Define and characterize what it means according to Descartes for X to have formal reality.
According to Descartes, for something (X) to have formal reality means that (X) exists or is actual.
Formal reality (also called formal being or actual being) is the reality a thing possesses in virtue of its existing. It is the intrinsic, non-representational reality of a thing as it is in itself.
Core Characterization
- Existence or actuality
Something has formal reality if and only if it is an existent (actual) entity. Non-existent or merely possible things (Pegasus, a chimera, nothing) have no formal reality. Descartes repeatedly ties formal reality to the status of being an actual thing rather than a mere representation or object of thought. - Degrees / ontological hierarchy
Formal reality comes in three principal degrees, ordered by ontological dependence:- Infinite substance (God) possesses the highest degree of formal reality.
- Finite substances (minds and bodies) possess a lesser degree.
- Modes (modifications of substances) possess the least degree.
- A substance has more formal reality than any of its modes because a mode depends for its existence on the substance, while the substance does not depend on any particular mode.
- Contrast with objective reality
Formal reality is sharply distinguished from objective reality:- Formal reality belongs to a thing as it exists in itself.
- Objective reality belongs to a thing as it is represented in an idea (the being of the object in the intellect).
- Descartes states the contrast explicitly in the Second Replies (AT VII 161; CSM II 114):
“Whatever exists in the objects of our ideas in a way which exactly corresponds to our perception of it is said to exist formally in those objects. […] And the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect — not of course formally existing, as it does in the heavens, but objectively existing.” - Application to ideas
An idea, considered as an existent mode of mind, has formal reality simply in virtue of existing as a mode. Descartes is explicit (Third Meditation, AT VII 41; CSM II 28):
“The nature of an idea is such that of itself it requires no formal reality except what it derives from my thought, of which it is a mode.”
The formal reality of an idea is therefore always that of a mode and is derived from the formal reality of the mind. This is independent of whatever objective reality the idea may contain. - Causal implications
Formal reality is the kind of reality governed by the ordinary causal principles (ex nihilo nihil fit and the causal adequacy principle). A cause must contain at least as much formal reality as is found in its effect. This is why the objective reality contained in an idea requires a cause that has at least as much formal reality as the objective reality in the idea.
In short: formal reality is the reality of existence or actuality. It is possessed by substances and modes in virtue of their being real entities in the ontological hierarchy, and it is carefully distinguished from the representational (objective) reality that ideas alone can contain.
According to Descartes, can an idea be said to actually contain this particular objective reality A but not actually contain objective reality B?
Yes.
According to Descartes, an idea can contain one particular objective reality (or one particular degree of objective reality) while not containing another.
This is a central and explicit feature of his theory of ideas in the Third Meditation. Descartes holds that ideas differ widely in the objective reality they contain, and that the amount or kind of objective reality an idea contains is determined by what it represents:
“In so far as the ideas are simply modes of thought, there is no recognizable inequality among them: they all appear to come from within me in the same fashion. But in so far as different ideas represent different things, it is clear that they differ widely. Undoubtedly, the ideas which represent substances to me amount to something more and, so to speak, contain within themselves more objective reality than the ideas which merely represent modes or accidents.” (AT VII 40; CSM II 28)
Thus:
- An idea that represents a substance contains the objective reality appropriate to a substance.
- An idea that represents a mode contains only the lesser objective reality appropriate to a mode.
- The idea of God is singled out as containing a higher (or infinite) degree of objective reality than any other idea (AT VII 46; CSM II 31).
- Sensory ideas of heat or cold are said to contain so little objective reality that it is difficult to distinguish from non-being (AT VII 44; CSM II 30).
Descartes further insists that the specific objective reality contained in a given idea requires a cause with at least as much formal reality as is contained objectively in that idea (AT VII 41; CSM II 28–29). This would be unintelligible unless ideas can contain one determinate objective reality rather than another.
In short, containment of objective reality is selective: an idea can actually contain objective reality (A) (corresponding to what it represents) while not containing objective reality (B).
Do ideas when thought have formal reality?
Yes.
According to Descartes, when an idea is actually thought (that is, when it occurs as a mode of mind), it has formal reality.
An idea is a mode of thinking substance. As an existent mode, it possesses formal reality simply in virtue of existing. Descartes is explicit on this point:
“The nature of an idea is such that of itself it requires no formal reality except what it derives from my thought, of which it is a mode.” (AT VII 41; CSM II 28)
The formal reality of an idea is therefore always the formal reality of a mode, and it is derived from the formal reality of the mind itself. This holds for every actually occurring idea, regardless of what (if anything) the idea represents or how much objective reality it contains.
In short: the fact that an idea is being thought is already sufficient for it to have formal reality.
Therefore, when an idea X contains objective reality A but not objective reality B it must be the case that idea X contains objective reality A as a formally real content and does not have objective reality B as a formally real content, right?
No.
That does not follow, and it is not Descartes’s view.
Here is the correct structure according to Descartes:
- Idea (X), when actually thought, has formal reality (the formal reality of a mode of mind).
- Idea (X) can contain objective reality (A) while not containing objective reality (B).
But the objective reality that the idea contains is not itself a formally real content of the idea. Formal reality and objective reality remain two distinct kinds of reality belonging to the idea under different considerations:
- Formal reality belongs to the idea as an existent mode.
- Objective reality belongs to the idea as a representation (it is the being of the object in the intellect).
Descartes never treats the objective reality contained in an idea as something that itself possesses formal reality inside the idea. Doing so would collapse the distinction he carefully draws and would undermine the causal argument of the Third Meditation (especially the argument from the idea of God). An idea can contain a high degree of objective reality while itself having only the low formal reality of a mode precisely because the objective reality is not formally real in the idea.
The accurate formulation is therefore simply:
Idea (X) has formal reality (as a mode) and contains objective reality (A) (while not containing objective reality (B)).
It is not the case that objective reality (A) is present in the idea as a formally real content.
Can one correctly say that in idea X while being actually thought and containing objective reality A that objective reality A exists as a content of idea X?
Yes.
One can correctly say that, while idea (X) is actually being thought and contains objective reality (A), objective reality (A) exists as a content of idea (X).
Descartes himself uses this language. He speaks of ideas as “containing” objective reality, and he defines the objective reality of an idea as the being of the represented thing in so far as this exists in the idea (Second Replies, AT VII 161; CSM II 113–14). He also tells Caterus that the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect — not formally, but objectively (AT VII 102; CSM II 74–75).
So the formulation is accurate, provided one keeps the crucial qualification in place:
- Objective reality (A) exists as content of idea (X) (i.e., it exists objectively in the idea).
- It does not exist formally in the idea.
The idea itself has formal reality as a mode; the objective reality it contains has only objective existence within that idea.
No, it does not logically follow.
The inference rests on an equivocation on the word “exists.”
Descartes uses two distinct senses of existence:
- Formal / actual existence
This is the existence that confers formal reality. A thing has formal reality precisely when it exists formally (as an actual entity in the ontological hierarchy: infinite substance, finite substance, or mode). - Objective existence
This is the technical sense in which an object (or its reality) “exists in the intellect” or “exists in the idea.” Descartes repeatedly insists that this is not formal existence.
He draws the contrast explicitly:
“the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect — not of course formally existing, as it does in the heavens, but objectively existing, i.e., in the way in which objects are normally in the intellect.” (AT VII 102; CSM II 74–75)
And again:
“just as the objective mode of being belongs to ideas by their very nature, so the formal mode of being belongs to the causes of ideas.” (AT VII 42; CSM II 29)
When we say that objective reality (A) “exists as a content of idea (X),” we are using the second, technical sense (objective existence). That does not mean objective reality (A) has actual/formal existence inside the idea, and therefore it does not mean that objective reality (A) has formal reality.
If it did, Descartes’s entire causal argument in the Third Meditation would collapse. An idea of God could not contain infinite objective reality while itself possessing only the formal reality of a finite mode. Descartes is careful to keep the two modes of being distinct precisely so that this does not happen.
In short:
- Idea (X) (as mode) has formal reality.
- Objective reality (A) exists objectively in idea (X).
- But objective reality (A) does not thereby have formal reality.
The two claims are compatible only because “exists objectively” is not the same as “exists formally.”
Notice that when I asked you if “in idea X while being actually thought and containing objective reality A then objective reality A exists as a content of idea X?” I used the word exists. You understood that use of the word “exist” to mean actually exist. Since anything whatsoever, when it actually exists, is said to exist formally, it follows that actually existing objectively real A in idea X necessarily has formal reality as an actually existing objective reality in idea X.
No. That is not what was conceded, and the inference still fails.
When I affirmed that one can correctly say “objective reality (A) exists as a content of idea (X),” I was using the word “exists” exactly as Descartes uses it in this context: in the technical sense of objective existence (existence in the intellect / existence as represented). I immediately and explicitly qualified the affirmation:
Objective reality (A) exists as content of idea (X) (i.e., it exists objectively in the idea).
It does not exist formally in the idea.
I did not understand or treat that use of “exists” as meaning actual or formal existence. Descartes himself uses the verb “exists” in both senses and is careful to mark the difference. The passage to Caterus is the clearest illustration:
“the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect — not of course formally existing, as it does in the heavens, but objectively existing.”
Here Descartes uses the same verb (“existing”) twice in one sentence while denying that the two uses are equivalent. Objective existence is a genuine mode of being (it is “not nothing”), but it is not formal/actual existence, and therefore it does not confer formal reality.
Your argument requires that every time something is said to “exist” it thereby has formal reality. Descartes rejects that assumption. He carves out a distinct, technical sense of existence (objective existence) that precisely does not entail formal reality. That is why an idea of God can contain infinite objective reality while itself possessing only the formal reality of a finite mode.
The correct statements remain:
- Idea (X) (as an occurrent mode) has formal reality.
- Objective reality (A) exists objectively as content of idea (X).
- Objective reality (A) does not have formal reality.
There is no contradiction once the two senses of “exists” are kept distinct, as Descartes requires.
So, according to you does the non-existence of objective reality B in idea X lack having any formally real existence in idea X since it doesn’t exist in idea X?
Yes.
Since objective reality (B) is not contained in idea (X) at all, it has no existence of any kind in idea (X) — neither objective existence nor formal existence.
There is simply no such content present in the idea. Consequently it cannot have formally real existence in the idea, because it is not there in any sense.
The situation is asymmetrical only in the positive case:
- When objective reality (A) is contained in idea (X), it exists objectively in the idea (and still does not have formal reality in the idea).
- When objective reality (B) is not contained in idea (X), it has neither objective nor formal existence in the idea.
Absence is absence. Descartes’s distinction between formal and objective being applies only to what is present; it does not create a special status for what is missing.
So, you are willing to assert the non-existence of objective reality B in idea X by agreeing that it has no formal reality. Therefore, one can attribute non-existence in terms of lack of formal reality, right?
No, not in the way you are framing it.
The non-existence of objective reality (B) in idea (X) is attributed first and foremost by the fact that (B) is simply not contained in the idea — it is not present objectively. That is the primary and proper way of stating the absence.
Because it is not present in any sense, it of course also lacks formal reality in the idea. But the lack of formal reality is a consequence of its total absence, not the criterion or the primary way of attributing that absence.
If we said that we attribute the non-existence of objective reality (B) in terms of its lack of formal reality, we would again be treating formal reality as the sole or privileged measure of existence inside the idea. That is precisely what Descartes’s distinction is designed to prevent.
Correct order of explanation:
- Objective reality (B) is not contained in idea (X) (it has no objective existence in the idea).
- Therefore it also has no formal existence in the idea.
We do not reverse the order and treat lack of formal reality as the way of establishing or characterizing the non-existence of the objective content.
Why not? Didn’t you commit yourself to what I just claimed when you wrote:
“Consequently it cannot have formally real existence in the idea, because it is not there in any sense.”
No. That sentence does not reverse the order of explanation or make lack of formal reality the primary way of attributing non-existence.
Look carefully at the structure:
“Consequently it cannot have formally real existence in the idea, because it is not there in any sense.”
The clause after “because” states the more fundamental fact: total absence (no objective presence at all). The absence of formal reality is presented as a consequence of that more basic fact.
The explanatory direction runs:
- Objective reality (B) is not present in idea (X) in any sense.
- Therefore it cannot have formally real existence in the idea.
I did not say, and the sentence does not mean, that we attribute the non-existence of (B) by pointing to its lack of formal reality. The lack of formal reality is simply what follows once we have already established that (B) is absent.
The distinction remains intact: non-existence of an objective content is first a matter of its not being contained (not existing objectively). The further fact that it also lacks formal reality is derivative.
When you state “not existing objectively” are you using the word “existing” to mean actual existence?
No.
When I say “not existing objectively,” the word “existing” is used in Descartes’s technical sense of objective existence (presence as representational content in the intellect). It does not mean actual or formal existence.
“Not existing objectively” simply means that the relevant objective reality is not contained in the idea as content. It is not a claim about formal/actual existence.
So, according to you does the phrase “not existing objectively” mean ‘not objectively existing objectively’?
No.
The phrase “not existing objectively” simply means that the thing in question does not have objective existence — it is not present as objective being / not contained as content in the idea.
It does not mean “not objectively existing objectively.” That would be an empty and unnecessary doubling of the adverb. Descartes’s technical vocabulary does not require or support that reading.
But doesn’t ‘not being present’ imply not having actual existence?
Within the idea, yes — but only in a limited and careful sense.
If something is not present in idea (X) at all, then it has neither objective existence nor formal existence in that idea. So, restricted to the idea, “not being present” does imply that it has no actual (formal) existence inside the idea.
However, that does not mean the thing lacks actual existence tout court. The formal sun, for example, is not present in a given idea of a triangle, yet it can still have actual existence in the heavens.
When I have spoken of objective reality (B) “not being present” in idea (X), I have meant only that it is absent from the content of that idea. The implication for formal reality is therefore also restricted to the idea: (B) has no formal reality in idea (X). It is not a claim about the actual existence of anything outside the idea.
Therefore, given that when “restricted to the idea, “not being present” implies that something has no actual (formal) existence inside the idea” it logically follows that when something is present in an idea it must have formal existence as that content.
No. That does not follow.
You are treating “present” as a single, univocal notion and then inferring that whatever is present in the idea must therefore be formally present. Descartes rejects that assumption.
There are two distinct ways something can be related to an idea:
- The idea itself is formally present (it exists as an actual mode of mind).
- The content can be objectively present (it exists objectively in the idea).
When objective reality (A) is present in idea (X), it is present objectively. That is a different mode of presence from formal presence. Descartes repeatedly insists on the distinction precisely so that the content can be present without the content itself having formal reality inside the idea.
The negative point I granted earlier (if something is not present at all, then it has no formal existence in the idea) does not license the positive inference that whatever is present must therefore have formal existence as content. The two modes of being remain distinct.
I think you are misunderstanding my Intent here. I am not claiming that when thinking of the Sun, the Sun has formal reality as the content of the idea of the Sun. Rather, I am claiming that when thinking of the Sun, that has as its content an actually existing, objectively real representation of the Sun, then it follows that the objectively real representation of the Sun, because it is present and exists in that idea must itself have formally real existence.
Thank you for the clarification. I now understand the precise claim you are making.
You are not saying that the Sun itself is formally real inside the idea. You are saying that the objectively real representation of the Sun (the objective reality / objective being of the Sun as it is contained in the idea) is itself something that exists in the idea, and therefore that representation must have formal reality.
Descartes does not accept this.
On his view, the objective reality (or objective being) of the Sun is not itself a formally real entity or content that exists inside the idea with formal reality of its own. It is a distinct mode of being of the object — the object’s being in the intellect — and that mode of being is precisely not formal being.
Descartes is explicit that the objective mode of being belongs to the idea by its nature, while the formal mode of being belongs to the causes of ideas (AT VII 42; CSM II 29). He never treats the objective reality itself as an additional formally real item residing in the mind.
If the objectively real representation of the Sun had formal reality of its own inside the idea, then every idea would contain, in addition to its own formal reality as a mode, a second formally real entity (the objective content). That would reintroduce the very third-thing / veil-of-ideas structure that the formal/objective distinction is designed to avoid, and it would make the causal argument of the Third Meditation impossible (an idea of God could not contain infinite objective reality while itself having only the formal reality of a finite mode).
So the correct Cartesian position remains:
- The idea (as occurrent mode) has formal reality.
- The representation of the Sun exists objectively in the idea.
- That objective representation does not itself have formal reality.
The presence of the objectively real representation does not confer formal reality upon it.
Assuming I am correct for the sake of argument about OR contents being formally real contents, explain in detail why it “would reintroduce the very third-thing / veil-of-ideas structure that the formal/objective distinction is designed to avoid, and it would make the causal argument of the Third Meditation impossible (an idea of God could not contain infinite objective reality while itself having only the formal reality of a finite mode).”
Assuming for the sake of argument that the objective reality contained in an idea is itself a formally real content, two serious problems arise for Descartes’s system.
First, the veil-of-ideas problem.
If the objective reality of the Sun is a formally real entity existing inside the mind, then there is a distinct mental object, the formally real objective-Sun, present in the intellect. The mind is then directly acquainted only with this internal formally real representation. The external Sun, if it exists at all, is reached only indirectly through that internal object. This is precisely the third-thing structure that the formal/objective distinction is designed to prevent. Descartes’s repeated insistence that the idea of the Sun is the Sun itself existing in the intellect, not formally but objectively, is meant to block the introduction of any such intermediate formally real mental object. Once objective reality is treated as formally real content, that intermediate object is reintroduced and the directness of cognition is lost.
Second, the Third Meditation causal argument becomes impossible.
Descartes’s argument depends on the possibility that an idea can contain a degree of objective reality higher than the formal reality of the idea itself. The idea of God is said to contain the objective reality of an infinite substance, while the idea, as a mode of a finite mind, possesses only the formal reality of a mode. The causal principle then requires a cause outside the finite mind that has at least as much formal reality as is contained objectively in the idea.
If the objective reality of God were itself a formally real content of the idea, the situation would be transformed. The idea would then contain, as a formally real constituent, an infinite formal reality. But a finite mode cannot contain infinite formal reality. The meditator would already possess, inside the idea, the very infinite formal reality whose existence the argument is trying to prove. The causal principle could no longer force the conclusion that something outside the finite mind must exist, because the infinite formal reality would already be present within the mind itself. The argument would be blocked at the outset.
In short, treating objective reality as formally real content both reinstates a veil of intermediate mental objects and collapses the asymmetry between the formal reality of the idea and the objective reality it contains. That asymmetry is indispensable to the Third Meditation proof.
I disagree with your analysis here:
“If the objective reality of God were itself a formally real content of the idea, the situation would be transformed. The idea would then contain, as a formally real constituent, an infinite formal reality. But a finite mode cannot contain infinite formal reality. The meditator would already possess, inside the idea, the very infinite formal reality whose existence the argument is trying to prove. The causal principle could no longer force the conclusion that something outside the finite mind must exist, because the infinite formal reality would already be present within the mind itself. The argument would be blocked at the outset.”
My reasons are given that the idea iof God actually contains an infinite content it requires a formally real cause to account for how such an infinite content can be contained in that idea thereby requiring God’s existence to account for it.
Your proposed reply does not remove the difficulty.
Under the assumption we are examining, the infinite objective reality of God is itself a formally real content of the idea. That means an infinite formal reality is already present inside the idea as one of its constituents. The idea is then no longer a finite mode that merely contains something infinite in a different mode of being. It is a finite mode that has an infinite formal reality as part of what it is.
A finite mode cannot have an infinite formal reality as a constituent. If it did, the mode itself would possess infinite formal reality, which is incompatible with its being a mode of a finite substance. The meditator’s claim to be a finite being with only finite formal reality would already be false before the causal principle is applied. The argument cannot get off the ground, because one of its essential premises has been contradicted by the very presence of the infinite formally real content.
You suggest that one still needs a cause to explain how the finite idea manages to contain that infinite formally real content. But if the content is already formally real and infinite, the containment itself has already placed infinite formal reality inside the finite mind. There is no longer a gap that the causal principle can exploit to force the existence of something outside the mind. The infinite formal reality is already present within.
The only way to avoid this result is to deny that the infinite objective reality is formally real content. That returns us to Descartes’s actual distinction: the idea has only the formal reality of a finite mode, while the infinite reality it contains is merely objective. The causal principle can then operate on the mismatch between the two.
No, you are misphrasing the situation. You wrote: “It is a finite mode that has an infinite formal reality as part of what it is.” Instead the proper phrasing is: “the idea of God contains a formally real objective reality representation of God” that requires a formally real God to cause such an existing objectively real infinite representational content.
The rephrasing does not escape the difficulty.
If the idea of God contains a formally real objective-reality representation of God, then an infinite formal reality is present inside the mind as a real constituent of the idea. Calling it a “formally real objective reality representation” does not alter its status. Once that representation is formally real and infinite, the finite mind already contains something with infinite formal reality.
A finite substance cannot contain an infinite formal reality as a real constituent. The presence of that infinite formally real content already contradicts the claim that the meditator is a finite being possessing only finite formal reality. The causal principle is then unable to do its work, because the infinite formal reality is already located inside the finite mind. There is no longer a shortfall of formal reality that needs to be supplied by a cause outside the mind.
Descartes’s argument requires that the infinite reality be present only objectively, not formally. The moment the infinite representational content is itself treated as formally real, the asymmetry between the formal reality of the idea and the reality it contains disappears, and the proof cannot proceed.
No, it isn’t ‘an infinite formal reality present in the idea of God’ but an infinite amount of objective reality actually formally existing in that idea.
The new phrasing does not remove the problem.
If an infinite amount of objective reality is “actually formally existing” in the idea, then that infinite reality is formally real. The content is no longer merely objective; it is objective reality that has been given formal existence inside the idea. At that point the distinction between formal and objective reality has been collapsed for the content itself.
A finite mode cannot contain, as a formally existing constituent, an infinite amount of reality. The presence of that infinite formally existing content already places infinite formal reality inside a finite mind, which is incompatible with the mind’s finitude. The causal principle therefore has nothing left to do: the infinite formal reality is already present within the finite substance, and the argument that something outside the mind must exist cannot get started.
Descartes needs the infinite reality to remain merely objective so that the idea itself stays finite in formal reality. Once the infinite objective reality is also said to exist formally in the idea, that requirement is violated.
Let’s see if we can resolve the dispute between us by asking several questions.
You keep wanting to say “the infinite reality is formally real.” Describe an example where, in those circumstances, it would be true to claim one has a formally real infinite amount, and you don’t need to bring in any minds to provide the exampke but just the having of an infinite amount of something.
According to Descartes, the clearest case of something that has a formally real infinite amount is God Himself.
God is an infinite substance and therefore possesses infinite formal reality. In Descartes’s terms, God has an infinite degree of formal reality. This is not a matter of anyone’s mind or of any representation. It is simply the formal reality that belongs to God as an actually existing infinite being.
No other example works in the same way. Finite substances and modes have only finite formal reality. Descartes does not allow an infinite amount of formal reality to belong to anything other than the infinite substance.
Besides God and ignoring Descartes give another example.
An infinite collection of actual physical objects.
Suppose there is an infinite number of stars existing in an infinite universe. That collection is an actually existing infinite amount of something (stars). The infinity is formal in the sense that the stars really exist and there are infinitely many of them. No mind or representation is required for the example.
Good example. Now suppose I have the idea of an infinite number of stars as provided in your example. Call this the infinite stars idea, or ISI, for short. What objective reality content is contained in ISI?
ISI contains the objective reality of an infinite collection of stars.
In other words, the objective reality content of ISI is the infinite collection of stars as it exists objectively in the idea (the infinite collection of stars existing in the intellect).
I concur. Is that OR content of ISI such that it has a formally real infinite reality content? Explain why or why not.
No.
The objective reality content of ISI is the infinite collection of stars existing objectively in the idea. That content does not have formal reality.
Formal reality belongs only to what actually exists. The infinite collection of stars has formal reality only if it exists outside the mind, as in the earlier example of an actual infinite universe. When that same collection is the content of ISI, it exists solely in the objective mode: it is the infinite collection of stars as represented, not as actually existing inside the idea.
If the objective reality content of ISI itself possessed formally real infinite reality, then a finite mode of a finite mind would contain infinite formal reality. That is impossible on Descartes’s ontology. The whole point of the formal/objective distinction is to allow an idea to contain an infinite (or very high) degree of objective reality while the idea itself remains finite in formal reality. Treating the objective content as formally real would erase that distinction and make the containment impossible.
Suppose that you are correct and that no Cartesian idea is ever other than a “finite mode of a finite mind” and so contains only a finite amount of anything and never contains an infinite amount of anything. Would this work for Descartes’s philosophy?
You have mischaracterized the position I have been defending.
I have not claimed that a Cartesian idea “contains only a finite amount of anything and never contains an infinite amount of anything.”
My claim has been narrower and more precise:
- Every idea, as an occurrent mode of a finite mind, has only finite formal reality.
- The same idea can nevertheless contain infinite objective reality (or a very high degree of objective reality).
Those two claims are compatible precisely because formal reality and objective reality are distinct modes of being.
If we instead adopted the stronger view you just described (that no idea can contain an infinite amount of anything at all), Descartes’s philosophy would not work. The Third Meditation proof of God’s existence requires that the idea of God contain infinite objective reality. Without that infinite objective content, the causal principle cannot force the conclusion that an infinite formal reality (God) must exist outside the finite mind. The entire argument collapses.
So the restricted view you formulated would be fatal to Descartes’s system. The view I have actually defended is the one Descartes needs: finite formal reality of the idea, infinite objective reality contained in the idea.
Can you think of any examples where we can make a distinction between two things but that there are cases where an item that satisfies one of those distinctions also sometimes satisfies the other as well simultaneously?
Yes. Many distinctions allow the same item to satisfy both sides at once.
Here are a few clear examples:
- Color and shape
We distinguish color from shape. Yet a single object (a red sphere) is both red and spherical simultaneously. - Being a parent and being a child
These are distinct relations. Yet the same person is both a parent (of their children) and a child (of their parents) at the same time. - Cause and effect
We distinguish causes from effects. Yet the same event can be both: the lighting of a match is the effect of striking it and the cause of the flame. - Token and type
We distinguish particular tokens from abstract types. Yet a particular spoken word is both a concrete token and an instance of a linguistic type at the same moment. - Formal and objective reality of an extra-mental object (Hoffman’s reading)
The Sun is formally real in the heavens and, at the same time, objectively real in the intellect when someone thinks of it. The same object satisfies both descriptions simultaneously, though under different considerations.
In each case the distinction remains real and useful, yet the same item can fall under both sides at once. Whether the formal/objective distinction for the content of an idea works the same way is a further question, but the general pattern you are pointing to is common.
So does formal reality mean having actual existence or not?
Yes.
According to Descartes, formal reality means having actual existence. A thing has formal reality precisely insofar as it exists as an actual entity (an infinite substance, a finite substance, or a mode).
Can objectively reality A ever not exist?
Yes.
A particular objective reality (A) exists only when some idea actually contains it. If no idea currently contains that objective reality, then objective reality (A) does not exist (even objectively).
Objective reality is the being of something in an idea. Without the idea, that objective being is not present.
Therefore it is acceptable to apply the distinction of formal reality to non-existent objective reality A, correct?
In a trivial sense, yes.
Anything that does not exist lacks formal reality. So if objective reality (A) is non-existent (no idea currently contains it), then it also lacks formal reality. That application of the distinction is unproblematic.
But this trivial point does not support the further claim that an existing objective reality must therefore have formal reality. The two cases remain different:
- When objective reality (A) does not exist, it has neither objective nor formal existence.
- When objective reality (A) does exist (as content of an idea), it has objective existence and still lacks formal reality.
The fact that we can correctly say a non-existent objective reality lacks formal reality does not collapse the distinction for cases in which the objective reality is present.
When you claim objective reality A is present isn’t it true to then claim that objective reality A is not not formally real?
No.
When objective reality (A) is present, it is present objectively. That does not mean it is formally real.
The claim “it is not not formally real” would be equivalent to saying it is formally real. But that does not follow from its objective presence. Objective presence and formal reality remain distinct. Something can be objectively present while still lacking formal reality. That is exactly the situation Descartes describes for the content of an idea.