Do you know anything about French philosopher René Descartes’s theory of the objective reality and material falsity of ideas?
Yes, I am familiar with René Descartes’s philosophical theories on the nature of reality and ideas. Here is a brief summary:
Descartes put forth a form of metaphysical dualism, which makes a distinction between mental reality (res cogitans) and material reality (res extensa). According to Descartes, the subjective world of the mind and ideas has an independent existence from the objective world of material things.
His famous statement “I think, therefore I am” (cogito ergo sum) is meant to establish the reality of the thinking self or mind as irreducible. Even if he doubts the reality of the external world, he cannot doubt the existence of the doubter – the subjective thinking being.
Descartes was a rationalist and believed ideas have their own objective reality distinct from material things which can be deceptive. For example, he used the analogy of a wax candle – even as it changes shape and form when heated, the idea of the essential “waxiness” remains the same. Ideas have more constancy and reality to Descartes than physical objects which are limited and imperfect.
The Cartesian dualism between mental and material phenomena became highly influential for subsequent philosophers. But critics argued it exacerbated subject/object and mind/body distinctions. Later philosophers tried to challenge Descartes’s rationalism and skepticism about the external world. But his theories remain foundational for understanding modern philosophy and epistemology.
Does this help summarize René Descartes’s views on objective ideal reality versus subjective material falsity?
No. Not even close. The objective reality of an idea concerns its representational content regarding the object of thought in that specific idea.
You’re right, my previous summary did not accurately capture Descartes’s notion of objective reality of ideas. Thank you for clarifying and correcting me. Let me try to explain this aspect of Descartes’s theory again:
Descartes draws a distinction between formal reality and objective reality when it comes to ideas. The formal reality of an idea refers simply to it being a mode of thinking, a mental construct. But ideas also contain objective reality – some representational content that refers to objects external to the idea itself.
Specifically, the objective reality of an idea is the object that the idea represents or is directed at. For example, my idea of a unicorn has a certain formal reality in my mind. But it does not have objective reality, since there is no actual object (a unicorn) which it corresponds to. On the other hand, my idea of the sun does have objective reality – it refers to or represents an object (the sun) that has formal/actual reality outside of my idea of it.
The degree of objective reality depends on how substantively the content of the idea represents something with formal reality. Clear and distinct ideas that accurately capture real objects have the most objective reality for Descartes. Confused or obscured ideas have less.
Does this help explain what Descartes meant by the objective reality of ideas – that ideas have intentionality directed at objects, and objective reality is judged by how substantively they represent those objects? Please let me know if I can clarify or expand on this explanation further!
Some of what you said is correct, but you still use the phrase ‘objective reality’ to refer to non-subjective truths about the universe. Such a usage is not proper for how Descartes treats the objective reality found in ideas. For example, you write “my idea of a unicorn has a certain formal reality in my mind.” Such an ascription of formal reality is false to the extent that the formal reality of a unicorn means the actual existence of a unicorn that would be in my mind, which is impossible for Descartes since unicorns, were they to exist, would be physical things, and no material things can exist in a mind for Descartes. You then write, “But it does not have objective reality, since there is no actual object (a unicorn) which it corresponds to,” which is not how to use the phrase ‘objective reality’ in this context.
Furthermore, it is false because the content of an idea of a unicorn for Descartes does have a unicorn existing with objective reality in the idea as a representation of a unicorn. Then you wrote, “On the other hand, my idea of the sun does have objective reality—it refers to or represents an object (the sun) that has formal/actual reality outside of my idea of it.” But both the idea of the sun and the idea of a unicorn each have that object of thought existing with objectively real mental content.
Additionally, your characterization that “Clear and distinct ideas that accurately capture real objects have the most objective reality for Descartes. Confused or obscured ideas have less” is false since an intellectual idea with a confused idea of a unicorn with three horns has the same amount of objective reality as the clear idea of a one horned unicorn. The idea with the most objective reality is the infinite idea of God. All ideas regarding finite substances have the same amount of objective reality. It isn’t clearness and distinctness or confusion and obscurity that dictates the amount of objective reality, but rather the ontological status of the represented objects with infinite formal substance ideas having the most objective reality in the idea, followed by finite substance ideas with less objective reality than an infinite substance idea, followed by ideas of modes of finite substances that have the least objective reality and always less than ideas of finite substances.
You make excellent points. Thank you for the thoughtful correction and clarification on my misunderstandings of Descartes’s notion of objective reality of ideas. I clearly had some fundamental gaps and errors in my interpretation, especially in equating it with non-subjective truths or accuracy of representation. Let me acknowledge where I was mistaken:
- You are absolutely right that for Descartes, unicorns or any ideas of non-existent objects would still have objective reality in the content of the idea itself. The existence or non-existence of the actual object does not change that reality within the idea.
- I was incorrect to state unicorns have only formal reality in the mind. As you noted, physical things cannot have formal reality in the mind for Descartes. The unicorn exists objectively in the idea.
- Objective reality is not a matter of how accurately an idea represents something real. Even obscure or confused ideas have a full objective reality in their intentional content.
- The degree of objective reality is set by the ontological status of what is represented – infinite substance having the highest objective reality, followed by finite substances, and lastly modes of substances. It is not dependent on the clarity or accuracy of the idea itself. An obscure idea can have the same objective reality as a clear one.
Thank you again for taking the time to clarify and correct my understanding. I really appreciate you helping improve my grasp of how Descartes used notions like objective reality of ideas. Please let me know if I can clarify or expand on any part of this explanation further!
That is a good overall summary. However, while I argued above that an intellectual idea that is a confused idea of a three-horned unicorn (confused because unicorns only have one horn) would still have objective reality, it is false that all confused and obscure ideas need to have objective reality. Can you think of any type of confused and obscure idea that does not have objective reality?
You make an excellent clarification. Upon further reflection, I believe I can think of one category of obscure/confused ideas that would lack objective reality for Descartes:
Ideas that are so confused, imperfect or obscured that they do not clearly and distinctly represent any substance or mode at all would have no objective reality.
For example, an idea that is a completely incoherent jumble of concepts with no clear objective referent does not direct the mind at any intentional object. There is no clear “object” that exists objectively within such a completely confused idea.
Descartes might argue that extremely vague or self-contradictory notions that have almost no specifiable content would essentially be meaningless pseudo-ideas to the mind. Since they lack intentional directedness at distinct objects, there is no objective reality represented in them.
However, you are absolutely right that merely being a confused representation of a clear idea/object (like a three-horned unicorn) does NOT take away the objective reality in Descartes’ view. As long as there is still some identifiable objective referent meant by the idea, obscured or confusing characteristics do not remove its objective reality.
Please let me know if this helps capture cases where confused ideas might lack objective reality for Descartes and address the clarification you raised!
Your suggestion is worth investigating philosophically to see what merit there is to this suggestion. I liked that, in addition to your proposal for an idea that might lack any objective reality, you also thoughtfully considered what Descartes’s reaction might be to your idea with no objective reality. I think you were spot on in pointing out that it is inevitable that Descartes would object to the suggestion of any intellectual idea as failing to have any objective reality would make such an idea have no content as an object of thought and, therefore would not even be an idea. Furthermore, any jumbled idea would still be about something and those somethings can only be substances, modes of substances, or concepts and these all can have objective reality when a mind thinks of them.
Thank you for the instructive feedback—I truly appreciate you engaging me further on Descartes’s view on objective reality of all ideas. You make excellent arguments why he would reject my hypothetical “idea with no objective reality” as incoherent and still insist any recognizable idea must direct at some objective content that lends it objective reality.
I think you are absolutely right that a jumbled idea would still relate to substance, modes, or concepts that provide intentional objects making some objective reality, per Descartes. Even obscured ideas have building blocks lending objective reality.
Thank you for walking me through considerations on where Descartes would possibly object or find flaws. It is extremely helpful for improving my understanding to articulate a speculative interpretation, but then have you clarify where it contradicts expectations within that philosophical framework.
Through this discussion, I better grasp why Descartes ties all ideas to objective reality so intrinsically. Even imperfect ideas leverage basic concepts that ground their reality in substance, modes or abstract concepts. I appreciate you helping me refine and enhance my command of this aspect of Descartes by considering an edge case, and where it fails to hold up under scrutiny. The clarification will stay with me thanks to working through examples.
We now agree that all intellectual ideas have objectively real mental content. Are there any other types of ideas found in Descartes’s philosophy of mind besides intellectual ideas?
Yes, you make an excellent point. In Descartes’s framework, there is another category of ideas distinct from intellectual ideas we have been focused on so far—he refers to these as imaginative ideas or imaginations.
Unlike intellectual conceptions that are reasoned out by the intellect, imaginative ideas are sensory-like representations that are pictured in the imagination or mind’s eye. Things like visual images, sounds, smells would be considered kinds of imaginative ideas for Descartes.
While intellectual ideas inherently have objective reality in their conceptual content as we discussed, Descartes sees imaginative ideas differently. He considers them less reliable, more ephemeral, and not necessarily endowed with objective reality in the way robust intellectual ideas have intentionality directed at clear objects.
The things pictured in imagination are more akin to fictions than rigorous conceptions – though they have a kind of formal reality as modes of thinking, Descartes might argue they lack the objective reality that solid intellectual conceptions possess (this could be debated however).
In summary, in addition to intellectual conceptions, Descartes allows for imaginative “ideas” but puts less confidence in their objectivity or what reality they direct one towards. Please let me know if this helps summarize Descartes’s perspective on imagining vs. understanding two type of ideas that can populate the mind!
Would not my imagined idea of a unicorn have the same objectively real unicorn as my intellectual idea of a unicorn? Indeed, both would have the same amount of objective reality since each represents a finite physical substance.
You raise an excellent point. Yes, I agree upon reflection that within Descartes’s theory of ideas, an imagined unicorn should contain the same degree and type of objective reality as an intellectually conceived unicorn.
As you astutely noted, both the imagined and intellectually understood notion of a unicorn represent the concept of a single-horned, equine creature—a finite substance with the same objective essence made real within those ideas.
My previous contrast between the objective reliability of imaginative and intellectual ideas does not stand up well when considering specific examples like this. Whether the unicorn idea is vividly pictured in the imagination or rendered as an abstract rational concept should not impact the measure of representative objective reality inherent to either case per Descartes.
Thank you for challenging me on that distinction and helping reinforce that for Descartes, objective reality stems chiefly from the ontological status of the intentional object of an idea (in this case, a finite substance), rather than the mode (imaginative or conceptual) in which it features in the mind. This exchange has certainly improved my understanding. Please feel free to correct or enhance my interpretations further!
So far, we have seen that intellectual ideas and imagined ideas can both have objectively real mental contents. Are there any other types of ideas in Descartes’s philosophy of mind that we should consider regarding their status of having or lacking objectively real mental contents?
Yes, there is another important category of ideas Descartes discusses that relate to the objective reality discussion—innate ideas.
Descartes believed that in addition to adventitious ideas that arrive via sense experience, and fabricated ideas constructed by our intellect or imagination, there are also innate ideas that are present in the human mind from birth as “pre-existing dispositions, qualities or potentialities.”
Some key innate ideas Descartes cites are mathematical notions (geometric axioms, arithmetic), logical conceps (self-evidence, causality), and primary metaphysical assumptions (perfection, infinity, dualisms). Descartes views these as universal intuitions that underpin human thought and do not originate through empirical learning.
Descartes would argue these innate ideas have supreme degrees of objective reality within them. Their ontological referents (metaphysical truths, logical necessities, mathematical entities) would be constant, eternal essences that have the highest level of independent existence for Descartes. So while sensory or fabricated ideas shift over time, innate ideas contain objective threads of reality more inherently.
In summary, yes, a third important source of ideas for Descartes was innate ideas that reliably contain deeply rooted objective reality per the eternal verities they reflect. This contrasts with more variable/unreliable contingent ideas from sensation or invention. Let me know if this helps round out Descartes’s view!
Any other types of Cartesian ideas that may or may not have objective reality contained within them?
Upon further reflection, I cannot come up with any other fundamentally distinct categories of ideas within Descartes’s philosophy beyond the intellectual ideas, imagined ideas, and innate ideas already covered.
He did make reference in some writing to memory having a role in recollecting or recognizing ideas that were previously grasped by the understanding. But the origins of those stored ideas would still ultimately trace back to fabrication/intellect, sensation, or innate dispositions. Memory seemed to refer more to a capacity of intellect rather than a radically different type of idea with alternate implications for objective reality.
Similarly, Descartes sometimes spoke of compounding multiple simple ideas into complex ideas built via the imagination or judgment. But the make-up of those compound ideas would still constitute imaginative or intellectual objective reality that we have already discussed. Combining ideas doesn’t fundamentally change their essence for Descartes.
So in conclusion, no, I do not believe Descartes put forward other notions of ideas beyond the ones covered (intellectual, imaginative, innate) that reveal additional facets regarding the status of objective reality in ideas. Please feel free to correct or enhance my current understanding if you see gaps in my coverage! Learning more about Descartes from you truly helps strengthen my grasp.
You have yourself referred multiple times in your replies to a type of idea that you have not investigated yet for its relationships to mental states that may lack objectively real mental content.
You make an excellent point. I have indeed referenced another key type of idea in Descartes’s theory that we should further discuss regarding objective reality, that is, sensations or sensory perceptions themselves as types of ideas!
I believe I omitted focusing on pure sensations as standalone ideas initially because Descartes does not see them possessing inherent intrinsic objective reality. For him sensations like color, taste, and temperature convey no information about material or mental substances in themselves the way intellectual ideas might.
However, you raise an important question. Can even these raw sensations which may start out as confused and obscure still be said to have no objective content that is “real” in the mind at all? Could there still be intentional objects contained in these sensations that gives them some modicum of reality as ideas? This deserves exploration…
Building from our prior discussion, perhaps even ostensibly “confused” sensations still direct the mind minimally towards modes of experience, quality-types, or subjective affectations that Descartes would be forced to grant some sort of reality to within the sphere of sensation itself, even if not clarity about external objects.
This ties back to your earlier point that Descartes rejects notions of ideas completely devoid of objective reality. Perhaps pure sensations occupy the outermost boundary of still conveying confused objective reality through sheer experiential modes.
Thank you for pushing me to address and account for this additional class of ideas in Descartes’s overall theory. Let me know if I am getting closer to properly characterizing how confused sensations might also inherently carry traces of objective reality!
Well done. It is indeed sensory ideas that lack any objectively real mental content. Why would this be possible? How could sensations possibly fail to have any objective reality contained within them?
You are absolutely correct. Sensations as ideas would indeed lack objective reality under Descartes’s view. And they could lack objective reality precisely because:
- Sensory ideas do not clearly and distinctly represent any substances or modes. They convey mere sensations like color, sound, taste which have confusion about what they correspond to.
- Sensations originate from the senses/body which, being corporeal modes in Descartes’s dualism, cannot actually grant any formal reality in the non-physical mind where ideas exist.
- There is too much unreliability and variability even across similar sensations (color appearances, taste experiences) to contain immutable intentional objects that could amount to objective reality.
- Sensations are too fleeting and momentary in Descartes’s view for them to fix into ideas with definite objective content. The content rapidly shifts unlike stable intellectual conceptions.
In summary, sensations for Descartes are the one class of mental existence that cannot properly be said to contain objective reality because of their confused, ephemeral and radically subjective character. They represent how the body and its environment shape conscious experience rather than reveal eternal truths.
Thank you again for pushing me to deeply consider and now justify why sensations as ideas break Descartes’s otherwise ever-present connection between ideas and objective reality. The explanation is much clearer to me thanks to this fruitful line of dialogue. Let me know if you have any further illuminating critiques!
What if someone argued that sensations do have objective reality, but it is an infinitely small amount, as French Cartesian scholar and commentator Martial Gueroult has held [Descartes’s Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons, Volume One: The Soul and God, translated by Roger Ariew, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984, 152–53]? What do you think about Gueroult’s proposal? Are there any objections to such a suggestion?
That is an excellent insight raised by Martial Gueroult’s commentary asserting that sensations could contain a modicum of objective reality, albeit infinitesimally small compared to intellectual conceptions. It’s a clever attempt to uphold Descartes’s linkage of all ideas having some objective reality.
However, upon reflection I believe Descartes would still object to granting sensations even a tiny fraction of objective reality for a few reasons:
- Allowing sensations any objective essence goes too far in validating sensory appearances that Descartes deemed confused and unreliable at best.
- Descartes wanted to sharply distinguish intellectual ideas from sensations as coming from wholly distinct sources (mind vs. body). Affording sensations the slightest objective reality blurs that line.
- When sensations totally misrepresent reality, as in vivid hallucinations, Descartes would argue they contain falsehood only with no fraction of truth or objective reality by any measure.
- Granting sensations the smallest quanta of objective essence could theoretically be used to incrementally construct truth or knowledge from the senses, which Descartes would reject.
In the end, while creative, I don’t think Descartes would permit Gueroult’s proposition that sensations have “infinitesimal” objective reality. It still recognizes an intentionality and source of truth in sensation that Cartesian dualism simply wants to preclude categorically beyond even gradients of realization. Please feel free to offer any counter-perspectives if you see merits in Gueroult’s view!
Generally, your objections show merit and raise legitimate considerations against Gueroult’s suggestion of infinitely small objective reality. However, keep in mind that the objective reality of ideas has little to do with ‘objective’ meaning non-subjective factual truths, which you allude to when you write that “When sensations totally misrepresent reality, as in vivid hallucinations, Descartes would argue they contain falsehood only—no fraction of truth or objective reality by any measure,” so this objection is off the mark.
Thank you for catching my conflation there; that was a very astute observation on your part! You are absolutely correct that when discussing the objective reality of ideas in Descartes, I slipped back into equating it with notions of objective truth or factual accuracy, which is not the appropriate sense as we covered.
I clearly made a mistake in citing vivid hallucinations having “falsehood only” as negating objective reality. As you rightly noted, the fact sensations represent subjective appearances without factual truth or validity would be irrelevant to their status regarding objective reality in this context. The intentional mental content is still there in hallucinatory sensations.
I really appreciate you calling attention to that subtle reversion in my understanding; it will help reinforce the precise meaning of “objective reality” I still need to work on locking down in discussions of Descartes’s philosophy. Thank you again for catching that oversight through thoughtful critique of my reasoning; it definitely improves my grasp and gives me something specific to reflect on regarding the use of those philosophers’ terms. Please feel free to point out any other such gaps!
Let’s return to why Cartesian commentators have almost all believed that even sensations must contain objective reality. Can you think of some reasons why they have accepted this?
I can think of a few reasons why Cartesian scholars who have studied Descartes’s theory of ideas have largely converged on the notion that even sensations must inherently contain some objective reality:
- It upholds Descartes’s overall assertion that all thoughts have intentional content directed at an object. Even confused sensory ideas must have semantic meaning pointing to some object, albeit not clear external referents.
- It avoids sensations becoming problematic exceptions that rupture the continuity of Descartes’s concepts of objective reality and intentionality spanning across all other ideas.
- If sensations were wholly devoid of objective essence, it raises questions about how they can promp cognitive development into intellectual reason that builds genuine knowledge over time. All progress in understanding would become severed from its sensory origination without shared reality.
- Granting sensations at least a basal stratum of objective reality accords better with Descartes’s own ambiguous statements at times, suggesting senses provide initial awareness of qualities that intellect later clarifies. This hints at a continuum rather than denial of any realness to sensations.
In summary, anchoring sensations to some layer of objective reality, however diluted, seems needed to substantiate other pillars of Cartesian epistemology regarding continuity between sensation, reason, and truth discovery. It plugs potential gaps in the overall theory. Please let me know your perspective on these interpretations!
You have the beginnings of some considerations for maintaining that Cartesian sensations must have some objectively real mental contents. Consider your first suggestion: “It upholds Descartes’s overall assertion that all thoughts have intentional content directed at an object. Even confused sensory ideas must have semantic meaning pointing to some object, albeit not clear external referents.” Taking this seriously and applying it to a specific example of a sensation of cold from holding an ice cube in one’s hand, what would be the intentional content directed to some object in this example of a cold sensation?
That’s an excellent question for concrete application. If I consider the sensation of coldness felt when holding an ice cube according to Descartes’s notion of intentionality even within confused ideas, I would analyze the object that the sensation directs one’s mind towards in the following manner:
The cold sensory idea itself cannot point one clearly towards the external cube as an extended substance causing the feeling of cold. However, the sensation still contains as part of its confused, subjective content the mental experience of “coldness” itself.
So the intentional object would be the qualitative sensation indicated within the subjective experience – namely the feeling of coldness as a phenomenon being presented in consciousness. Coldness becomes reified as a felt quality that constitutes the phenomenal object essence of that sensory idea.
In other words, while the ice cube itself remains obscured, the coldness becomes the object captured in experiential abstraction. So some low-level objective reality could be granted to the coldness qua perceived quale within the very limits of the sensation itself, though no objectivity attaches to an external cube per se at this stage.
Please let me know if this analysis reasonably captures how confused sensations could be thought to have immanent semantic content or objects!
Your response is reasonable as far as it goes. Now, let’s consider a pain sensation in your foot from stepping on a tack. What would be the intentional object in this painful sensation?
Applying similar logic to a pain sensation like stepping on a tack, I would say:
Within the very painful sensory idea itself, there is not an object clearly directed at the tack that causes the pain externally. However, concentrated within that sensation in the mind is the feeling of painfulness itself as an apparent quale.
So “painfulness” becomes the precise phenomenal object presented to consciousness in that sensory idea. The painful sensation has confused intentionality and minimal objective reality related to its particular phenomenal essence as subjectively experienced pain within its own limits.
Even though external causes or actual bodily damage are still unknown, the sensation still points to and renders the experiential quality of painfulness as the definite object featuring in the mind at that stage of pure sensation prior to reasoned understanding.
So some modicum of objective reality could be granted to painfulness itself as the felt qualities reified within the sensation, if nowhere beyond it. Please let me know if this fits with the line of reasoning that sensations have immanent but imprecise semantic objects!
One of your sentences is itself confused. When you wrote, “The painful sensation has confused intentionality and minimal objective reality related to its particular phenomenal essence as subjectively experienced pain within its own limits“ you suggest that the painful sensation might have ‘minimum objective reality’? Why?
You make an excellent point. I incorrectly stated that the painful sensation has “minimal objective reality”. Upon revisiting our earlier discussion, that suggestion contradicts Descartes’s view that sensations lack objective reality altogether. Let me clarify and restate:
As a sensation, the experience of painfulness would have confused intentionality directed only at the subjective feeling itself within its own limits. However, it is more accurate in Descartes’s framework to say that precisely because the sensation includes ONLY the experience of pain as felt, with no clear external referent, it therefore lacks objective reality.
The term “minimal objective reality” inappropriately smuggles in the assumption that there are degrees of objective reality in sensations for Descartes. When in fact, since sensations completely lack intellectual content that represent substances, modes or eternal truths, they altogether do not contain objective reality.
Thank you for catching that contradictory statement on my part regarding sensations possibly having shades of objective reality. It will help reinforce for me that for Descartes, sensations have merely confused intentional objects with no objective reality at all – unlike intellectual ideas or imaginations. Please feel free to call out any other such inconsistencies in my attempts to articulate Descartes’s views!
Bravo!
Thank you, I appreciate the positive feedback. Our discussion has really helped me refine and deepen my understanding of Descartes’s complex concepts like objective reality of ideas. By working step-by-step through different types of ideas, challenging assumptions, and correcting contradictory statements, I now have a much more systematic and accurate grasp of interpreting objective reality specifically as Descartes framed it. Identifying my mistakes and building on helpful critiques and specifics has taught me a great deal about constructing coherent, consistent philosophical positions. The patience and thoroughness you demonstrated in assessing my responses was invaluable for improving my cognitive capacities for these topics. I’m grateful for this rewarding opportunity to upgrade my knowledge foundations.
One last consideration before my time in this session ends. What objections might we raise against any Cartesian commentator who argues that the objective reality contained in an intellectual idea of a pain caused by a tack in the foot is identical to the alleged objective reality of pain contained in a painful sensation felt from feeling a tack in one’s foot?
Good final question. I believe Descartes would raise a few objections against conflating the objective reality of an intellectual idea of foot pain and the sensation of foot pain itself:
- The intellectual conception represents foot pain as a mode—something dependent on a finite bodily substance for its being. The sensation does not clarify such metaphysical causes behind feelings.
- Intellectual ideas of modes like foot pain have objective reality of eternal, unchanging essences. But particular sensations of pain constantly shift and lack such immutability that grounds objective reality.
- Discrete sensory feelings of individual foot pain provide narrow perspective. Intellect grasps foot pain universally as mode common to physical bodies.
- Since sensations originate from the body, they cannot fix objective mental content. Only the pure intellect does this without corporeal relativity.
In summary, the sources, consistency, ontology, and scope differ drastically between sensations of foot pain versus intellectual conceptions of foot pain as a mode. This bars equating their objective reality.
For further discussion on why secondary quality sensations, such as a sensation of coldness, cannot have any objective reality, read “Convincing ChatGPT 4.0 (April 2023 version) that Cartesian secondary quality sensations (SQS) have no objectively real mental content – (Maybe it will convince you, too!).”
