The Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus (P. Berol. inv. 9782), a fragmentary Middle Platonist text dated to the 1st or 2nd century AD, provides a detailed, line-by-line exegesis of the dialogue from its prologue through approximately 153d–154b, with additional fragments extending to discussions of dreams, madness, and perceptual errors. Likely originating from an Alexandrian philosophical milieu, the commentary exemplifies the era’s trend toward dogmatic interpretations of Plato, blending exegesis with doctrinal advocacy. It positions itself as a defense of a unified Platonic-Academic tradition, eclectically incorporating (and subordinating) Aristotelian, Stoic, and skeptical elements to Platonist principles. The commentator (Anon.) rejects skeptical readings of Plato, emphasizing recollection (anamnesis), metaphysical flux, and assimilation to the divine as core to epistemology.
Anon. argues that the Theaetetus is fundamentally about the essence of “simple and incomposite knowledge” (e.g., cognition of individual theorems in geometry or music), not the criterion of truth or the objects of knowledge. This contrasts with rival Platonists who saw it as addressing the criterion (using it instrumentally for judgment) or delineating what knowledge is not of (sensibles, as in the Theaetetus) versus what it is of (Forms, as in the Sophist). Instead, Anon. views the dialogue as didactic, not aporetic, aligning it with Plato’s broader metaphysics: knowledge is “right opinion bound by an explanation given by reasoning” (echoing the Meno), tested against sensory accuracy, right opinion, and reasoned opinion, culminating in an incomplete but near-complete definition (lacking only the “bond of explanation”).
The commentary begins with the prologue, dismissing an “affected” alternative version and interpreting the genuine one (starting “Just now, Terpsion”) as a model of ethical “appropriate actions” (kathēkonta, borrowed from Stoics but rooted in Socratics). It praises Euclid as a “weighty man” for framing the dialogue, avoiding narrative interruptions. Discussions of characters highlight natural traits: Theaetetus embodies rare virtues (e.g., quick learning, gentleness, courage) that may conflict but coexist in exceptional souls. Anon. critiques popular beauty standards, equating true beauty with wisdom.
A significant portion explicates the mathematical interlude (147c–148d), reconstructing Theodorus’ demonstration of incommensurable “Powers” (squares with oblong-number areas, like 3ft or 5ft, commensurate in plane but not sides with a 1ft square) versus “Lengths” (square-number areas, commensurate in both). Anon. extends this to solids, using numbers for clarity and emphasizing universals to encompass infinities—a dialectical principle. This section, with diagrams and proofs, showcases Anon’s use of Aristotelian syllogistic for exegesis, revealing hidden doctrines.
The midwifery metaphor (148e–151d) is tied to recollection: souls are pregnant with conceptions needing articulation, not implantation. Socrates’ “barrenness” is relative to teaching others, aligning with divine compulsion for recollection over dogmatism. Anon. addresses appropriation (oikeiosis), critiquing Stoics and Epicureans for failing to preserve justice (e.g., unequal appropriation leads to unequal striving). Justice is instead based on “likeness to god,” not natural sympathy, with a shipwreck dilemma refuting Stoic claims.
Protagoras’ relativism (“man is the measure”) is critiqued via flux: nothing is absolute; all is relative, leading to perception equaling knowledge (tested with wind-coldness examples). Anon. subordinates Heraclitean flux and Empedoclean effluences to Platonism, rejecting Parmenides’ stasis. Fragments critique false perceptions in dreams/madness, affirming perception’s infallibility under Protagorean assumptions but ultimately refuting it.
Critically, the commentary is eclectic yet dogmatic, using rival philosophies polemically (e.g., against Stoic virtues or Epicurean atomism) to affirm Plato’s superiority. It employs syllogistic reconstruction to “uncover” doctrines, reflecting Middle Platonism’s harmonizing tendency. However, its denial of a two-worlds epistemology (Forms for knowledge, sensibles for opinion) as explaining the aporia surprises modern scholars, who often see the absence of Forms as key to the dialogue’s inconclusiveness. Anon’s optimism—that the definition is nearly complete—contrasts with aporetic readings. The text’s fragmentary nature limits scope, but its survival offers rare insight into pre-Neoplatonic commentary traditions, blending pedagogy with philosophy.
Unique Interpretations by Anonymous Not Advocated by Current Platonic Scholars
Based on contemporary scholarship (e.g., Sedley, Bonazzi, Tarrant, Matoso), Anon’s interpretations are often eclectic and Middle Platonist-specific, but many align with or influence later traditions. However, several stand out as distinctive to Anon. in ways not replicated or advocated by modern scholars, who typically emphasize different aspects of Plato’s epistemology, such as the role of Forms in resolving the aporia or the dialogue’s aporetic nature. Modern Unitarians (e.g., Cornford) often see the Theaetetus as presupposing Forms, while Revisionists (e.g., Ryle) view it as independent of them; Anon.’s positions diverge uniquely without modern parallels.
- Rejection of the “Object-Related” Interpretation Without Invoking Forms as the Resolution: Anon. explicitly denies that the Theaetetus demonstrates what knowledge is not of (sensibles) while the Sophist shows what it is of (Forms), insisting instead that both dialogues concern the essence of knowledge, not its objects (cols. II–III). Modern scholars like Sedley note this as “surprising” because it rejects what many (e.g., Unitarians) see as Plato’s “fundamental insight”—a two-kinds-of-objects epistemology (Forms for knowledge, sensibles for opinion) explaining the aporia. No current scholar advocates this exact denial; instead, they either endorse the object-distinction (e.g., Cornford 1935, Gill/McCabe 1996) or argue the dialogue stands alone without Forms (Revisionists like Runciman 1962). Anon’s view—that the aporia stems from an incomplete definition (needing only the “bond of explanation”) rather than ontological shortfall—is not championed today, as it downplays Forms’ role in a way modern Platonists find un-Platonic.
- Justice Based Solely on “Likeness to God,” with a Specific Shipwreck Dilemma Refuting Stoic Appropriation: In discussing appropriation (oikeiosis) (cols. V–VIII), Anon. critiques Stoics for basing justice on unequal natural sympathy, using a shipwreck scenario (only one survivor) to refute it, and insists Plato grounds justice in divine assimilation, not oikeiosis. While modern scholars discuss Plato’s divine likeness (e.g., Sedley 1999 on Theaetetus digression), none advocate this precise anti-Stoic formulation as Plato’s intent in the Theaetetus, nor use the shipwreck exactly as Anon. does. Contemporary analyses (e.g., Annas 1999) link justice to Forms or virtue-unity, not this eclectic polemic subordinating Stoicism.
- The Theaetetus as Exclusively About “Simple and Incomposite Knowledge,” Defined Eclectically with Aristotelian and Zenonian Elements: Anon. defines the dialogue’s scope as simple knowledge (e.g., individual theorems), drawing from Plato’s Meno (“right opinion bound by reasoning”), Aristotle (“supposition with proof”), and Zeno (“disposition in receipt of impressions not modifiable by argument”) (col. XV). Modern scholars (e.g., Chappell 2005, Fine 2014) debate knowledge definitions but do not advocate this hybrid as Plato’s core thesis; they focus on perception, true belief, or logos, without Anon’s eclectic synthesis or restriction to “simple” versus “composite” (systematic) knowledge. This Aristotelian-Stoic blend for exegesis is noted as distinctive Middle Platonist (Bonazzi 2008), not mirrored in current advocacy.
These interpretations reflect Anon’s Middle Platonist context—eclectic yet dogmatic—but modern scholarship finds them idiosyncratic or overly harmonizing, preferring views that highlight the dialogue’s aporia, Forms’ absence, or Socratic inquiry. No tool results show current scholars endorsing these exact positions; instead, they critique or historicize them as non-standard. If none exist, the answer is that all Anon’s key claims have modern parallels or contrasts, but the above are the closest to uniquely unadvocated.