Investigating Schmitter on Cartesian Representation with Grok 3

Amy Morgan Schmitter, in her “Representation, Self-Representation, and the Passions in Descartes,”¹Amy Morgan Schmitter, “Representation, Self-Representation, and the Passions in Descartes,” Review of Metaphysics 48 (December 1994): 332–33. explains her model for how to understand the mechanisms of representation found in Descartes’s writings stating:

I suggest that one way to understand Descartes’ metaphysical turn in his mature work is as an attempt to ground the accounts he has offered of signification in something further: representation, particularly mental representation. From the start, Descartes explains signification by reference to mental representation: a word, figure, or symbol signifies its objects by prompting the mind to think of those objects. Although Descartes offers detailed and comprehensive accounts in works such as the Rules for the Direction of the Mind of what constitutes effective and convenient systems of signification by way of the relations between signifying element, system, and the objects signified thereby, the mental operations that allow signification to operate, especially that of the “intuition of simple natures,” is never fully explained. It remains to the mature phase of Descartes’ career to crack open the basic operations of our thought by developing the full-fledged doctrine of ideas—a doctrine that makes explicit how an object is represented to a subject.²I [Schmitter] have discussed Descartes’ early work on signification and the problems it raises in chapter 1 of my dissertation. See Amy Morgan Schmitter, “Descartes’ Representation of the Self” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1993), 1–39. Later chapters discuss representation in ideas.

Looking at the doctrine of ideas developed in such works as the Meditations allows us to develop a model of representation, that is, what is involved when Descartes says that an idea “represents” such and-such an object. What I suggest is that a “representation” is a structural whole embracing several, interrelated component parts. The component parts include what I call the “subject-position,” that is, a relation to the first-person subject for whom the representation is a representation. This subject-position is directed at an object, what is represented in the representation (the representatum), through a “vehicle” of representation, which vehicle stands in a particular (and variable) relation to the represented object. This vehicle, I should emphasize, does not as such constitute some tertium quid intervening between the subject-position and what the idea is of; what an idea is “of” is its object, which is directly represented therein. Indeed, in many cases the vehicle is not metaphysically distinct from the object. (If, for instance, the object is a substance, it may be represented through some of its modes, which constitute the vehicle. To be sure, we may also talk of representing a chunk of extension through its color or a mode of extension through a line segment, in which cases the relation of representation is—or should be—considered conventional.) More generally, the vehicle is formed by the interaction of subject and object. The object can be modified by the vehicle, in the sense that what the object is represented as is a matter of the vehicle through which the object is represented. Although I will not argue the matter further here, I do think there is a great deal of textual evidence for this model—particularly in Descartes’ crucial notion of “an idea taken objectively” as well as his use of per, ut, and in the case of materially false ideas, tanquam clauses that modify the represented object as or through something or other. Various of these component parts have been noticed by other commentators, such as Vere Chappell, who remarks on the “to me” relation that characterizes ideas, and Ann Wilbur MacKenzie, who introduces the notion of a vehicle in her discussion of representation in sensory ideas.³Vere Chappell, “The Theory of Ideas,” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, ed. Amelie Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 191; Anne W. MacKenzie, “Descartes on Life and Sense,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19, no. 2 (1989): 163–92.

The model explains and clarifies the range of possible metaphysical and epistemic relations between objects and their representing vehicles, thereby establishing the basis for relying on the perception of objects presented in and though representations.⁴The full development of this model forms the bulk of my dissertation, especially of chapters 1, 3, and 4. For a useful comparison of other seventeenth-century notions of representation, see Louis Marin, Portrait of the King (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), especially the introduction.

This model of representation is particularly designed to allow us to determine the reliability of representations within ideas. For this reason it also serves in Descartes’ theory of error, particularly as it is developed in the notion of material falsity. Although I cannot give an adequate explanation here, I suggest that material falsity is largely a matter of failing to distinguish the contributions made by the subject from those made by the object in forming the vehicle of representation, so that what properly belongs to the representing appears as a feature of the represented object.⁵Chapter 4 of my [Schmitter’s] dissertation discusses material falsity and representation.

Furthermore, because the model of representation contains a “to me” relation and because it turns out that the reliability of the representation requires distinguishing the activity of the subject-position, the account of representation also works as an account of my nature as a thinking thing, a being that forms ideas that represent. I am an active representer, occupying the subject-position in representations and actively directed at the object; indeed, my activity is crucial in generating the entire representative structure, although the contents that properly specify the representation are activated by the thing that appears as the object, and it is the interaction of both that fully characterizes the idea. An idea, then, as a representation, is a whole embracing both subjective and objective components and not some double standing in place of and between the things it represents and the subject.

Why does Schmitter believe that the material falsity of ideas can be explained by the fact that there is a failure to distinguish the contributions made by the subject from those made by the object in forming the vehicle of representation, so that what properly belongs to the representing appears as a feature of the represented object.

What are examples where this occurs?

Amy Morgan Schmitter’s explanation of material falsity in Descartes’ philosophy hinges on the idea that it arises from a failure to distinguish the contributions of the subject (the thinker or perceiver) from those of the object (the thing represented) in forming the “vehicle” of representation. The vehicle is the means through which an object is represented in the mind, such as a mode, quality, or sensory impression, which mediates the relationship between the subject and the object. When the subject’s contribution to this vehicle—such as their perceptual or interpretive activity—is mistakenly attributed to the object itself, the resulting idea is materially false because it misrepresents the object as having properties that actually stem from the subject’s activity.

Why Schmitter Believes This

Schmitter argues that Descartes’ model of representation, as developed in works like the Meditations, involves a complex interplay between the subject-position (the “to me” perspective of the thinker), the object (the representatum), and the vehicle (the mode or quality through which the object is represented). Material falsity occurs when the vehicle, which is shaped by both the object’s properties and the subject’s cognitive or sensory processes, is misread, and features of the vehicle that arise from the subject’s activity are taken as inherent to the object. This confusion leads to an idea that “provides material for error” by presenting the object inaccurately.

In Descartes’ framework, ideas are not intermediaries standing between the subject and object but are direct representations of objects, modified by the vehicle. When the subject fails to recognize their role in shaping the vehicle (e.g., through sensory biases or cognitive assumptions), they project subjective contributions onto the object, resulting in a materially false idea. Schmitter emphasizes that this is central to Descartes’ theory of error, as it explains how misrepresentation occurs without requiring an external deception.

Examples of Material Falsity

Descartes discusses material falsity primarily in the context of sensory ideas, particularly in Meditation III and his replies to objections. Below are examples where the failure to distinguish subject and object contributions leads to material falsity:

1. The Idea of Cold as a Positive Quality:
   • Descartes considers the sensory idea of cold, which may present coldness as a positive quality or “real” property of an object (e.g., a cold stone). In reality, coldness might be merely the absence of heat (a privation) rather than a positive attribute of the object. The subject’s sensory apparatus contributes to the perception of coldness as a distinct quality, but this contribution is mistakenly attributed to the object itself. The vehicle—here, the sensory impression of cold—misleads the subject into thinking coldness is an inherent feature of the stone, when it may reflect the subject’s physiological response to a lack of heat. This results in a materially false idea because the idea misrepresents the object’s true nature.
2. Sensory Colors as Properties of Objects:
   • When perceiving a red apple, the idea of redness may present the color as a property inherent to the apple itself. However, Descartes argues that colors, as experienced, are modes of sensation produced by the interaction of light, the object’s surface, and the subject’s visual system. The vehicle of representation (the sensory quality of redness) is partly a product of the subject’s perceptual system, but if the subject takes redness to be a property of the apple itself, they form a materially false idea. The failure to distinguish the subject’s contribution (the sensory processing of light) from the object’s contribution (its physical structure) leads to this error.
3. Pain as Located in the Body:
   • The sensation of pain, such as a pain “in” the foot, may lead one to believe that pain is a property of the foot itself. Descartes explains that pain is a mode of the mind’s perception, triggered by bodily conditions but not actually a feature of the foot. The vehicle—the sensory experience of pain—arises from the subject’s mental and physiological response to bodily damage, but if the subject attributes the pain directly to the foot as an inherent quality, the idea is materially false. This misattribution occurs because the subject does not separate their role in generating the sensation from the objective state of the foot.

Clarification with Schmitter’s Model

Schmitter’s model highlights that the vehicle of representation is a joint product of the subject and object, and material falsity emerges when the subject’s role in shaping the vehicle is not recognized. For instance:

• In the case of cold, the vehicle (the sensation of coldness) is influenced by the subject’s sensory system, but the idea falsely presents coldness as a property of the object.
• In the case of color, the vehicle (the sensory quality of redness) is shaped by the subject’s visual perception, but the idea attributes redness to the apple itself.
• In the case of pain, the vehicle (the sensation of pain) is a mental mode, but the idea projects it onto the body as an objective feature.

This failure to distinguish contributions undermines the reliability of the representation, as the idea misrepresents the object’s true nature. Schmitter’s model thus provides a framework for understanding how Descartes accounts for error in sensory ideas, emphasizing the active role of the subject in forming representations and the need to critically assess the vehicle to avoid material falsity.

Supporting Textual Evidence

While Schmitter notes that a full explanation of material falsity is beyond the scope of her quoted passage, she points to Descartes’ discussions of “an idea taken objectively” and his use of modifying clauses (e.g., per, ut, tanquam) in describing ideas. These suggest that ideas represent objects as or through certain qualities, which can introduce error if misattributed. Her dissertation (chapter 4) likely elaborates on these points, as she references it for further discussion of material falsity.

If you need a deeper analysis of specific texts (e.g., Meditation III or Descartes’ replies to Arnauld on material falsity) or further exploration of Schmitter’s dissertation claims, let me know!

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Schmitter’s FOOTNOTES

• 1
  Amy Morgan Schmitter, “Representation, Self-Representation, and the Passions in Descartes,” Review of Metaphysics 48 (December 1994): 332–33.
• 2
  I [Schmitter] have discussed Descartes’ early work on signification and the problems it raises in chapter 1 of my dissertation. See Amy Morgan Schmitter, “Descartes’ Representation of the Self” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1993), 1–39. Later chapters discuss representation in ideas.
• 3
  Vere Chappell, “The Theory of Ideas,” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, ed. Amelie Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 191; Anne W. MacKenzie, “Descartes on Life and Sense,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19, no. 2 (1989): 163–92.
• 4
  The full development of this model forms the bulk of my dissertation, especially of chapters 1, 3, and 4. For a useful comparison of other seventeenth-century notions of representation, see Louis Marin, Portrait of the King (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), especially the introduction.
• 5
  Chapter 4 of my [Schmitter’s] dissertation discusses material falsity and representation.