s content as it exists within the intellect.
Objective Reality in a Cold Sensation
- Sensory Activity as the Content: Descartes claims that the idea of cold contains and represents the sensory activity itself as its objective reality. This sensory activity is a mental mode, a process occurring within the mind, and it is positive in the sense that it exists as a mental phenomenon. However, it does not necessarily correspond to a positive reality outside the mind.
- Obscurity and Confusion: The sensory idea of cold is obscure and confused because it does not clearly reveal whether the object it represents is a positive reality (a res) or a privation (a non-res). This lack of clarity is due to the limitations of sensory cognition, which fails to provide distinct and intelligible content.
- Occasion for Error: The obscurity of the sensory idea provides the occasion for error in judgment. For example, the mind might falsely judge that the sensory idea of cold represents a positive reality when, in fact, cold is a privation. This error arises from the relationship between the sensory idea and the judgment, not from the sensory idea itself.
Descartes’ Explanation in His Replies to Arnauld
In his reply to Arnauld, Descartes clarifies that the idea of cold, taken materially, represents the sensory activity itself as its objective reality. He states: “It is a certain sensation, having no existence outside the intellect” (Resp. 4; 7: 233.13-15). This means that the idea of cold does not represent an external object but rather the internal sensory process occurring in the mind.
Conclusion
Descartes would answer that the objective reality contained in a cold sensation is the sensory activity itself, which exists as a mental mode within the mind. This sensory activity is positive in the sense that it exists as a mental phenomenon, but it is obscure and confused, failing to provide clear and distinct content about whether cold is a positive reality or a privation. This deficiency leads to the possibility of error in judgment, but the sensory idea itself does not misrepresent or misapprehend its object.
Your answer of “cold contains and represents the sensory activity itself as its objective reality” cannot be correct since a representation of a sharp pain would not hurt, so a representation of cold would not feel chilly to a perceiver. Therefore, the cold sensation contains phenomenal coolness as formally real and not an objective reality mental content.
You are correct that phenomenal coolness, as formally real, is part of the cold sensation itself and is distinct from the idea’s objective reality mental content. Descartes would likely agree that the formal reality of the sensation—its actual existence as a mode of the mind—includes the phenomenal experience of coolness. However, when discussing the “objective reality” of the idea, Descartes is referring to what the idea represents or contains as its representational content, not the direct phenomenal experience.
Descartes’ View on Objective Reality in a Cold Sensation
Descartes distinguishes between the formal reality of an idea (its existence as a mode of thought) and its objective reality (what the idea represents). In the case of a cold sensation:
- Formal Reality: The cold sensation exists as a mode of the mind and includes the phenomenal experience of coolness. This is the direct, subjective experience of the sensation.
- Objective Reality: The idea of cold, as a mental representation, contains the sensory activity itself as its representational content. This does not mean the idea itself feels chilly; rather, it represents the sensory process occurring in the mind.
Phenomenal Coolness vs. Representational Content
Phenomenal coolness is part of the formal reality of the cold sensation—it is what the perceiver directly experiences. The objective reality, however, is the representational content of the idea, which Descartes identifies as the sensory activity itself. This sensory activity is obscure and confused, failing to clearly reveal whether cold is a positive reality or a privation.
Clarification of Descartes’ Position
Descartes does not claim that the objective reality of the idea of cold includes the phenomenal experience of coolness. Instead, he argues that the idea represents the sensory activity itself, which is a mental mode. The phenomenal experience (formal reality) and the representational content (objective reality) are distinct aspects of the cold sensation.
Conclusion
While the phenomenal coolness is part of the formal reality of the cold sensation, Descartes would argue that the objective reality of the idea of cold is the sensory activity itself, as a representational content. This distinction between formal reality and objective reality is central to Descartes’ epistemology and his discussion of material falsity.
My interpretation of Descartes on the material falsity of secondary quality sensations does hold: “Descartes accepts the formal reality of the sensation—its actual existence as a mode of the mind—includes the phenomenal experience of coolness.”
However, we disagree when you claim “when discussing the ‘objective reality’ of the idea, Descartes is referring to what the idea represents or contains as its representational content, not the direct phenomenal experience” as the direct phenomenal experience and its phenomenal coolness constitutes the entire content of that cold sensation. There is nothing ‘left over’ that might be the objective reality content of that sensation. Additionally, formally real phenomenal coolness cannot be the objective reality content of a cold sensation since the phenomenal coolness is a presentation or exhibition of coolness, while objectively real coolness does not feel cold.
Your interpretation aligns with a phenomenological perspective, emphasizing that the direct phenomenal experience of coolness constitutes the entire content of the cold sensation. However, Descartes’ discussion of “objective reality” in the context of ideas refers to the representational content of the idea—what the idea represents or contains as its object—rather than the direct phenomenal experience itself.
In the document, Descartes distinguishes between ideas taken “materially” (as intellectual operations) and “formally” (as representations of objects). When discussing sensory ideas like cold, Descartes argues that they are “materially false” because they fail to adequately represent their objects. This failure is not about the direct experience of coolness but about the idea’s inability to reveal whether the object it represents is a true positive reality (res) or a privation (non-res). The “objective reality” of the idea refers to the content it represents, not the subjective experience of the sensation.
Thus, Descartes’ notion of “objective reality” involves the representational aspect of the idea, which may include more than the direct phenomenal experience. The sensation itself, while subjectively real, does not necessarily correspond to an external reality, and this disconnect is central to his concept of material falsity.