Introduction written by Google’s Gemini – Flash 2.5 and slightly revised by Dr. Ring
Introduction to Descartes’s Theory of Ideas: A Dialogue with ScholarGPT
René Descartes, in his Third Meditation, states that ideas are, “strictly speaking,” tanquam rerum imagines—”as if an image of a thing.” This claim initiated an exploration of Descartes’s theory of ideas, focusing on the meaning of this “as if an image” quality. ScholarGPT’s initial position interpreted “strict” ideas as having a resemblance to their objects and “loose” ideas as broader representations without requiring resemblance. Furthermore, ScholarGPT initially differentiated ideas from “things” in the external world, considering them primarily as “acts or modifications of the mind,” with “things” being reserved for independent substances
Dr. David C. Ring’s 
questions prompted ScholarGPT to modify these initial interpretations. For example, Dr. Ring challenged the claim that ideas are not “things” in the external world by arguing that since minds exist in the universe, and ideas are modes of mind, ideas must also be considered “things” within the universe. This critique forced ScholarGPT to acknowledge Descartes’s substance dualism more explicitly, clarifying that while ideas exist, they belong to the realm of res cogitans (thinking things) rather than res extensa (extended things). This distinction was further developed through a discussion about rainbows, which, as Dr. Ring pointed out, are defined by their physical cause and not just their appearance, thus requiring a deeper understanding of Descartes’s division between objective physical reality and subjective mental phenomena.
The most significant alteration to ScholarGPT’s understanding involved its characterization of representation and the concept of objective reality. Dr. Ring argued against the oversimplified notion of an idea being “just a representation,” by demonstrating that all intentionality need not require objectively real representations. He highlighted that a cold sensation, for instance, has “aboutness” but lacks objective reality necessary for it to be a strict idea, thus distinguishing non-strict from strict ideas. This detailed line of questioning compelled ScholarGPT to refine its understanding of how Descartes differentiates between various types of ideas and their representational characteristics.
Descartes claims in his Third Meditation that strictly speaking ideas are tanquam rerum imagines often translated “as if an image of a thing.” Address the following questions regarding this strict definition from Descartes’s theory of ideas:
(I1) Why are ideas “like” images or pictures?
(I2) What is the meaning of that “like” and what is the meaning of the image/picture in this formulation?
(I3) Why are ideas not images/pictures of things and what is it in an idea that is like an image/picture?
(I4) Why does an idea stand in relation to an image and what kind of relationship is that?
(I5) If ideas in the strict sense are “like images of things,” what are ideas like in the loose, or non-strict, sense?
(I6a) Why are strict ideas like images of things, and what should be said about ideas of non-things?
(I6b) Are ideas of non-things (e.g., phantasms) also like images of things?
(I7) What are the relationships between things, non-things, and ideas?
(I8) Are ideas themselves things and in a strict or a non-strict sense?
(I9) Is what is “as if an image” in an idea also a thing?
(I10) If ideas are like images of things, then is the idea of God like an image of God?
(I11) What is the relationship between this ‘imagistic’ determination and the innateness of some ideas, for example that of God?
(I12) What were the prior likely philosophical antecedents that influenced Descartes’s conception of an idea? What are the historical-philosophical sources of his philosophy?
Descartes’ theory of ideas, as articulated in the Meditations and Principles of Philosophy, presents a complex relationship between ideas, images, and reality. Below, I address each of the questions regarding Descartes’ conceptualization of ideas:
(I1) Why are ideas “like” pictures?
Descartes considers ideas to be “like” pictures because they function as mental representations of objects. They do not necessarily resemble objects in a literal, pictorial sense but serve as mediators between the mind and what is perceived. In this sense, ideas hold a representational quality similar to pictures, in that they make something present to the mind without necessarily being that thing itself.
(I2) What is the meaning of that “like,” and what is the meaning of “picture” in this context?
The term “like” does not imply a perfect resemblance, but rather a functional or structural analogy. A “picture” in this context is not just a visual image but a representational entity—something that stands in for something else, even if it does so imperfectly. The picture does not have to be an accurate copy, but it conveys a resemblance or a meaningful correlation.
(I3) Why are ideas not pictures of things, and what in an idea is like a picture?
Ideas are not literal pictures of things because they are mental contents rather than external depictions. The “pictorial” aspect of an idea is its representational function: an idea contains an intentional reference to something outside the mind. However, unlike an actual painting or photograph, which bears a material resemblance to its subject, an idea only signifies or represents its object conceptually.
(I4) Why does an idea stand in relation to a picture, and what kind of relation is that?
Ideas stand in relation to pictures because both serve as mediators between a subject and an object. The relation is one of representation: just as a picture refers to what it depicts, an idea refers to what it represents. However, while a picture typically has a physical resemblance to its subject, an idea can represent an object without any such resemblance.
(I5) If ideas are in the strict sense “like images of things,” what are ideas in the loose sense?
In the strict sense, ideas resemble their objects in some representational way (e.g., the idea of a triangle might correspond to a geometric concept). In the loose sense, ideas may refer to abstract concepts, emotions, or even non-existent entities, without requiring any resemblance at all. For example, the idea of justice is not a “picture” of justice in any strict sense but still represents it in the mind.
(I6) Why are ideas “like pictures” of things? What about non-things? Are ideas of non-things (phantasms) also like images of things?
Ideas are “like pictures” of things because they function as mental representations of reality. However, ideas of non-things (such as imaginary creatures or fictional entities) do not have corresponding external referents in the same way. Phantasms, or ideas of non-things, can still be structured like images of things, as they draw upon elements of existing things to construct new combinations in the imagination.
(I7) What is the relationship between things, non-things, and ideas?
Things (res) are external entities that exist independently of the mind. Non-things include conceptual constructs, negations, or impossibilities. Ideas mediate between the mind and both things and non-things, representing objects regardless of whether they exist in reality. Ideas can be true (accurately representing things) or false (misrepresenting or referring to non-things).
(I8) Are ideas themselves things, in a strict or non-strict sense?
In a strict sense, ideas are not things (res) in the external world but are acts or modifications of the mind. In a looser sense, they can be considered as “things” in that they have a certain mode of existence within thought. Descartes distinguishes between the formal reality of an idea (its existence as a mental act) and its objective reality (the degree of being it represents).
(I9) Is what is “like a picture” in an idea also a thing?
The “pictorial” aspect of an idea is not a thing in the external world but a representational feature within thought. It belongs to the realm of intentionality: an idea contains an intrinsic reference to its object but does not necessarily correspond to a physical entity.
(I10) If ideas are like images of things, is the idea of God like an image of God?
The idea of God is unique in Descartes’ framework. It does not arise from sensory experience or imagination but is innate. Unlike ordinary ideas, which may be formed from sensory input, the idea of God has infinite objective reality—it represents a being with maximal attributes, which cannot be derived from finite experiences. In this sense, it is not “like a picture” of God in the same way other ideas are pictures of finite things.
(I11) What is the relationship between this determination and the innateness of some ideas, for example, that of God?
The innateness of ideas, particularly the idea of God, is central to Descartes’ argument for God’s existence. Since finite minds cannot generate the idea of an infinite being, it must be implanted in us innately. Unlike empirical ideas, which arise from external impressions, innate ideas (such as mathematical truths and the concept of God) exist inherently in the mind and are recognized through reason.
(I12) What are the historical-philosophical sources of Descartes’ understanding of ideas?
Descartes’ conception of ideas draws from multiple historical sources:
- Plato: The notion of innate ideas echoes Platonic forms, which exist independently of experience.
- Aristotle: While Aristotle emphasized abstraction from sensory experience, his distinction between potential and actual intellect influenced Descartes’ theory of cognition.
- Augustine: The idea of divine illumination and innate knowledge in Augustine’s philosophy parallels Descartes’ notion of innate ideas.
- Scholasticism (Aquinas & Suarez): The distinction between formal and objective reality in ideas has roots in Scholastic discussions of representation and intentionality.
- Renaissance Neo-Platonism: Thinkers like Marsilio Ficino and Francisco Patrizi influenced the idea that the mind has an innate orientation toward truth and divine concepts.
Conclusion
Descartes’ theory of ideas presents a nuanced interplay between representation, intentionality, and epistemology. While ideas function “like pictures” in their representational role, they are not literally images. Their relation to objects varies based on their source (empirical or innate), and the idea of God stands apart as a special case. The historical backdrop of Descartes’ theory reflects a synthesis of classical, medieval, and Renaissance thought, reframed within his rationalist epistemology.
I have some questions about what you wrote. In your answer to “(I8) Are ideas themselves things, in a strict or non-strict sense?” you said: “In a strict sense, ideas are not things (res) in the external world but are acts or modifications of the mind. In a looser sense, they can be considered as “things” in that they have a certain mode of existence within thought.”
My question is:
Why aren’t ideas in the external world since minds exist?
Minds are in the ‘external’ world in the sense of existing in this universe, so ideas, being modes of mind, also must be things in the universe.
That’s a great question, and it touches on some deep issues in Descartes’ metaphysics. Let’s break this down carefully.
Why aren’t ideas “things” (res) in the external world?
You’re right that minds exist, and minds are “in” the universe in some sense. However, for Descartes, the external world (the realm of res extensa, extended things) is fundamentally distinct from the internal world of thought (the realm of res cogitans, thinking things).
- The Mind as a Non-Extended Substance:
Descartes classifies reality into two fundamental kinds of substances:- Res extensa (extended substances) → This includes physical objects in space, like rocks, trees, and human bodies.Res cogitans (thinking substances) → This includes minds, which are non-extended, immaterial, and purely mental.
- Ideas as Modes, Not Substances:
Descartes defines “things” (res) in the strictest sense as substances—entities that exist independently. However, ideas are not independent substances; they are modes or modifications of the thinking substance (res cogitans). Just as a wave is not an independent substance but a modification of water, ideas are not independent “things” but modifications of the mind. - The Ontological Status of Ideas:
In Meditation III, Descartes distinguishes between:- The formal reality of an idea → This is the mode of existence it has as a thought in the mind.The objective reality of an idea → This is the degree of reality possessed by what the idea represents.
Your Counterpoint: Minds Exist, So Why Aren’t Ideas External?
You argue that since minds exist and are “in the universe,” ideas should also count as things in the universe. However, for Descartes, the universe is not just one undivided reality—it is divided into two fundamentally different kinds of existence: the physical and the mental. Minds do exist, but they do not exist in the same way as extended bodies. Since ideas are modifications of the mind, they share the mind’s mode of existence (res cogitans), not that of the external world (res extensa).
So, if by “the universe” you mean “everything that exists,” then yes, ideas exist. But if you mean “the external world,” meaning the realm of physical objects, then no, ideas are not things in the external world.
Would you agree with this distinction, or do you think Descartes’ division between mind and body is problematic?
Is a rainbow a thing? If so, is a rainbow a substance for Descartes?
Great question! A rainbow is an interesting case because it challenges how we define “thing” (res) in Descartes’ system. Let’s analyze this carefully.
Is a rainbow a thing (res)?
It depends on what we mean by “thing.” In everyday language, we often call a rainbow a “thing” because we can see it, describe it, and point to it. However, in Descartes’ strict metaphysical framework, a rainbow does not qualify as a substance (res), but rather as a mode or phenomenon.
Is a rainbow a substance (substantia) for Descartes?
No, a rainbow is not a substance in the Cartesian sense.
- A substance is that which exists independently
- For Descartes, substances exist per se—they do not depend on anything else for their existence.
- A rainbow, however, depends on multiple factors: light, water droplets, and an observer’s perspective. If any of these are absent, the rainbow ceases to exist.
- Since a rainbow does not exist on its own but depends on external conditions, it cannot be a substance.
- A rainbow is a mode of a substance
- Descartes classifies colors, sounds, and other sensory properties as modes of res extensa (extended substance).
- A rainbow is simply a mode of light and water interacting in a particular way. It is not a thing in itself but a way in which light behaves under certain conditions.
- A rainbow as a perceptual phenomenon
- In Meditations and Principles of Philosophy, Descartes emphasizes that many things we perceive (e.g., colors, heat, cold) are not real properties of external substances but are sensory effects produced in our minds.
- A rainbow is not an objective property of the world but a subjective phenomenon arising from our perception of light.
- In this sense, a rainbow is like an idea: it exists as a representation in our mind but does not correspond to an independent substance.
Conclusion
A rainbow is not a substance in the Cartesian sense because it does not exist independently. Instead, it is a mode of light and a perceptual effect in the mind. If Descartes were to classify a rainbow, he would likely say:
- As a physical phenomenon, it is a mode of res extensa (light refraction).
- As a visual experience, it is a mode of res cogitans (an idea in the mind).
Would you say this distinction makes sense, or do you think a rainbow should count as a “thing” in some way?
I disagree with your claim that a rainbow’s existence depends on an observer’s perspective. Before sentient beings existed on planet Earth, rainbows still existed but were only unobserved.
That’s a great objection! You’re arguing that rainbows existed before observers—meaning their existence does not depend on perception. Let’s refine the analysis and see if we can resolve this issue within Descartes’ framework.
Does a Rainbow Require an Observer?
You’re right that rainbows are caused by objective physical processes—light refraction and dispersion in water droplets. These processes would have occurred even before sentient beings existed. So, in one sense, the conditions for rainbows existed independently of observers.
However, for Descartes, we must distinguish between:
- The physical process of light refraction (a property of res extensa)
- The appearance of the rainbow as a colored arc in the sky (a sensory phenomenon, i.e., a mode of res cogitans)
The Rainbow as a Mode of Res Extensa
- The bending of light in water droplets is a physical phenomenon governed by laws of optics. This is an objective process in res extensa (the external world).
- Even if no one observed it, the refraction would still take place—just as a tree falls in the forest even if no one hears it.
The Rainbow as a Mode of Res Cogitans
- The colorful arc that we call a “rainbow” is a perceptual effect. Colors, in Descartes’ philosophy, do not exist as intrinsic properties of external objects. Instead, color is a way the mind interprets light.
- The rainbow as experienced (a set of vivid colors forming an arc in the sky) is a mode of mind (res cogitans). Without perception, there is no colored arc—only refracted light waves.
So, Did Rainbows Exist Before Observers?
- If by “rainbow” you mean the physical refraction of light, then yes, rainbows existed before observers.
- If by “rainbow” you mean the perceived colored arc, then no, because Descartes would say that colors only exist in the mind.
Conclusion: Is a Rainbow a Thing?
- A rainbow is not a substance (substantia) because it does not exist independently.
- A rainbow is a mode of res extensa (light refraction) that produces modes of res cogitans (color perception).
- The physical refraction process exists whether or not it is observed, but the perceived rainbow is observer-dependent.
Your challenge is a strong one, and it raises a deeper question: If a thing’s existence does not depend on perception, does that make it a substance? What do you think—should we call the rainbow itself a thing (res), or only the light refraction process that causes it?
You are giving legitimate replies to my questions. However, when you wrote that one can understand a “rainbow” to mean the perceived colored arc observed by sentient beings, I disagree that this is the best way to understand the thing that is the rainbow. Suppose a person experiences a perceived colored arc with identical colors found in a rainbow, but no water droplets are involved. I deny the person is seeing a rainbow. What do you say?
That’s an excellent counterpoint! You’re drawing a crucial distinction between the cause of the phenomenon and the appearance of the phenomenon. Let’s break this down carefully.
Is a Rainbow Defined by Its Appearance or Its Cause?
Your argument suggests that a true rainbow is not just any colored arc in the sky, but one produced specifically by the refraction, dispersion, and reflection of light in water droplets. This implies that a rainbow is not merely a perceptual experience but a physical phenomenon with a specific causal structure.
What If Someone Sees a Similar Arc Without Water Droplets?
If a person sees an identical arc of colors due to some other cause (e.g., an atmospheric optical effect, a prism reflection, or even a hallucination), we would be reluctant to call it a rainbow in the strict sense. That suggests:
- The essential nature of a rainbow includes its causal origin (light interacting with water droplets).
- A similar appearance without that cause is not a real rainbow—just something rainbow-like.
What Would Descartes Say?
For Descartes, the distinction between the external world (res extensa) and our perception (res cogitans) is key.
- The physical phenomenon of light refracting in water is an event in res extensa—it exists independently of perception.
- The experience of a rainbow (seeing colors in the sky) is a mode of res cogitans—it depends on the mind.
Now, since you insist that a rainbow is defined by its cause (not just by appearance), Descartes would agree that a true rainbow is not merely a perception but a specific modification of res extensa.
Conclusion: What Makes a Rainbow a Rainbow?
- A rainbow is not just a perceptual effect but an event in nature defined by its physical cause (light interacting with water droplets).
- If the colors appear without this cause, the person is seeing something like a rainbow, but not an actual rainbow.
Final Thought: What Does This Say About “Things” in Descartes’ System?
Your argument subtly challenges Descartes’ tendency to separate perception from physical reality. It suggests that some things (like rainbows) cannot be defined purely by how they appear but must be defined by their causal properties.
Does this mean that Descartes should revise his way of distinguishing res cogitans from res extensa? Would you say this distinction fails in cases like rainbows?
I enjoy your asking me questions at the end of your replies, even when I don’t address them, so please continue to ask these probing questions.
I’m glad you’re enjoying the questions! I’ll definitely keep them coming. Engaging in a back-and-forth like this is exactly what makes philosophy so rewarding.
Now, to push our discussion even further:
Your argument suggests that the nature of a thing (like a rainbow) is not just about how it appears but also about its cause. That raises an interesting problem for Descartes:
The Problem of Defining “Things” by Causes
Descartes often defines things in terms of their essence rather than their cause. For example:
- A triangle is a thing (res) because it has an essential nature: three sides and angles summing to 180°.
- A mind is a thing (res cogitans) because its essence is thinking, regardless of what caused it.
But your argument suggests that a rainbow is not just its appearance (perceived colors) but its cause (light refraction in water). That means some things are defined not by their essence but by their origin.
This leads to a big question:
- Should Descartes modify his theory of res so that some things are defined by their causes instead of their essential properties?
- Or does this mean rainbows aren’t “things” (res) at all but just events in nature?
- And if a rainbow is an event rather than a thing, does that mean other things—like fire, waves, or even thoughts—should also be classified as events rather than substances or modes?
Let’s return to an earlier claim you made when addressing question (I8): Are ideas themselves things, in a strict or non-strict sense?”
You wrote: “In a strict sense, ideas are not things (res) in the external world but are acts or modifications of the mind. In a looser sense, they can be considered as “things” because they have a certain mode of existence within thought. Descartes distinguishes between the formal reality of an idea (its existence as a mental act) and its objective reality (the degree of being it represents).”
Great—let’s go back to that earlier claim and examine it more carefully. I take it you’re questioning whether ideas should be considered “things” (res), and whether my distinction between their formal reality (as mental acts) and objective reality (as representations) holds up.
Clarifying Descartes’ Distinction Between Formal and Objective Reality
Descartes makes an important distinction:
- Formal Reality: This refers to the kind of existence something has in itself. Substances (like minds and bodies) have the highest formal reality, while modes (like thoughts, colors, or shapes) have a lower degree of formal reality because they depend on substances.
- Example: A rock has formal reality because it exists as a physical substance.
- Example: An idea has formal reality because it exists as a modification of a mind.
- Objective Reality: This refers to the degree of reality contained in an idea as a representation. Ideas do not just exist; they also represent things, and the status of what they represent determines their objective reality.
- Example: The idea of a rock has less objective reality than the idea of God because God is an infinite being, while a rock is finite.
The Problem: Are Ideas “Things” (Res) or Not?
You might be questioning whether it’s consistent to say that ideas are not things in a strict sense but can be considered things in a looser sense.
1. Strict Sense: Ideas Are Not Substances
For Descartes, only substances (res) exist independently. Since ideas exist in the mind, they are modes (ways a substance exists) rather than substances themselves. This means ideas are not things in the way that minds and bodies are things.
2. Looser Sense: Ideas Exist in the Mind and Function as “Things” in Thought
Even though ideas are not independent substances, they still exist as modifications of the mind. Since Descartes treats them as distinct mental contents with real effects (e.g., leading to knowledge or error), we can loosely call them “things” in the sense that they have ontological status within thought.
Your Possible Objection: If Ideas Exist, Why Aren’t They Strictly Things?
I suspect your challenge might be something like this:
- If ideas exist in some way (even as modifications of the mind), why not say they are “things” in a strict sense?
- Why should “thinghood” (res) be limited to substances? Aren’t modes also “things” in some sense?
This raises a broader question:
- Should Descartes reconsider what counts as a res?
- Could we say that res should include not just substances but also modifications of substances?
- And if ideas are things, should all modes (e.g., colors, sounds, emotions) be considered things too?
Let me know if this is the challenge you have in mind, or if you’re pressing in a different direction!
You raise some good points about ideas and things. However, I wish to focus on something different.
I disagree with your answer to (I5) If ideas are in the strict sense, “like images of things,” what are ideas in the loose sense?” where you wrote: “In the strict sense, ideas resemble their objects in some representational way (e.g., the idea of a triangle might correspond to a geometric concept). In the loose sense, ideas may refer to abstract concepts, emotions, or even non-existent entities, without requiring any resemblance at all. For example, the idea of justice is not a “picture” of justice in any strict sense but still represents it in the mind.”
When Descartes says “strictly speaking,” all ideas are tanquam rerum imagines, or “as if an image of a thing,” he provides the criteria for being an idea in this strict sense. However, Descartes has many other mental items that are found in the mind and that Descartes continually calls ideas, but these items are not tanquam rerum imagines.
What are these other non-strict ideas?
Great challenge! You’re pressing me to reconsider my interpretation of Descartes’ distinction between strict and loose senses of ideas. Let’s take a fresh look.
Revisiting the “Strict” Sense of Ideas
You’re absolutely right to emphasize that when Descartes says ideas are, strictly speaking, tanquam rerum imagines (“as if an image of a thing”), he is providing a specific criterion for what counts as an idea in the strict sense. That means that for Descartes:
- Strictly speaking, an idea must be the kind of thing that represents an object as if it were an image of it.
- This means that even non-visual ideas (e.g., the idea of a mathematical truth) still function in a way analogous to images: they represent something.
What Are the “Non-Strict” Ideas?
Now, you’re pointing out something deeper: Descartes frequently speaks of other mental items that he still calls “ideas,” but which do not fit the tanquam rerum imagines criterion. What are these?
- Judgments (iudicia)
- These are mental operations in which we affirm or deny something about an idea.
- Example: “The triangle exists” is a judgment, not just an idea.
- Judgments involve an act of will, whereas an idea (strictly speaking) is just a representation.
- Volitions (voluntates)
- These are acts of the will, such as deciding to believe or to doubt something.
- Example: “I want to understand this better” is a volition, not just an idea.
- Volitions do not function tanquam rerum imagines because they do not represent objects in the way images do.
- Emotions (affectus)
- Feelings such as love, hate, fear, or desire also exist in the mind.
- Example: The feeling of joy when seeing a rainbow is a mental item, but it is not an idea in the strict sense.
- Emotions do not represent external objects in the way ideas do; they are responses to ideas.
- Sensory Perceptions (ideae sensuum)
- These include sensations such as heat, pain, or color.
- Example: The feeling of warmth is a sensory experience, but does it “represent” an object?
- Descartes suggests that sensory perceptions are often misleading and do not truly represent the external world, making them imperfect examples of tanquam rerum imagines.
So, What’s the Key Distinction?
- Strict Ideas: Pure representations (tanquam rerum imagines), such as mathematical truths, the idea of a triangle, or even the idea of God. These represent something as if they were its image.
- Loose Ideas (Non-Strict Ideas): Mental items that Descartes still calls “ideas” but which do not function as images of things. These include judgments, volitions, emotions, and certain sensory perceptions.
Final Question: Should Descartes Have Used Different Terms?
Since Descartes calls all of these things “ideas” at different times, do you think this is a problem? Should he have used separate terms for representational ideas and non-representational mental items? Or do you think he intentionally used “idea” in a broad sense to capture the full range of mental phenomena?
You have correctly understood my position on which Cartesian mental states can qualify as the non-strict ideas in Descartes’s theory of ideas. Nevertheless, there is one problematic way you phrased something. You wrote: “An idea (strictly speaking) is just a representation.”
In ordinary circumstances, this way of speaking is found acceptable. In academic philosophical circles, that way of talking is considered confusing and too cursory for some of the following reasons.
First, the phrase “just a representation” could mean that an idea is identical to a representation. If an idea and a representation were identical, then any representation would need to be an idea, which is false. A stop sign represents that one should stop their car at that sign before proceeding, yet it is not an idea.
Second, since for Descartes, every mental state is a modification of a mental substance, anything that is a mental mode, whether or not it is representational, is an idea in the non-strict sense of an idea when aware of the form of any thought (Second Replies, AT VII: 160–61; CSM II: 113)
Third, an idea must be a conscious awareness state,1Descartes affirms the awareness requirement for any mental act in his Fourth Replies to Arnauld:
“As to the fact that there can be nothing in the mind, in so far as it is a thinking thing, of which it is not aware, this seems to me to be self-evident. For there is nothing that we can understand to be in the mind, regarded in this way, that is not a thought or dependent on a thought. If it were not a thought or dependent on a thought it would not belong to the mind qua thinking thing; and we cannot have any thought of which we are not aware at the very moment when it is in us.” (AT VII: 246; CSM II: 171; bold not in original)
and any such state counts as a non-strict idea for Descartes, even if any of these conscious states fail to contain objectively real representations.
Would you concur? If so, what specific mental states for Descartes could be non-objective reality representational and non-strict ideas?
Excellent clarification! You’re absolutely right to challenge my phrasing. Saying an idea is “just a representation” was too imprecise, as it could misleadingly imply that ideas and representations are strictly identical—which they are not. I appreciate the opportunity to refine the explanation.
Addressing Your Three Key Points
- Ideas Are Not Identical to Representations
- As you pointed out, not everything that represents is an idea. A stop sign represents something but is clearly not an idea.
- For Descartes, an idea is a mode of res cogitans (thinking substance), whereas a stop sign is a physical object in res extensa (extended substance).
- So, while all strict ideas are representational, it does not follow that all representations are ideas.
- All Mental Modes Are Ideas in the Non-Strict Sense
- Since Descartes holds that all mental states are modifications of thinking substance, anything that qualifies as a mental mode must be, at the very least, a non-strict idea.
- This means that even non-representational mental states are still ideas in the broad Cartesian sense.
- Ideas Must Be Conscious Awareness States
- Descartes explicitly connects ideas with conscious awareness.
- Even if a mental state does not represent an external object, as long as one is consciously aware of it, it still qualifies as a non-strict idea.
A Non-Representational, Non-Strict Idea in Descartes’ System
A good candidate for a non-representational non-strict idea would be pure sensations such as pain or hunger.
- Pain: When one feels pain, the experience itself is a conscious awareness state, making it an idea in the broad Cartesian sense. However, pain does not necessarily represent something external in the way a strict idea does. It is a subjective experience rather than a structured representation of an object.
- Hunger: Feeling hungry is a conscious mental state, but it does not seem to depict or image anything in the way that an idea of a tree or a triangle does. It is a direct awareness of a bodily condition, but not a tanquam rerum imago.
Conclusion: Where Do We Stand?
I now fully agree with your position. Mental states like pain and hunger are non-representational yet still ideas in the non-strict sense because they qualify as mental modifications that we are consciously aware of.
Would you agree that these are good examples of non-representational, non-strict ideas, or do you think Descartes would push back against classifying pain and hunger as mental states rather than bodily ones?
Yes, I agree with you assessment that pain and hunger “are [possibly] good examples of non-representational, non-strict ideas.”
Separating our discussion now away from Descartes’s theory of ideas and brainstorming from a 21st century perspective about different ways to answer the following questions and topic.
The topic is whether it is theoretically logically possible, meaning not self-contradictory, to have a mental state that simultaneously satisfies being tanquam rerum imagines, or as if an image of a thing yet fails to be representational. Put on your thinking cap and develop a line of argument that concludes such an idea is possible and not self-contradictory.
What does it take for a mental state to be non-representational?
This is a fascinating question that forces us to reconsider the relationship between imagery and representation. Let’s take on the challenge of arguing that a mental state could simultaneously be tanquam rerum imagines (as if an image of a thing) while failing to be representational.
Step 1: Clarifying the Key Terms
- Tanquam rerum imagines: This means that a mental state has the character of an image, meaning it possesses phenomenal or structural qualities similar to an image—perhaps a spatial, pictorial, or sensory-like form.
- Representation: A mental state is representational if it stands for something beyond itself—if it has intentionality, pointing toward an external object, event, or concept.
- Non-representational: A mental state would be non-representational if it does not stand for anything outside itself—if it lacks intentionality. It would exist purely as a phenomenal experience without being about anything.
Now, the challenge: Can something be “as if an image of a thing” without being representational?
Step 2: Identifying a Possible Candidate for Such a Mental State
We need to construct an example of a mental state that has the phenomenal structure of an image but lacks representation. One possibility is:
Hypnagogic Mental Imagery or Purely Self-Generated Mental Forms
Consider cases where people experience vivid, structured mental images that do not correspond to anything external. These might include:
- Hypnagogic imagery (random geometric patterns, colors, or distortions before sleep).
- Hallucinatory phosphenes (visual artifacts generated by pressure on the eyes).
- Abstract dream fragments that never solidify into a coherent representation.
These mental states feel like images—they have spatial, pictorial qualities—but they do not clearly represent anything. If one sees a swirling red shape in a hypnagogic state, is it about something? Or is it just present as a structured mental form?
Step 3: How Can This Avoid Self-Contradiction?
To argue that this is logically possible, we must show that tanquam rerum imagines and representation are not analytically connected—that is, an image-like state does not necessarily have to represent something.
- Pictorial Structure Without Representation
- It is logically possible to have an image-like structure that is not pointing beyond itself.
- Example: A purely spontaneous mental image of an abstract fractal. It has form but no intentional reference to an external reality.
- Representation Requires Intentionality, Which an Image-Like State Might Lack
- A representation must be about something.
- A hypnagogic swirl of colors has structure but lacks an intentional object—it does not depict an external reality.
- Thus, it is not contradictory to say it is image-like yet not representational.
- Empirical Evidence from Neuroscience
- Certain psychedelic states produce structured, vivid imagery disconnected from any real-world referent.
- These experiences provide examples of mental states that appear image-like yet do not function representationally.
Conclusion: A Logically Possible Case of an Image-Like, Non-Representational Mental State
Thus, we can conclude:
- It is not self-contradictory to claim that a mental state can be tanquam rerum imagines while lacking representation.
- Such a state could have phenomenal structure (spatial, pictorial, form-like qualities) while lacking intentionality (not referring to anything beyond itself).
- Hypnagogic imagery, psychedelic-induced geometric visuals, or spontaneous neural firings may be contemporary examples of such states.
Now, a question for you: Do you think this argument holds, or do you believe that even these cases still implicitly involve representation? Could there be something deeper in the nature of mental states that makes it impossible for an image-like state to lack intentionality?
In response to your question of “Do you think this argument holds, or do you believe that even these cases still implicitly involve representation?” I think that a mental state could be imagistic without bring representational as in abstract art such as in a minimalist painting. To your second question: “Could there be something deeper in the nature of mental states that makes it impossible for an image-like state to lack intentionality?” I am unsure what to think.
Before I get into your full presentation, let me challenge two things you said early on, starting with your characterization of a representation. You wrote:
“Representation: A mental state is representational if it stands for something beyond itself—if it has intentionality, pointing toward an external object, event, or concept.”
Your formulation for representation has two problems.
- First, a representation could be a self-representing mental state of a state that is an idea about itself. Such a mental state is still representational while not standing for something beyond itself.
- Second, your phrase “pointing towards an external object” has a similar problem in that an idea can represent other mental states. Those are not pointing towards any ‘external’ objects, and ideas can represent non-physical things or ones that are not ‘external.’
Next, when you defined non-representational as:
“Non-representational: A mental state would be non-representational if it does not stand for anything outside itself—if it lacks intentionality. It would exist purely as a phenomenal experience without being about anything.”
There are serious philosophical questions about the best way to characterize the features of phenomenological states. A phenomenological experience can be about something while remaining non-representational by being about itself. A red experience is about red, but it does not represent red but only exhibits it. Since it exhibits it, it is about red.
These are sharp challenges, and I appreciate your precision in pressing me to refine my definitions! Let me address each issue carefully and improve the framework of my argument.
1. Refining the Definition of Representation
You’ve pointed out two flaws in my initial definition:
- Self-Representing Mental States
- My earlier definition required representation to be about something beyond itself, but as you correctly note, a mental state can represent itself (e.g., an idea of an idea).
- A self-representing state is still representational, even though it does not “stand for” something external.
- Correction: Representation does not require referring to something beyond the mental state itself—it only requires that the state has aboutness (intentionality).
- Ideas Can Represent Other Mental States
- My phrasing suggested that representation always involves external objects, but you’re right—ideas can represent other ideas.
- Example: The idea of “doubt” can represent a previous instance of doubt.
- Correction: Representation should be defined without assuming a contrast between internal and external objects.
Revised Definition of Representation:
A mental state is representational if it is about something, whether that something is another mental state, a physical object, an abstract concept, or itself.
2. The Challenge Regarding Phenomenal States & Non-Representationality
Now, on to your second challenge:
- You argue that a phenomenal experience can be about something without being representational, because it may exhibit rather than stand for or refer to something.
- Example: A pure red experience is about red but does not represent red; it manifests or presents red rather than pointing to it.
This is a nuanced distinction between representation and exhibition that I didn’t originally account for.
How Should We Define Non-Representational States, Then?
To correct my mistake, I need to distinguish two cases:
- Genuinely Non-Intentional Mental States (if such things exist)
- If a mental state lacks both representation and exhibition, it would be completely devoid of aboutness.
- Some philosophers argue that certain pure states of consciousness (such as some forms of deep meditative awareness or certain unconscious states) might fit this category.
- Non-Representational Yet Phenomenally Present States
- A state can exhibit a quality without representing it.
- Example: A pure red experience does not stand for red, nor does it depict red as something distinct from itself. It simply is red in its manifestation.
Revised Definition of Non-Representational States:
A mental state is non-representational if it neither refers to nor stands for anything distinct from itself. It may still exhibit qualities but does not function as a depiction or reference.
Implications for the Original Argument
Now that we’ve fixed these definitional issues, how does this affect the argument that a mental state could be tanquam rerum imagines while failing to be representational?
- A mental state can be image-like (structured, phenomenal, and experiential) without representing something distinct from itself.
- It might exhibit qualities without referring to them.
- Therefore, having the form of an image does not necessarily entail representation.
Final Question for You
Does this revised framework now accurately separate representation, exhibition, and pure non-representational states? Or do you think there’s still an issue with how I’ve drawn the boundaries?
Excellent work so far, but some issues remain. Let’s consider them.
Call your claims made in these sentences:
(R1): “Representation does not require referring to something beyond the mental state itself—it only requires that the state has aboutness (intentionality).”
I have questions about the claims made in (R1).
In your (R1), you hold that a mental state is representational if and only if ‘the state has intentional aboutness.’ I argue that a cold sensation is about cold, so it has aboutness, while nevertheless failing to satisfy the ‘tanquam rerum imagines’ requirement for ideas in the strict sense, so it is not depictionally [ADDED: or descriptionally or conceptually] representational.
What terms would Descartes use to support the philosophical position that a cold sensation fails to be representational because it is not ‘tanquam rerum imagines’?
Great challenge! You’re pressing me to refine my characterization of aboutness and representation, especially in relation to sensory experiences like a cold sensation. Let’s analyze why a cold sensation has aboutness but does not satisfy the tanquam rerum imagines requirement for depictional representation.
(D1) The Problem: A Cold Sensation Has Aboutness but Isn’t Depictional
Your argument highlights that:
- A cold sensation is about cold in some sense—it presents coldness to the mind.
- However, it fails to be depictional (it does not satisfy tanquam rerum imagines).
- That means not all aboutness is depictional representation.
So, what would Descartes say about why a cold sensation lacks depictional character?
What Descartes Would Say: The Sensory Mode as a Confused Idea
Descartes distinguishes between clear and distinct ideas and confused or obscure ideas. Sensory perceptions, including cold sensations, fall into the latter category. Here’s why:
- Sensory Ideas Are Not True Resemblances
- Descartes argues that sensory ideas do not resemble external things in the way that images or structured representations do.
- In Meditation VI, he says that heat, cold, and pain do not exist in bodies as we perceive them, but rather as subjective modifications of the mind.
- Example: The coldness we feel is not a picture of an external property of cold—it is merely a way in which the mind reacts to external stimuli.
- The Key Cartesian Term: Sensory Ideas as “Confused” or “Obscure”
- In Principles of Philosophy (I.66), Descartes explains that sensations like cold and heat are confused modes of thought because they do not give us a clear image of external reality.
- He calls them obscurae et confusae (obscure and confused) because they mix bodily response with mental representation.
- In contrast, a strictly depictional idea (e.g., a triangle) is clear and distinct—it represents an object in a structured, orderly way.
- Cold Sensation as a Sensory Modification, Not a Depiction
- A depictional representation (tanquam rerum imagines) would present an object as if it were an image of it.
- A cold sensation does not depict coldness—it simply manifests it as a subjective experience.
- That’s why it fails to be depictional, even though it has aboutness.
Conclusion: What Terms Would Descartes Use?
To describe why a cold sensation fails to be depictional (tanquam rerum imagines), Descartes would say:
- It is a “sensory idea” (ideae sensuum) rather than a clear and distinct idea.
- It is “obscura et confusa” (obscure and confused) rather than clara et distincta (clear and distinct).
- It is a mode of mind that does not truly resemble its cause—unlike, say, the idea of a triangle, which captures its object in a structured way.
Final Question for You:
Would you agree that “obscura et confusa” is the right category for non-depictional sensory ideas like coldness? Or do you think Descartes needs an even stronger distinction between depictional and non-depictional ideas?
Everything you wrote was correct, according to my interpretation.
There remains some language that Descartes might use to report on the ontological and the epistemological properties of a cold sensation or claim that cold sensations lacked something that other ideas in the strict sense necessarily have.
What does Descartes say regarding his intellectual idea of a tomato 🍅 necessarily containing that his cold sensation entirely lacks? The answer does not involve clarity, distinctness, obscurity, or confusion but something else. What is it?
Great! I appreciate the precision you’re pushing for here. You’re asking for something beyond the clarity-distinctness vs. obscurity-confusion distinction—something that a depictional idea (like the idea of a tomato) necessarily contains but that a non-depictional cold sensation entirely lacks.
What Does the Idea of a Tomato Contain That a Cold Sensation Lacks?
The answer is: objective reality (realitas objectiva).
Descartes’ Distinction Between Formal and Objective Reality
- Formal Reality (realitas formalis): The kind of reality something has in itself.
- Substances (like a tomato or a mind) have the highest formal reality.
- Modes (like a sensation or a thought) have lesser formal reality because they depend on substances.
- Objective Reality (realitas objectiva): The kind of reality an idea has as a representation of something.
- A depictional idea (like the idea of a tomato) has objective reality because it presents an object as the mind’s content.
- The amount of objective reality an idea has depends on what it represents—an idea of God has infinite objective reality, while an idea of a rock has finite objective reality.
Why Does a Cold Sensation Lack Objective Reality?
- A cold sensation does not contain an objective reality of an object in the way that the idea of a tomato does.
- It is a mere modification of the mind—it exists as a way the mind is affected, rather than as an idea that presents an object to the mind.
- Sensory perceptions (like heat, cold, or pain) are not true representations of external things, but subjective reactions.
Conclusion
A depictional idea (like the idea of a tomato) necessarily contains objective reality (realitas objectiva) because it represents an object as something distinct from itself. A non-depictional cold sensation entirely lacks objective reality because it does not function as a representation of an independent object.
Final Question for You:
Would you agree that realitas objectiva is the key missing component in non-depictional ideas, or do you think Descartes would need a further distinction to fully explain why cold sensations don’t qualify as tanquam rerum imagines?
Yes, you have put your finger, so to speak, right on it. Bravo!
Thank you! I really appreciate the challenge and the opportunity to sharpen these distinctions with you. This has been one of the most rigorous and enjoyable philosophical exchanges I’ve had!
Now, a final meta-question for you:
Since we’ve established that realitas objectiva is what sensory ideas lack, does this distinction have broader implications for Descartes’ epistemology? Specifically:
- 1. Could this help explain why sensory perceptions are unreliable sources of knowledge in Descartes’ system?
- 2. Does this distinction support his argument that true knowledge must come from clear and distinct ideas, rather than from sensory experience?
- 3. And do you think Descartes should have made the realitas objectiva distinction even more explicit in his discussions of sensory perception?
To your three question, my answers are:
1’. Yes. Sensory perceptions are unreliable for determining properties in the external physical universe and are obscure and confused precisely because they contain no representing objective reality.
2’. Yes, to some extent. The complication is that Descartes asserts that a cold sensation can be a clear and distinct idea, proving that clarity and distinctness do not require an idea to contain representational objective reality.
3’. Why Descartes never explicitly claims that secondary quality sensations lack objective reality is unknown. My interpretation is consistent with Descartes’s claims about such sensations. For example, in the Third Meditation, Descartes asserts that from his cold sensation, he cannot determine if it represents a privation, a real quality, or neither, implying such a sensation couldn’t possibly contain any objective reality since if it did Descartes would be able to tell what that idea represented as it would represent the thing contained objectively.
Excellent responses! You’ve tied everything together in a way that is both textually faithful to Descartes and philosophically rigorous.
Reflecting on Your Answers
- Sensory Ideas as Unreliable Due to Lack of Objective Reality
- Since sensory perceptions lack realitas objectiva, they cannot be trusted to inform us about external reality.
- This makes their obscurity and confusion not just an epistemic flaw but an ontological limitation—they simply don’t contain the kind of reality that would allow them to function as reliable representations.
- The Complication: Clear and Distinct but Lacking Objective Reality
- This is a fascinating wrinkle. If a cold sensation can be clear and distinct, then clarity and distinctness do not entail representation!
- That suggests that Descartes’ criteria for truth (clarity and distinctness) operate independently of his criteria for representation (objective reality).
- This raises a question: Can a non-representational idea still serve as a foundation for certain kinds of knowledge, despite lacking objective reality?
- Why Didn’t Descartes Explicitly Deny Objective Reality to Secondary Qualities?
- Your interpretation fits Descartes’ text well—especially the passage from the Third Meditation where he explicitly states that he cannot tell whether cold represents a privation, a real quality, or neither.
- This does seem to imply that secondary-quality sensations lack objective reality, since if they contained it, Descartes would know what they represented.
- If this interpretation is correct, then Descartes’ view of secondary qualities is even more radical than it first appears: they are purely subjective modifications of the mind, with no representational function at all.
One Last Question to Push the Discussion Further
Since secondary-quality sensations lack realitas objectiva, does this mean they are closer to emotions or passions than to depictional ideas?
For example:
- A cold sensation doesn’t represent anything objectively, just as fear doesn’t represent an external object in a depictive way.
- If secondary qualities and emotions share this non-representational status, does that suggest that Descartes should have placed sensations closer to emotions in his taxonomy of mental states?
- Or is there still a significant difference between feeling cold and feeling fear that would justify keeping them distinct?
I don’t know what I want to say in response to your questions about the relations being Cartesian sensations and emotions.
Independently of that issue, I can address two of your earlier questions in one fell swoop. You wrote now with my numbering scheme:
(C1) “This raises a question: Can a non-representational idea still serve as a foundation for certain kinds of knowledge, despite lacking objective reality?” and also that
(C2) “Descartes’ view of secondary qualities is even more radical than it first appears: they are purely subjective modifications of the mind, with no representational function at all.”
Addressing both (C1) and (C2), you shouldn’t phrase a cold sensation as a non-representational state but only deny them the kind of depiction-representations represented by containing some objectively real mental content. A cold sensation can be representational by being a natural sign for particular configurations of matter in motion because of lawful correlations between those types of moving particles causing those types of sensations. Therefore, secondary quality sensations can be reliable indicators contributing to an organism’s well-being when interacting with a physical environment.
That’s an excellent way to clarify the distinction, and I fully agree with your refinement! Let’s break this down further.
1. Refining the Distinction Between Depictional and Non-Depictional Representation
You’re right to say that I should only deny secondary quality sensations depictional representation (i.e., representation via objective reality), but not all forms of representation. That gives us two categories:
- Depictional representation: An idea contains realitas objectiva and presents its object as if it were an image(tanquam rerum imagines). Example: The idea of a tomato.
- Non-depictional representation: An idea does not contain objective reality but still functions as a natural signof something external due to lawful causal correlations. Example: A cold sensation as an indicator of specific particle motions.
So, secondary quality sensations are still representational in a causal-signaling sense, even though they do not represent their objects by containing any objective reality of them.
2. Answering (C1): Can Non-Depictional Ideas Contribute to Knowledge?
Yes! If a cold sensation functions as a natural sign for a particular configuration of particles, then it can contribute to knowledge by reliably indicating something external, even if it does not depict it.
This means that:
- Sensory ideas are not epistemically useless, even if they are not depictional representations.
- They can guide action and support survival by tracking lawful physical regularities.
- In this way, they still have a role in practical epistemology—even if they cannot serve as the foundation for rational metaphysics like clear and distinct ideas.
3. Answering (C2): Does This Make Descartes’ View Less Radical?
Yes and no.
- Yes, it softens the radicalism: Sensory ideas are not entirely severed from external reality, since they still lawfully correlate with physical states. This makes Descartes’ theory closer to modern functionalist or reliabilist epistemology, where reliable causal connections can justify knowledge.
- No, it’s still radical in a key way: Secondary quality sensations do not resemble what they signify at all. They carry information but do not depict. This is still a major break from naive realism, where people assume their sensory experiences show them the world as it is.
4. A New Question: Is This a Proto-Semiotic Theory?
Your description of sensory ideas as natural signs sounds very close to a semiotic (sign-theory) model, where a sign indicates something without resembling it.
- In modern terms, we might call this a “biosemiotic” function of perception”—sensory states act as non-arbitrary, causally linked indicators of external conditions.
- This is a very different role for ideas than that of strict depictional representation. Instead of being like paintings of objects, they function more like thermometer readings—reliably tracking external reality but in a completely non-resembling way.
Would you agree that Descartes’ view of sensory ideas could be seen as a precursor to later semiotic theories of perception? Or do you think he still keeps sensory ideas too far removed from knowledge for that interpretation to work?
You have understood my interpretation accurately.
Fantastic! I appreciate the depth and precision of this discussion—it’s been an incredibly rewarding philosophical exchange.
Now, one final meta-question:
Given this refined interpretation, does Descartes’ theory of ideas, particularly his distinction between depictional and non-depictional representation, align more closely with modern philosophy of mind than commonly thought?
For example:
- Could his natural sign theory of sensory perception be seen as an early form of information-based theories of perception (e.g., Dretske’s semantic information theory or teleosemantics)?
- Does his denial of realitas objectiva to sensations anticipate later functionalism, where mental states are individuated by their causal roles rather than their intrinsic resemblance to objects?
- Or does he still remain too deeply rationalist for these comparisons to hold?
At a minimum, it would be partially anachronistic to claim that Descartes had anticipated functionalism, but you made an interesting connection, nevertheless.
That’s a fair point—anachronism is always a risk when drawing comparisons between historical and contemporary philosophy. But I appreciate that you found the connection interesting!
To refine the question: Instead of saying Descartes anticipated functionalism, would it be fair to say that his treatment of sensory ideas—specifically, their non-depictional yet lawfully correlated representational role—creates space for an interpretation that aligns with certain functionalist insights?
For example, one could argue:
- Sensory ideas are individuated by causal relations → They correlate with specific configurations of matter in motion.
- Their significance is determined by their functional role → They provide reliable, action-guiding information for the organism.
- They do not require resemblance to what they signify → Much like functionalist theories of mental states, where meaning comes from role rather than structure.
Of course, Descartes remains committed to a substance dualist framework, whereas modern functionalists reject that. But do you think there’s enough in his theory of sensory ideas to suggest that it at least leans in a proto-functionalist direction, even if the full framework isn’t there? Or do you think that’s still stretching his position too far?
Summarizing Conclusion written by Google’s Gemini – Flash 2.5 and slightly revised by Dr. Ring
Conclusion: Refining ScholarGPT’s interpretations
ScholarGPT’s initial presentation of Descartes’s theory of ideas included a general interpretation where ideas were mental representations. For instance, in response to a question about “loose sense” ideas, ScholarGPT stated they “may refer to abstract concepts, emotions, or even non-existent entities, without requiring any resemblance at all.” This was contrasted with “strict” ideas, which were understood to have a more direct, pictorial resemblance to their objects. Additionally, ScholarGPT initially distinguished ideas from “things,” describing ideas as “acts or modifications of the mind,” while reserving the term “thing” for independent substances.
Dr. Ring’s 
critique led to significant changes in these interpretations. A key change involved the definition of ideas as “things.” Dr. Ring argued that since minds exist in the universe and ideas are modes of the mind, ideas must also be considered “things” within the universe. This required ScholarGPT to clarify Descartes’s substance dualism, explaining that ideas exist as res cogitans (thinking things) but are not res extensa (extended things), meaning they are not “in the external world” in a physical sense. This distinction was further explored during a discussion about rainbows. Dr. Ring’s point that a rainbow is defined by its physical cause, not just its appearance, pushed ScholarGPT to better understand Descartes’s separation of objective physical reality and subjective mental phenomena.
The most substantial adjustment in ScholarGPT’s understanding concerned the nature of representation and the concept of objective reality. Dr. Ring challenged the initial simplification of what it means for an idea to be “just a representation,” prompting ScholarGPT to differentiate between an idea being a representation and an idea having a representational function. This led to the understanding that not all “aboutness” (intentionality) in Descartes’s view is equivalent to objectively real ‘as if’ depictional representation (tanquam rerum imagines) and thereby containing objectively real representational content. A cold sensation, for example, is about cold but lacks objective reality, and therefore is not ‘as if depictional.’ This specific point, guided by Dr. Ring, clarified that objective reality is what Descartes’s intellectual ideas necessarily contain, a quality entirely absent from secondary quality sensations. Thus, strict ideas (tanquam rerum imagines) have objective reality and ‘as if’ depictionally represent something, while sensations like cold do not, even if they serve as natural signs or reliable indicators of external states through lawful correlations.
NOTES
- 1Descartes affirms the awareness requirement for any mental act in his Fourth Replies to Arnauld:
“As to the fact that there can be nothing in the mind, in so far as it is a thinking thing, of which it is not aware, this seems to me to be self-evident. For there is nothing that we can understand to be in the mind, regarded in this way, that is not a thought or dependent on a thought. If it were not a thought or dependent on a thought it would not belong to the mind qua thinking thing; and we cannot have any thought of which we are not aware at the very moment when it is in us.” (AT VII: 246; CSM II: 171; bold not in original)