“Consciousness bei Descartes” by Christian Barth (English translation by DeepL & Google Translate)

October 4, 2024

Barth, Christian . “Bewusstsein bei Descartes“ [”Consciousness in Descartes”] — Preprint / Published in: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie [Archive for the History of Philosophy] 93 (2011): 162–94.

[NOTE: All underlining was in original. There are some minor formatting changes in this English translation. The page numbers 1–40 are at the bottom of each section of text below and mirror the corresponding German pages in the preprint.]

Abstract

For Descartes, consciousness is closely connected to the intellectual perception of thought. This paper argues that the prevalent interpretations of Descartes’s account of consciousness in terms of higher-order perception and self-representation fail. These interpretations mistakenly assume that Cartesian consciousness possesses the same theoretical structure in all cases. It is shown by a close analysis of relevant passages that for Descartes the consciousness of perceptions and the consciousness of volitions have different theoretical structures. From this analysis a more adequate picture of Cartesian consciousness is developed and, finally, compared with a recent reconstruction provided by Vili Lähteenmäki.

Consciousness in Descartes¹

1 Introduction: The research situation

It is not without reason that the topic of consciousness is often seen as the linchpin of Descartes’ conception² of the mind. Three observations support this view:

+++a) Consciousness of one’s own thoughts is the starting point of cogito reasoning;

+++b) Descartes emphatically defends the thesis that consciousness is a defining characteristic of thoughts and thus every thought is conscious of the thinking being;

+++c) Descartes gives rise to the assumption that he regards consciousness as the essential characteristic of the mind.

Despite these observations, it is astonishing how little Descartes says about consciousness. Descartes distinguishes very precisely between a basal consciousness (referred to below as ‘consciousness_b‛), which is involuntary and concerns all acts of thought, and a reflexive consciousness of attention, which consists in an arbitrary act of reflecting on acts of thought and whose object is only some acts of thought.³ Descartes also emphasizes that the above-mentioned observations all concern only involuntary consciousness. This is therefore the actually interesting type of consciousness in Descartes. Nevertheless, his statements on the subject of consciousness remain sparse and in need of interpretation. It is therefore not surprising that very different conceptions of consciousness_b in particular have been attributed to Descartes in the research literature.

¹ I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments, Johannes Haag for valuable discussions on the topic of consciousness in Descartes, and the participants of the colloquium of the Institute of Philosophy at the Humboldt University of Berlin (summer semester 2009) for stimulating questions and comments on an earlier lecture version of this text. Finally, I would like to thank Boris Hennig for discussing the text, Elena Baltuta for clarifications on Thomas Aquinas, Paolo Rubini for discussing some translation issues and Sebastian Bender for reviewing the manuscript.

² I am deliberately speaking of a conception and not of a theory of consciousness. As Andreas Kemmerling rightly notes, Descartes had “strong intuitions on the subject of consciousness” but “no elaborated doctrine of it” (Kemmerling 1996, 166). Unfortunately, this leads to unattractive expressions such as “meta-act conception,” which must be used to describe the position attributed to Descartes by authors.

³ As we shall see, Vili Lähteenmäki even distinguishes three types of consciousness in Descartes (see Lähteenmäki 2008).

Preprint / Published in: Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie [Archive for the History of Philosophy] 93 (2011), 162–94

One of the few passages in which Descartes comments on consciousness is his definition of the term ‘idea’ in the appendix to his replies to Mersenne’s objections. There Descartes states that the consciousness that accompanies all acts of thought consists in an immediate perception of the form of these acts of thought:

[Quote 1] By the name of idea I understand that form of any thought by the immediate perception of which I am conscious of the very same thought. (AT VII 160)

Since, for Descartes, perceptions are acts of the intellect, this passage indicates that Descartes advocates an intellectual conception of consciousness_b. And this should come as no surprise. For Descartes, thinking beings have two fundamental faculties, the intellect and the will. While the activities of the intellect for Descartes consist in grasping content, the activities of the will consist in adopting attitudes such as that of wanting, affirming and fearing grasped content.⁴ However, if a thinking being is conscious of an act of thinking, then it grasps this act of thinking in a certain way, but does not adopt an attitude towards this act. Consciousness_b can therefore, within the theoretical framework in which Descartes operates, only consist in an activity of the intellect and not of the will.

However, Descartes’ conception of consciousness_b is thus only characterized in its approach, but not explained in its details. In order to do this, the concept of the form of an act of thought from quotation 1 and its relationship to the concepts of perception and act of thought must be analyzed.⁵ On the other hand, it is necessary to clarify the deep structure⁶ of consciousness_b according to Descartes, i.e., in

[However, Descartes’ conception of consciousness_b is thus characterized only in its approach, but not explained in its details. In order to achieve this, on the one hand, the concept of the form of an act of thought from quotation 1 and its relationship to the concepts of perception as well as the act of thought must be analyzed.⁵ On the other hand, it is necessary to clarify which depth structure⁶ the consciousness_b according to Descartes has, i.e., in]

⁴ See AT VII 36f. (As usual, the references with the abbreviation ‘AT‛ refer to the standard edition of Descartes’ works by Adam and Tannery. The Latin numbers refer to the volume of this edition, the Arabic numbers to the page of the corresponding volume. Unless otherwise indicated, the translations are mine).

⁵ This question is addressed in section 5.

⁶ The deep structure is to be understood as the mental abilities and/or activities in which consciousness_b consists and which are to be described in a theory of consciousness_b. It is important to see that the deep structure does not (or at least not necessarily) belong to the content of consciousness_b , that is, it does not (or at least not necessarily) become conscious to the thinking being. The deep structure of consciousness_b does not (or at least not necessarily) become conscious [does not occur (or at least not necessarily) into consciousness_b], but it constitutes [German: konstituiert] consciousness_b. Just as a clock displays time without simultaneously revealing its mechanism [As the clock indicates time, without at the same time representing its mechanism], consciousness_b consists of certain mental abilities and/or activities, without these necessarily becoming the content [G: inhalt] of consciousness_b or having to become so [without these themselves becoming or at least having to become the content of consciousness_b].

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what relationship Descartes sees between the act of perception, in which, according to quotation 1, consciousness_b is supposed to exist, and the act of thinking, which is the object of consciousness_b . Four positions can be found in the research literature on this point:

[which relation the act of perception, in which according to quotation 1 consciousness_b is to exist, and the act of thought, which is the object of consciousness_b, are to each other according to Descartes. On this point, four positions can be found in the research literature:]

John Cottingham,⁷ Udo Thiel,⁸ and Katherine Morris⁹ ascribe to Descartes an actual meta-act-conception of consciousness_b . According to this interpretation, Descartes holds the view that the consciousness_b of an act of thought consists in the fact that the thinking being performs an act of perception of a higher order that is directed towards this act of thought and of which the thinking being thereby becomes conscious_b. For Descartes, consciousness_b of an act of thought would therefore consist in perceiving an act of thought.

Andreas Kemmerling seems to want to attribute to Descartes not an actual but a dispositional meta-act-conception, according to which consciousness_b does not consist in the fact that the thinking being performs a meta-perception, but in the fact that there is a near disposition¹⁰ to perform such a perception.¹¹ For Descartes, consciousness_b of an act of thought would then consist in being in the disposition to perceive the act of thought in question.

Richard Aquila¹² and Daisy Radner¹³ do not ascribe a meta-act conception of consciousness_b to Descartes. Instead, they think that, according to Descartes, acts of thought contain a

^6(cont.) necessarily) into consciousness_b, but it constitutes consciousness_b. Just as the clock shows the time without at the same time representing its mechanism, so consciousness_b consists in certain mental abilities and/or activities without these themselves becoming or at least having to become the content of consciousness_b.

⁷ See Cottingham 1978, 211–14.

⁸ See Thiel 1994, 90–92.

⁹ See Morris 2000, 403f.

¹⁰ With the distinction between proximate and remote dispositions, the Aristotelian distinction between the actual possession of a disposition and the capacity to acquire a disposition is taken up here and in the further course of the text (see De Anima, II, 5). Accordingly, a thinking being has a near disposition to perform a metaperception if it possesses this disposition and exercises it under suitable circumstances. In contrast, a thinking being has a remote disposition to perform metaperception if it is capable of acquiring this disposition under suitable circumstances.

¹¹ See Kemmerling 1996, 180–86.

¹² See Aquila 1988, 546f. Aquila ascribes to Descartes the somewhat cryptic view according to which the consciousness of one’s own acts of thought consists in a cognition or perception of these acts of thought, which is at the same time in some way (“somehow”) identical with these acts of thought.

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perception or representation of themselves. For Descartes, this self-perception or self-representation would be consciousness_b of acts of thought. Descartes thus represents therefore a conception of self-perception or self-representation conception of consciousness_b. Consciousness_b would then consist in the fact that an act of thought contains a perception or representation of itself.

In an insightful, recent essay, Vili Lähteenmäki argued that consciousness_b for Descartes—unlike in the three interpretations considered so far—does not have a homogeneous deep structure in all cases, but is divided into several sub-cases with regard to its deep structure.¹⁴ For Descartes, therefore, every act of thought is conscious_b without this consciousness_b having the same deep structure in all cases. In addition, Lähteenmäki attributes to Descartes the distinction not only between two, but between three types of consciousness: (a) rudimentary consciousness; (b) (involuntary) reflexive consciousness; (c) (voluntary) attentional consciousness. For Descartes, the consciousness that accompanies all acts of thought_b should consist either in a pure rudimentary consciousness or in a combination of rudimentary and reflexive consciousness. We will have to examine later what these two forms of consciousness_b are all about. In any case, Lähteenmäki believes that these distinctions lead to an interpretation that does more justice to Descartes than the approaches mentioned above. We will see that Lähteenmäki is right in arguing that consciousness_b can have different depth structures for Descartes. However, in section 5, a precise analysis of quotation 1 against the background of Descartes’ Meditations will show that Lähteenmäki’s reconstruction of these structures is not convincing.

Before we turn to Lähteenmäki’s interpretation, however, we need to examine the validity of the first three interpretations. In order to be able to do this, we will first have to examine in section 2 how the phenomenon to be explained—consciousness_b—for Descartes. In this section, therefore, the explanandum is staked out. In sections 3 and 4 we then turn to the

¹³ See Radner 1988, 446f. Radner believes that acts of thought have two objects for Descartes: The primary object consists in something that is not identical with the act of thinking, such as physical objects of perception; the secondary object is the act of thinking itself.

¹⁴ See Lähteenmäki 2008.

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first two interpretative approaches, which ascribe to Descartes a meta-act-conception and a self-representationalist conception of consciousness_b, respectively. These approaches will not be convincing. However, their discussion will provide us with important conditions for an adequate interpretation. Section 5 develops an interpretation of this conception that takes these adequacy conditions into account. Section 6 provides a critical comparison between this interpretation and that of Vili Lähteenmäki. A final consideration, in which we address the objection that the proposed interpretation no longer allows for a unified conception of consciousness_b in Descartes, concludes this paper (section 7).

2 The nature of consciousness in Descartes

Before we can turn to Descartes’ conception of consciousness_b , we must first clarify how the phenomenon of consciousness_b is constituted according to Descartes. As the following quotations in the text show, for Descartes consciousness_b is a relation between a thinking being and an object of consciousness and not a one-dimensional property of acts of thinking. This becomes clear from the fact that Descartes does not speak of conscious_b (as opposed to unconscious_b) acts of thought. Rather, Descartes says that a subject has consciousness_b of something or is conscious_b of something.

But what is a thinking being conscious_b of if it is conscious_b of something? As Descartes states in the appendix to his reply to Mersenne’s objections, in his view it is definitionally true that all acts of thinking are directly¹⁵ conscious_b of the thinking being in question:

[Quote 2] Under the name of thought I include everything that is in us in such a way that we are directly aware of it. Thus all activities of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses are thoughts. (AT VII 160)

But are only acts of thought the object of consciousness_b? Let us consider the following passage from Descartes’ replies to Arnauld’s objections:

¹⁵ On the distinction between things of which the Cartesian mind is directly aware and those of which it is indirectly conscious_b, see footnote 17.

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[Quote 3] But that nothing can be in the mind, inasmuch as it is a thinking thing of which it is not conscious, seems to me self-evident, because we understand that there is nothing in that which is thus contemplated which is not a thought or dependent on a thought[.] (AT VII 246)

According to Descartes, a mind is conscious_b of everything that is in it. On the basis of this passage, one could now assume that more than just acts of thought are the object of consciousness_b. After all, a Cartesian mind not only exhibits acts of thought, but also faculties, in particular the two fundamental faculties of intellect and will.¹⁶ However, in quotation 3 the restriction must be noted that the mind has consciousness_b of everything that is in it, insofar as it is a thinking thing. The object of consciousness_b is all mental operations, i.e., all acts of thinking, but not mental faculties (at least not if they are not activated in the form of acts of thinking).¹⁷ Descartes makes this clear when he states this to Arnauld:

[Quote 4] The third and last thing is that nothing can be in our mind of which we are not conscious. I have understood this with regard to activities, and he [meaning Arnauld; C.B.] denies it with regard to faculties. (AT VII 232)

[German text following Quote 4 (with only footnote 18 inserted as superscript) from pp. 7–8:

Jedem cartesischen Geist ist also zu jedem Zeitpunkt alles bewusst_b, was zu diesem Zeitpunkt in ihm geschieht. Mit anderen Worten: Jeder Geist hat Bewusstsein_b von allen seinen Denkakten;^{18 [Und da der cartesische Geist immerzu denkt, folgt, dass er auch immerzu Bewusstseinb von Denkakten hat.}] etwas anderes als Denkakte ist aber nicht Gegenstand des Bewusstseins_b, insbesondere nicht geistige Vermögen. Allerdings ist damit noch nicht entschieden, ob das Bewusstsein_b von Denkakten ein Bewusstsein_b von ihnen in allen ihren Hinsichten ist oder nur im Hinblick auf einige ihrer Aspekte. Auch wenn einem cartesischen Geist alle seine Denkakte bewusst_b sind,

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bedeutet dies ja noch nicht sogleich, dass die Denkakte dem Geist auch in allen Hinsichten bewusst_b sind. Es könnte ja etwa sein, dass ein Denkakt dem Geist nur bewusst_b ist, insofern der Akt einen bestimmten Gehalt aufweist. Das Bewusstsein_b wäre dann zwar auf den Denkakt gerichtet; ‚in‛ das Bewusstsein_b —so könnte man sagen—würde aber nur der Inhalt des Akts gelangen. Es gilt also zu unterscheiden zwischen dem Gegenstand des Bewusstseins_b, also derjenigen Sache, auf die das Bewusstsein_b gerichtet ist, und dem Inhalt des Bewusstseins_b, also derjenigen Sache, die ‚in‛ das Bewusstsein_b gelangt. Zu fragen ist, ob Inhalt und Gegenstand des Bewusstseins_b für Descartes zusammenfallen, ob also der Gegenstand des Bewusstseins_b, so wie er ist und in allen Hinsichten, auch den Inhalt des Bewusstseins_b ausmacht. Die Zitate 1 bis 4 können diese Frage nicht entscheiden. Wir werden im weiteren Verlauf unserer Untersuchung sehen müssen, wie es sich damit bei Descartes verhält.¹⁹ Zusammenfassend können wir aber schon jetzt festhalten, dass Descartes das Phänomen des Bewusstseins_b in drei Hinsichten charakterisiert.

(1) Bewusstsein_b ist eine Relation: Cartesische Geister haben Bewusstsein_b von ihren Denkakten.

(2) Jeder Geist hat Bewusstsein_b von allen seinen Denkakten. Geist

(3) Gegenstand des Bewusstseins_b sind ausschließlich Denkakte.]

[Continued translation by Merlin with ChatGPT immediately below Quote 4 on p. 7]

Every Cartesian mind is therefore conscious_b of everything that is happening in it at any given time. In other words: Every mind has consciousness_b of all its acts of thinking;¹⁸ something other than acts of thinking, however, is not the object of consciousness_b, especially not mental faculties.

However, this does not yet decide whether the consciousness_b of thought acts is a consciousness_b of them in all their aspects or only with regard to some of their aspects.

[GT: Every Cartesian mind [GT actually mistranslated it as “spirit”] is thus aware at all times of everything that is happening in him at that time. In other words, every mind has consciousness_b of all his acts of thought;¹⁸ something other than an act of thought is not the object of consciousness, but not mental ability. However, it has not yet been decided whether the consciousness of acts of thought is a consciousness of them in all their respects or only with regard to some of their aspects. Even if a Cartesian mind is aware of all his acts of thought,

¹⁶ See AT VIII-A 17.

¹⁷ Boris Hennig points out that a distinction must be made between indirect and direct objects of consciousness. Indirect object are mental abilities, direct object are the acts in which the activation of these abilities consists (see Hennig 2006b, 24). I will not take up this distinction in the following, since it will only be about the immediate objects of consciousness.

¹⁸ And since the Cartesian spirit always thinks, it follows that he is also always aware of acts of thought.

this does not immediately mean that the acts of thought are also aware of the mind in all respects. It could be, for example, that the mind is only aware of an act of thought, insofar as the act has a certain content. The consciousness_b would then be directed at the act of thought; ‘in’ the consciousness_b—so one could say—would only enter the content of the act. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the object of consciousness_b, i.e., that thing to which consciousness_b is directed, and the content of consciousness_b, i.e., that thing that enters ‘into’ consciousness_b. It is to be asked whether the content and object of consciousness_b coincide for Descartes, i.e., whether the object of consciousness_b, as it is and in all respects, also constitutes the content of consciousness_b. Quotes 1 to 4 cannot decide this question. We will have to see how it is with Descartes in the further course of our investigation.¹⁹ In summary, however, we can already state that Descartes characterizes the phenomenon of consciousness in three respects:

+++(1) Consciousness_b is a relation: Cartesian minds have consciousness_b of their acts of thought.

+++(2) Every mind has consciousness_b of all his acts of thought.

+++(3) The subject of consciousness_b are exclusively acts of thought.]

[Merlin: Even if a Cartesian mind is aware of all its mental acts, this does not immediately mean that the acts of thought are also fully conscious to the mind in all respects. It could be that an act of thought is only conscious to the mind insofar as the act has a specific content. The consciousness would then indeed be directed at the act of thought; “in” the consciousness—one might say—only the content of the act would be included. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between the object of consciousness, that is, the thing to which consciousness is directed, and the content of consciousness, that is, the thing that “enters” consciousness. The question arises whether content and object of consciousness coincide for Descartes, whether, therefore, the object of consciousness, as it is and in all respects, also constitutes the content of consciousness. Quotes 1 to 4 cannot decide this question. We will need to see in the further course of our investigation how this is the case with Descartes. Summarizing, we can already note that Descartes characterizes the phenomenon of consciousness in three respects:

+++(1) Consciousness_b is a relation: Cartesian minds are conscious_b of their acts of thought.

+++(2) Every mind is conscious_b of all its acts of thought.

+++(3) The object of consciousness_b is exclusively acts of thought.]

[Merlin: Even if a Cartesian mind is aware of all its mental acts, this does not immediately mean that the mental acts are also aware of every aspect. It could be, for example, that a mental act is only conscious to the mind insofar as the act has a specific content. The consciousness would then indeed be directed towards the mental act; however, one might say that only the content of the act would enter ‘into’ the consciousness. Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between the object [G: Gegenstand] of consciousness_b, which is the thing the consciousness is directed at, and the content of consciousness, which is the thing that ‘enters’ the consciousness. The question arises whether the content and object of consciousness coincide for Descartes, i.e., whether the object of consciousness, as it is and in all respects, also constitutes the content of consciousness. Quotes 1 to 4 cannot decide this question. We will have to determine how this issue is addressed by Descartes as we proceed further in our investigation.]

[GT: This does not immediately mean that the acts of thought are also aware_b of the mind in all respects. It could be, for example, that an act of thought is only aware of the mind, insofar as the act has a certain content. The consciousness_b would then be directed at the act of thought; ‘in’ the consciousness_b—so one could say—but only the content of the act would reach. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the object of consciousness_b, i.e., that thing to which consciousness_b is directed, and the content of consciousness_b, i.e., that thing that enters ‘into’ consciousness_b. It is to be asked whether the content and the object of consciousness coincide for Descartes, whether the object of consciousness, as it is and in all respects, also the content of consciousness. Quotes 1 to 4 cannot decide this question. In the further course of our investigation, we will have to see how it behaves with Descartes.¹⁹ In summary, however, we can already state that Descartes characterizes the phenomenon of consciousness in three respects:

+++(1) Consciousness is a relation: Cartesian spirits have consciousness’, from their acts of thought.

+++(2) Every mind has consciousness of all his acts of thought.

+++(3) The subject of the consciousness are exclusively thought acts.]

3 Does consciousness exist for Descartes in metaperception?

Even if a Cartesian mind is conscious_b of all its acts of thought, . . .

¹⁶ See AT VIII-A 17.

¹⁷ Boris Hennig points out that a distinction must be made between indirect and direct objects of consciousness_b . Indirect objects are mental abilities, direct objects are the acts in which these abilities are activated (see Hennig 2006b, 24). I will not take up this distinction in the following, as I will only be concerned with the direct objects of consciousness_b.

¹⁸ And since the Cartesian mind is always thinking, it follows that it is also always conscious_b of acts of thinking.

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this does not immediately mean that the acts of thinking are conscious_b to the mind in all respects. It could be, for example, that the mind is only conscious_b of an act of thinking insofar as the act has a certain content. Consciousness_b would then be directed towards the act of thinking, but only the content of the act would enter consciousness_b, one could say. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the object [G: Gegenstand] of consciousness_b, i.e., that thing that enters ‘into’ consciousness_b. The question is whether content and object of consciousness_b coincide for Descartes, i.e., whether the object of consciousness_b, as it is and in all respects, also constitutes the content of consciousness_b. Quotations 1 to 4 cannot decide this question. We will have to see in the further course of our investigation how this is the case with Descartes.¹⁹

In summary, however, we can already state that Descartes characterizes the phenomenon of consciousness_b in three respects:

+++(1) Consciousness_b is a relation: Cartesian minds have consciousness_b of their acts of thinking [G: Denkakten].

+++(2) Every mind has consciousness_b of all its thought acts.

+++(3) The subject of consciousness_b is exclusively acts of thought.

3 Does consciousness exist for Descartes in metaperception?

As explained above, authors such as Cottingham, Thiel, and Morris believe that they can attribute to Descartes the view that consciousness_b of an act of thought consists in perceiving this act of thought. In short: Cartesian consciousness_b would thus consist in an actual metaperception. In fact, Descartes seems to speak in favor of such a conception in quotation 1, for this passage suggests that Descartes attributes the consciousness_b of an act of thinking to the existence of a higher-level perception that is directed towards this act of thinking. This interpretation is supported by another passage in which Descartes seems to advocate an actual meta-act-conception of consciousness_b . In the conversation with Franz Burman it says:

¹⁹ See above all section 5.

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[Quote 5] But that nothing can be in the mind, inasmuch as it is a thinking thing of which it is not conscious, seems to me self-evident.
[Burman] But how can it be conscious if <being conscious of something> is the same as thinking? But for you to think this, namely that you are conscious of something, you already pass over to another thought, and so you no longer think of the thing you thought of before, and so you are not conscious that you think, but that you have thought.
[Descartes] <Being conscious of something> is of course the same as thinking and reflecting on your thoughts. But it is false that this cannot happen while the previous thought exists. For, as we have already seen, the soul can think several things at the same time and dwell in its thought, and at the same time, as often as it pleases, reflect on its thoughts and thus be conscious of its thought. (AT V 149; my [Barth’s] emphasis by underlining)

Despite this passage, it is doubtful for both exegetical and systematic reasons whether Descartes can be credited with an actual meta-act-conception of consciousness_b:

From an exegetical point of view, such an interpretation is out of the question, since Descartes explicitly rejects Pierre Bourdin’s attribution of an actual meta-act-conception of consciousness²⁰ :

[Quote 6] When he [meaning Bourdin; C.B.] further says that it is not enough for a substance to be thinking for it to be placed above matter and to be spiritual par excellence—he wants only <such a substance> to be called mind—but that, in addition, it is necessary that it thinks by a reflexive act, that it thinks, or [sive] it has consciousness of its thought; <then> also a mason speaks thoughtlessly in the same way when he says that he who is knowledgeable in the art of building must consider by a reflexive act that he has that knowledge before he can be a master builder. Even if there really is no master builder who has not often contemplated, or at least could have contemplated, that he has knowledge of building, it is nevertheless obvious that this contemplation is not required for him to be a master builder. Nor is simple contemplation or [sive] reflection required in order for the thinking substance to be placed above matter. For every first thought by which we notice anything is no longer different from the second <thought> by which we notice that we have previously noticed this, just as this <second thought> <is no longer different> from the third <thought> by which we notice that we have noticed that we had noticed this. And if the first <thought> is similar to a physical thing

²⁰ See AT VII 533f.

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is conceded, no reason, however minimal, can be put forward why <he> should not also be conceded the second <thought>. (AT VII 559)

There are two theses by Bourdin that Descartes opposes here: Firstly, Bourdin thinks that the characteristic of the mental is not simply thinking, but reflection, i.e. referring to thoughts in thinking. Secondly, consciousness_b of thoughts would consist in such a reflection on thoughts. Descartes rejects both theses in the quoted passage. Against the first thesis, he argues that a reference to acts of reflection does nothing to prove the immateriality of the mind. For with regard to their ontological status, the acts of thought that are reflected upon and the acts of reflection are of equal rank. Therefore, if material things could perform acts of thought, then there is nothing to prevent them from also being able to reflect on acts of thought. In order to prove the immateriality of the mind, it must therefore be shown that thinking in general—i.e., even simple, non-reflective thinking—cannot be material. Descartes is of course of this opinion and expresses this when he says: “No longer is a simple contemplation or [sive] reflection required, so that the thinking substance is set above matter.” The immateriality of thinking substance thus already follows from the fact that it thinks and does not require that it also reflects. Furthermore, Descartes argues against Bourdin that thinking substances do not, or at least not permanently, have to reflect on their acts of thinking. For just as a master builder does not have to constantly reflect on the fact that he is skilled in the art of building in order to be a master builder, a thinking substance does not have to constantly reflect on its acts of thinking in order to be a thinking substance.²¹ But then consciousness_b cannot consist in an act of reflection, because, according to Descartes, a thinking being permanently performs acts of thinking and, since it is conscious of each of its acts of thinking, it must permanently have consciousness_b of acts of thinking. According to Descartes, an act of reflection is therefore not necessary for consciousness_b. Descartes does not advocate an actual meta-act-conception of consciousness_b.

A systematic consideration also speaks against the hypothesis that Descartes represents an actual meta-act-conception of consciousness_b: According to Descartes, a mind

²¹ See also AT VI 23, where Descartes emphasizes the difference between a conviction and a realization that one has a certain conviction.

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all his acts of thought consciously_b. If Descartes were to adopt a meta-act-conception, this would mean that for every act of thought of level n there would have to be a meta-act of level n+1, the existence of which is responsible for the fact that the act of thought of level n is conscious_b for the thinker. It is obvious that under these circumstances the meta-act-conception leads to an infinite regress, which ultimately leaves the consciousness_b of the original nth level thought act unexplained. We would be forced to assume an infinite cascade of meta-acts, which, however, never ends in a thought act that is conscious_b of itself for the thinker and could thus found the consciousness_b of all lower-level thought acts. In conjunction with Descartes’ thesis that all acts of thought are conscious_b of the thinker, an actual meta-act-conception of consciousness_b generates an infinite regress that deprives the phenomenon of consciousness_b of any foundation. Consequently, Cartesian minds could never be conscious_b of any of their acts of thinking.

But if both exegetical and systematic reasons speak against the attribution of a meta-act-conception of consciousness_b , how are quotations 1 and 5 to be understood, which seem to speak in favor of such a conception in Descartes?

Let us look at both passages again, starting with quotation 5 from the conversation with Franz Burman. One way of reconciling this quotation with Descartes’ rejection of a meta-act conception is to deny outright that Descartes actually made this statement. After all, this quotation comes from the notes of a twenty-year-old theology student, and it is certainly not entirely implausible to assume that Burman either misremembered Descartes’ statement or misunderstood it.²² In this way, however, an internal contradiction in Descartes with regard to quotation 1 cannot be avoided. Quote 1 comes from Descartes’ reply to Mersenne’s objections and thus from Descartes’ own pen. Moreover, this passage has a certain official status, since Descartes gives a definition of the concept of the idea that was so central to him. Therefore, if this passage can be reconciled with Descartes’ rejection of a meta-act conception, then not by referring to the uncertain source situation, but only by a corresponding

²² For an alternative strategy to reconcile quotation 5 with Descartes’ rejection of an actual meta-act conception of consciousness, see Lähteenmäki 2008, 184f.

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interpretation of this passage. This will be done in section 5. There it will be shown that quotation 1 by no means commits Descartes to a meta-act conception.

Before we can develop this interpretation, however, we must first turn to the question of whether Descartes—as Andreas Kemmerling thinks—holds the view that consciousness_b consists in a close disposition to a metaperception. Perhaps Descartes does not have an actual perception of the form of thought in mind in quotation 1, but only the disposition to such a perception. For Descartes, consciousness_b would therefore consist in a permanent readiness to form a metaperception, without this readiness always leading to a metaperception.

Such a dispositional meta-act-conception of consciousness_b is not exposed to the above-mentioned regress objection against an actual meta-act conception, because in order to explain the consciousness_b of an act of the nth level, no infinite cascade of meta-acts would have to be assumed, but only the ability to form a meta-act of the required level under suitable circumstances. And such a capacity is in no way mysterious. It simply consists in being able to prefix each thought with the operator ‘I think that …‛ as often as desired. This ability therefore boils down to being able to apply the operator ‘I think that …‛ iteratively. To be able to do this, it is sufficient for a thinking being to be able to use this operator at all. If there are simple meta-thought of the form ‘I think that p‛ can form, so at the same time the ability to do this in any number of iterations seems to be given.

But a dispositional meta-act conception not only avoids the regress objection, but is also compatible with Descartes’ reply to Bourdin’s objections (quote 6). There Descartes rejects the view that consciousness depends on an actual meta-act. Rather, every act of thinking as such is consciousb of the thinking being. Descartes’ observation is taken into account by the dispositional conception of the meta-act, for it too does not attribute consciousness_b to the presence of a meta-perception, but only to the near disposition to have one.

Even if the interpretation according to which Descartes represents a dispositional meta-act conception thus meets the two objections to the attribution of a

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meta-act conception, it nevertheless encounters exegetical difficulties:²³

(1) In his replies to Arnauld’s objections, Descartes makes it unmistakably clear that consciousness is an actuality and not a potentiality:

[Quote 7] But it is to be noted that while the acts or [sive] operations, of our mind are always actual to us; the faculties or [sive] faculties, <on the other hand> are not always, except potentially; so that when we proceed to the use of any faculty, we immediately—if that faculty is in the mind—become actual to that <faculty>; and we may therefore deny that <a faculty> is in the mind, if we cannot become conscious of it. (AT VII 246f.; my emphasis)

Descartes distinguishes here between an actualized consciousness_b and the ability to be aware of something. The former concerns mental acts and mental faculties, insofar as these are actualized in the form of mental acts. In contrast, we have no actual consciousness_b of mental faculties that are not actualized, but only a potential one, i.e. we have the ability to become awareb of them when they are actualized. The consciousness_b that accompanies all acts of thought thus consists for Descartes in an actuality and not in a potentiality.²⁴ It is something that actually happens and not just something that can happen. Consciousness_b can therefore not be understood as a disposition. It is not a potentiality that is actualized under suitable circumstances, but it is already an actuality.

(2) There are also difficulties with the following passage from a letter to Antoine Arnauld from 1648:

[Quote 8] Thus I call the first and simple thoughts of children […] direct <thoughts>, not reflexive <thoughts>; but when an adult perceives something and at the same time perceives that he has not perceived the same thing before, I call this second perception

²³ For further criticism of Kemmerling’s position, see Hennig 2006a, 67–71 and Hennig 2006b, 26f.

²⁴ See also quote 4.

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Reflection, and I refer <it> only to the intellect, although it is so connected with perception that they occur simultaneously and cannot apparently be distinguished from one another. (AT V 221)

In this passage, Descartes distinguishes between two types of thoughts. On the one hand, these are direct thoughts that occur to children and which obviously include perceptions (as we will see from quotation 9, they also include sensations of pain, pleasure, etc.). On the other hand, it is about reflexive thoughts. In contrast to direct acts of thought, reflexive acts of thought are directed towards other acts of thought. In a reflexive act of thought, an act of thought is presented as an act of thought in a certain way, for example—as Descartes states in the quotation—as one in the course of which something is perceived that has not yet been perceived. What is interesting about this passage is that, according to Descartes, children’s direct thoughts are not accompanied by reflexive thoughts. The reason for this is apparently that reflexive thoughts are exclusively associated with the intellect (and thus not with the unity of mind and body), but children are not yet capable of performing such purely intellectual acts. Descartes expresses himself in this sense in the following passage, which is taken from a letter to Hyperaspistes from 1641:

[Quote 9] Nor have I asserted without reason that the human soul, wherever it is, even in the womb, is always thinking: […] For this reason, however, I am not convinced that the mind of the child in the womb meditates on matters of metaphysics; quite the contrary […] Nothing is more in accordance with reason than that we suppose that the mind, which has been quite freshly united with the body of the child, is exclusively occupied with ideas of pain, pleasure, heat, cold, and similar ideas, which have arisen from this union and to a certain extent mixture, and can only be confusedly perceived or [sive]. (AT III 423f.; my emphasis)

Children only have confused perceptions that arise from the unity of mind and body, but not yet purely intellectual perceptions, such as would be necessary for metaphysical considerations. This implies that they cannot have reflexive thoughts at all, because such thoughts—as Descartes says in quotation 8—belong exclusively to the intellect. This emphasizes once again that Descartes cannot be credited with an actual meta-act conception of consciousness. However, quotations 8 and 9 also prove that Descartes does not ascribe a dispositional

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meta-act conception of consciousness. For the comparison of children and adults in quotation 8 suggests that Descartes wants to deny children the near ability²⁵ to form reflective thoughts altogether. And quotation 9 shows that Descartes is of the opinion that children, at least at the beginning of their development, only have perceptions that arise from the unity of body and mind and therefore do not perform any purely intellectual acts. Apparently, Descartes is of the opinion that the capacity for reflective thought only develops in the course of the child’s further development, whereas adults have this capacity and can perform it quite casually. However, if children—as claimed in quotation 9—possess acts of thought that are conscious_b (sensations of pain, pleasure, etc.), but at the same time have no proximate capacity to form reflexive thoughts, Descartes cannot be of the opinion that the consciousness_b of acts of thought consists in the presence of such a proximate capacity for reflection. A dispositional meta-act conception of consciousness_b cannot be attributed to Descartes for this second reason either.

4 Does consciousness exist for Descartes in self-representation?

Obviously, neither an actual nor a dispositional meta-act conception of consciousness_b can be ascribed to Descartes. Descartes explicitly rejects an actual meta-act conception. The attribution of a dispositional meta-act conception is neither compatible with the fact that consciousness_b is an actuality and not a potentiality, nor with the fact that children can feel and perceive, but cannot perform reflexive acts of thought of the pure intellect. For Descartes, then, consciousness_b of an act of thought consists neither in reflecting on the act of thought nor in having the near ability to reflect on it. But how can quotation 1 be reconciled with this result? How can Descartes reject a meta-act conception if he simultaneously claims that the consciousness_b of an act of thought is based on a perception (of the form) of this act of thought?

Perhaps this exegetical problem can be solved if we attribute to Descartes—as Richard Aquila and Daisie Radner do—a self-representationalist conception of consciousness. According to this interpretation, Descartes holds that mental acts do not merely represent an external object,

²⁵ For the distinction between near and distant ability, see footnote 10.

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but at the same time represent themselves and in this way bring themselves to the mind’s awareness_b. In contrast to the case of a meta-act conception, the self-representationalist approach does not explain the consciousness_b of acts of thought with reference to a meta-act, but with reference to a property of the act itself, namely the property of representing itself. When a mind performs an act of thinking, this means that the mind is conscious_b of a represented object by virtue of this act and at the same time is conscious_b of the act itself by virtue of the property of self-representation of the act. Quote 1 would then have to be understood in such a way that the consciousness_b of an act of thinking is based on the fact that this act of thinking contains not only a perception of an external object, but also always a perception of itself—more precisely: of its own form. This would avoid having to understand quotation 1 as a commitment to a meta-act conception. In addition, there are further reasons to attribute such a conception of consciousness to Descartes:

(1) A self-representationalist conception of consciousness_b does not lead to the above regress problem in the Cartesian framework, precisely because it does not require a meta-act for consciousness_b at all.

(2) A self-representationalist conception is consistent with Descartes’ reply to Bourdin’s objections, for the proponent of such a conception would insist with all vehemence—as Descartes does to Bourdin—that acts of thought as such, i.e., without the presence of a meta-act, are conscious to the mind.

(3) Some passages seem to speak directly to the fact that Descartes holds a self-representationalist conception of consciousness_b . In the Passions de l’ame, for example, he says with regard to the consciousness_b of acts of will :²⁶

²⁶ I distinguish between acts of will and volitional acts. The latter comprise Descartes’ class of acts of thought based on volitional activity. In AT VII 37, Descartes contrasts this class of acts of thought with ideas (in the narrow sense) by emphasizing that the former, in contrast to ideas (in the narrow sense), involve an attitude towards a representational content. Descartes gives as examples acts of thought of willing, fearing, affirming and denying. As

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[Quote 10] For it is certain that we cannot will anything without perceiving in the same way that we will it. And although, with regard to our soul, to will something is an action, one can say that in it there is also an experiencing, <namely> to perceive that it wills. Nevertheless, because this perception and this willing are really only the same thing, the designation <but> is always determined by that which is nobler, one is not at all accustomed to call it a suffering, but only an action. (AT XI 343; my emphasis)

The first sentence seems to speak in favor of a meta-act conception of the consciousness of acts of will, because it says that every act of will is accompanied by a perception that has the content that something specific is willed. However, Descartes counteracts this impression in the third sentence. In this sentence, he states that the perception referred to is identical with the act of will, and this seems to indicate that for Descartes, acts of will always represent themselves as acts of will. Descartes had already formulated this analysis of acts of will in a letter to Mersenne in 1641:

[Quote 11] I maintain that we have ideas not only of all that is in our intellect, but even of all that is in the will. For we cannot will anything without knowing that we will it; nor know of it without through an idea. But I do not maintain that this idea is different from the activity itself. (AT III 295; my emphasis)

Even if this passage is not as clear as quotation 10, Descartes again seems to want to assert here that we, who are thinking beings, know about our acts of will, that we perform these acts with reference to a certain object. This knowledge is mediated by an idea of the act of will. Since Descartes conceives of ideas as representationally substantive acts of perception, we thus seem to find in this passage the same position that he formulates in quotation 10. And again, Descartes states that the idea or perception of the act of will is not distinct from the act of will itself.

By contrast, I call ‘volitional acts’ the narrower class of thought acts that we ascribe to each other with sentences of the type ‘S wants X’ or ‘S wants that p’. Acts of volition are a subclass of volitional acts.

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In view of these passages, it is not surprising that Descartes is often attributed a self-representationalist conception in the research literature. But this interpretation is also problematic:

(1) The self-representationalist interpretation implies that not only acts of will but also purely perceptual acts of thought represent themselves. However, it should be noted that Descartes makes no reference to a self-representationalist performance of purely perceptual acts of thought at any point where he elaborates his theory of acts of thought. In central writings such as the Meditations, Descartes does emphasize that all acts of thought have representational content.²⁷ However, nowhere does Descartes state that this content contains two levels, the first of which concerns a specific object and the second of which concerns the act itself. For Descartes, purely perceptual acts of thought consist in thinking of a certain object or in thinking that this or that is the case. However, they do not imply a further representation of the act of thinking itself. Since Descartes characterizes the representational power of perceptions in scholastic terminology and traces it back to an obiective existence of things in ideas, a self-representationalist conception would require that every perception in Descartes exists obiectively in itself. But this is obviously not the case for Descartes: at no point does Descartes state that a perception exists obiectively in itself.

(2) An even more serious problem arises for the self-representationalist interpretation if we again consider Descartes’ remarks on the thinking abilities of children. If Descartes held a self-representationalist conception of consciousness, he would be committed to the thesis that every act of thinking represents itself. This would mean that the idea of an act of thinking would be part of every act of thinking. For children, this would mean that when they feel warmth or hunger, the content of their consciousness at that moment would not only be the warmth or hunger, but also the thought act of feeling the warmth or hunger. However, these theses are not compatible with Descartes’ statements on the thinking capacity of children. In the above-mentioned letter to Hyperaspistes (quote 9), Descartes says:

²⁷ See AT VII 36f.

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[Quote 12] Nothing is more in accordance with reason than for us to suppose that the mind, which has been quite freshly united to the body of the child, is exclusively occupied with ideas of pain, pleasure, heat, cold, and similar ideas, which have arisen from this union and, as it were, mixture, and can only be confusedly perceived or [sive] felt. Thus he nevertheless has in himself ideas of God, of himself, and of all these truths, which are called self-evident, just as adult men have the same <ideas and truths> when they do not turn to them. (AT III 424)

As Descartes points out in this passage, intellectual ideas such as those of God and of the mind are innate in the child, but they are only in the child’s mind in the same way that ideas are in the minds of adults when they do not turn to them. By this Descartes means that intellectual ideas are only dispositionally given in the mind of children and are not yet actualized in the form of acts of thought. In other words: While children are capable of thinking,²⁸ they do not yet have the ability to perform purely intellectual acts in which innate, intellectual ideas are activated. According to Descartes—as seen above—children only have confused sensations. However, the idea of an act of thinking is an innate, intellectual and not a sensory idea. It is therefore only dispositionally given in childhood and not yet actualized in acts of thought. But then the consciousness_b that accompanies all acts of thought and therefore also the acts of thought of children cannot—at least not in all cases—consist in the self-representation of acts of thought as acts of thought, because for this to happen, the intellectual idea of the act of thought would already have to be activated, which is not yet possible for children. According to Descartes, children are simply not (yet) capable of purely intellectual acts.

(3) Finally, a closer look reveals that quotations 10 and 11 are by no means clear evidence for a self-representationalist conception of consciousness. When Descartes says that the perception of wanting something in particular is to be equated with the act of will, then it is clear for factual reasons that Descartes cannot have meant this literally, because perceptions belong to the passive intellect, whereas acts of will are essentially the result of an act of will.

²⁸ See quotation 9 and AT VII 246f.

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activity of the will. Perceptions can therefore not be sensu stricto identical with acts of will. However, it is possible that acts of will are always accompanied by perceptions of themselves. We must therefore distinguish between acts of will in the pure sense and in an enriched sense and, more generally, between volitional acts of thought²⁹ in the pure sense and in an enriched sense. The latter consist of a pure volitional act of thought in combination with a perception that is directed towards this pure volitional act. An enriched volitional act of thought then consists not only of a volitional act of thought of wanting, hoping, affirming, fearing, etc., but there would also be a perception which has as its content that the thinking being wants, hopes, affirms, fears, … . If Descartes now says in quotations 10 and 11 that perception and the act of will are the same thing or not different from each other, but that for factual reasons he cannot mean acts of will in the pure sense, then he must obviously be understood to mean acts of will in the enriched sense. If we generalize this point to all volitional acts of thought, then Descartes is by no means to be credited with the view that volitional acts of thought represent themselves (in the pure sense), but rather with the view that they are represented by a perception with which they together form an enriched volitional act of thought. In this context, one can speak of an actualized meta-act conception of the consciousness of volitional thought acts (in the pure sense). As we will see in more detail in section 5, an actual meta-act conception of the consciousness_b of volitional thought acts is quite compatible with the above criticism of the meta-act conceptual interpretation approach. However, it must be kept in mind that Descartes can in no way be credited with such a theory with regard to the consciousness_b of all acts of thought.

The attempt to find room for a self-representationalist conception of consciousness in Descartes also fails. With this, however, the exegetical options with regard to an explanation of consciousness in Descartes seem to be exhausted. In quotation 1, Descartes suggests an intellectual theory of consciousness_b

²⁹ By volitional acts of thought, I mean all activities of the will, to which Descartes would include, for example, the “Desire, averting, affirming, denying, doubting and various kinds of willing” (AT VIII-A 17). The activities of the will thus encompass more than just acts of will. Cf. footnote 26.

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according to which the consciousness_b of acts of thought consists in the perception (of the form) of these acts of thought. The attempts to interpret this quotation in the sense of an (actual or dispositional) meta-act conception or in the sense of a self-representationalist conception are not convincing. However, we should not draw the conclusion from this negative result that quotation 1 cannot be interpreted meaningfully at all. Rather, such an interpretation will be presented in the next section.

5 An alternative interpretation proposal: Two different deep structures of consciousness

The interpretation of quotation 1 is not easy, as it contains five technical terms from Descartes’ philosophy of mind: the terms idea, the form of a thought, thought, perception and consciousness. Andreas Kemmerling distinguishes five uses of “forma” in Descartes³⁰ and, even after a thorough examination of the secondary literature, sees no convincing interpretation of this term³¹ . In his view, it is an expression of embarrassment that conceals rather than resolves inconsistencies in Descartes’ theory of ideas.³² Dominik Perler, on the other hand, lists four interpretations of this term that have been cited in the secondary literature, but which in his view all fail,³³ and develops a fifth interpretation that he considers satisfactory.³⁴ I will not now examine and discuss all these interpretations of the concept of the form of a thought, but develop my own interpretation of the talk of forms of thought in quotation 1, which allows this passage to be interpreted in such a way that it does not commit Descartes to a meta-act conception of consciousness.

In quotation 1, which comes from the replies to Mersenne’s objections, Descartes is concerned with a definition of the concept of the idea. This concept already plays a role in the

³⁰ See Kemmerling 1996, 21–23.

³¹ See Kemmerling 1996, 26–38.

³² See Kemmerling 1996, 74f.

³³ See Perler 1996, 59–61.

³⁴ See Perler 1996, 62–64.

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Meditations itself plays a central role. As we shall see, Descartes distinguishes several concepts of ideas in the Meditations, all of which are candidates for the concept of idea that Descartes attempts to define in quotation 1. In the third meditation, Descartes also discusses the form of a thought. In order to understand quotation 1, we must therefore turn to Descartes’ explanations of the concept of idea in the Meditations.

From Descartes’ preface to the Meditations we can see the distinction between the idea considered materialiter and the idea considered obiective. The idea materialiter considered is an intellectual act of perception considered in abstraction from its representational content. The idea obiectively considered consists in the representational content, which is considered in abstraction from the perceptual act whose content it is.³⁵ This conceptual distinction between an idea materialiter and an idea obiectively considered presupposes the concept of an idea simpliciter, which can be considered in these two respects. An idea simpliciter is the entire representationally substantive act of perception. However, we have not yet covered all the distinctions with regard to Descartes’ use of the expression ‘idea.’ Descartes uses this expression in a fourth sense, which goes further in its extension than the concept of idea simpliciter. To see this, we must turn to the following passage from the third meditation:

[Quote 13] Now order seems to demand that I first divide all my thoughts into certain categories […] . Some of these thoughts are, as it were, images of things and to them alone the name >idea< in the proper sense is given: for example, when I think a human being or a chimera or heaven or an angel or God. But other thoughts have certain other forms: for example, when I will, when I fear, when I affirm or when I deny, I always grasp some thing as the object of my thought, but with the thought I also grasp more than an image of this thing; and of these thoughts the one are called acts of will or affects, but the others are called judgments. (AT VII 36f.; translation by Andreas Schmidt from Descartes 2004; my emphasis)

In this passage, Descartes divides acts of thought into two classes: On the one hand, the acts of thought, which Descartes calls ‘ideas proper [actual]

³⁵ See AT VII 8.

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sense‘ and which I will call ‘ideas in the narrow sense’ below. These are characterized by the fact that they are “like images of things,” with which Descartes expresses the fact that, like images, they have a representational content. Ideas in the narrow sense are thus acts of thought with representational content. The analogous taxonomy of acts of thought in the Principles of Philosophy also shows that they are perceptions, i.e., acts of the intellect. There are in turn three subcategories of these: Perceptions/sensations, conceptions of the imagination, and pure acts of the intellect.³⁶ If we take our previous distinction between ideas considered obiectively, ideas considered materialiter and ideas simpliciter for comparison, then ideas in the narrow sense are to be equated with ideas simpliciter. The concept of idea simpliciter as well as the concept of idea in the narrow sense refer to representationally substantive acts of perception without considering them in any particular respect.

But if there are ideas in a narrow sense, there must also be ideas in a broad sense. This brings us to the second type of thought act that Descartes describes in quotation 13 describes. These are volitional acts of thought or affects and judgments. In his later taxonomy in the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes will classify them all—including judgments—as volitional acts of thought.³⁷ For Descartes, volitional acts of thought include not only desires, but all acts of thought that, in addition to a representational content, also include an attitude of the thinking being towards this content. Hopes, doubts and fears also belong to the volitional acts of thought. These presuppose an idea simpliciter, i.e. a representationally substantive perception, because the thinker of a volitional act of thought – as Descartes says – in the execution of the act “always grasps some thing as the object of [his] thought”. However, something else is added to the apprehension of an object, namely an attitude of the thinking being towards the apprehended object, such as that of affirmation/denial or fear. The activity of the will adds this attitude to the idea simpliciter. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the idea obiective, the idea materialiter, the idea simpliciter or the idea in the narrow sense and, fourthly, the idea in the broad sense. Ideas in the broad sense are representationally substantive acts of perception (= ideas simpliciter/ideas in the narrow sense)

³⁶ See AT VIII-A 17.

³⁷ See AT VIII-A 17.

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extended by attitudes towards the representational contents of the perceptions, whereby these attitudes emerge from an activity of the will. From the preface to the Meditations and the third meditation (quotation 13), we have thus obtained four possible candidates for the concept of idea that Descartes might intend to define in quotation 1.

Furthermore, quotation 13 is valuable because Descartes also uses the concept of the form of a thought in this passage. According to Descartes, volitional acts of thought differ from ideas in the narrow sense in that they have “certain other forms”. This indicates that ideas in the narrow sense also have a form. Since the reference to “certain other forms” follows an enumeration of thoughts (ideas in the narrow sense) with different representational contents, it is obvious that Descartes understands the forms that ideas in the narrow sense have to be their specific representational content. In fact, this seems inevitable, since the only feature that intrinsically distinguishes individual ideas in the narrow sense from one another is precisely their representational content. As acts of the intellect, i.e., from a material point of view, ideas in the narrow sense are intrinsically indistinguishable. It is therefore the representational content that gives an idea in the narrow sense its specific form. The “certain other forms” of volitional thought acts, on the other hand, are the type-specific attitudes of affirming, denying, desiring, fearing, etc. in relation to the corresponding representational content. For Descartes, the forms of thought therefore include the representational content of acts of perception and the attitudes towards this content that are typical of volitional acts of thought.

Let us return to quotation 1. Descartes is obviously defining here a general concept of idea and not a special concept of idea such as the idea obiective or materialiter. Ideas in the narrow sense and ideas in the broad sense therefore come into question as definiendum. However, it is also possible that Descartes has a different concept of ideas in mind. In any case, Descartes identifies ideas here with forms of thought, not necessarily with all forms of thought, but with those whose immediate perception arises for the consciousness of the act of thinking. Against the background of Descartes’ remarks on forms of thought in quotation 13, there are three possible understandings: Either Descartes understands the form of a thought to be the representational content of a

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The term “thought” or “thought” is understood to mean attitudes towards such content or forms of thought and includes both content and attitudes.

The following two considerations show that Descartes is to be understood in the sense of the third option:

(1) The immediate perception of an idea or the form of a thought is supposed to arise for the consciousness_b of the corresponding thought. Intellectual acts, i.e. perceptions, however, only have representational contents as forms.³⁸ Nevertheless, intellectual acts are consciousbto the thinking being. Therefore, it can only be the immediate perception of the representational contents that arises for the consciousness_b of the intellectual acts. Thus, at least representational contents belong to the forms of thought with which Descartes identifies ideas in quotation 1.

(2) However, these forms of thought include not only representational content, but also the attitudes of affirming, denying, desiring, etc., which are characteristic of volitional acts. This can be seen in the following passage, which is taken from Descartes’ replies to Hobbes’ objections:

[Quote 14] At this point, he [meaning Hobbes; C.B.] wants the name of idea to be understood as referring only to images of material things that exist in the physical imagination.

³⁸ It is true that there are different types of acts of perception, namely those of perception/sensation, of (imagined) representation and of pure intellect. For Descartes, however, these are obviously not forms of thought. There are two reasons for this: (1) In quotation 13, he does not distinguish between these types of perceptions. Rather, he explains the concept of the form of thought with regard to perceptions on the basis of various representational contents. (2) There is a factual difference between the distinction between the three types of perceptions and the different attitudes that characterize volitional acts. The distinction between the types of perceptions is made with regard to their origin. In the third meditation, Descartes distinguishes between ideas (in the narrow sense) that are innate, come from outside and are produced by the thinking being itself (see AT VII 37f.). This corresponds to the distinction between perceptions as purely intellectual acts, as perceptions/sensations and as ideas of the imagination. However, the distinction between the various attitudes that characterize volitional acts of thought is not based on the extrinsic characteristic of the diversity of their origin (they all arise from the will), but on an intrinsic characteristic, namely the diversity of the attitudes themselves.

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On this assumption it is easy to prove for them that there can be no peculiar idea of the angel and none of God. Nevertheless, I make it clear in various places, preferably in this passage itself, that I use the name of idea for everything that is directly perceived by the mind, so that when I will and am afraid, even the will and fear are counted by me among the ideas, because I simultaneously perceive that I will and am afraid. (AT VII 181; my emphasis)

In accordance with quotation 1, Descartes here determines the extension of the expression ‘idea‛ as everything that is directly perceived by the mind. However, he does not cite the representational contents of perceptions as examples here, but rather the attitudes of wanting and fearing with regard to such contents. For Descartes, these are therefore also ideas or forms of thought, in whose immediate perception consciousness_b exists.

The forms of any thoughts that Descartes speaks of in quotation 1 must include both the forms of acts of perception and the forms of volitional acts of thought, i.e. both representational contents and attitudes towards such contents. Ideas are thus equated in quotation 1 precisely with these forms of thought. Therefore, the concept of idea that Descartes defines in quotation 1 is similar to the concept of idea in the broad sense in quotation 13, but it is not identical to it, because while ideas in the broad sense are acts of thought already provided with a certain form, Descartes now defines ideas as the forms of acts of thought themselves. Strictly speaking, he thus introduces a fifth concept of ideas here.

What does this mean for Descartes’ conception of consciousness_b? In quotation 1, Descartes attributes the consciousness_b of acts of thought to the immediate perception of their form. Since forms can consist in representational contents (in the case of acts of perception) or in attitudes towards these contents (in the case of volitional acts of thought), two cases need to be considered:

(1) Consciousness_b of acts of perception: If we consider quotation 1 with reference to acts of perception, then the consciousness_b of these acts is based on the immediate perception of their form. However, the form of acts of perception consists in their representational content. Consequently, the consciousness_b of acts of perception concerns these acts only insofar as they have a representational content. In other words: When Descartes speaksof acts of perception as belonging to the thinking being

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then this only applies with regard to the representational content of these acts. And this awareness_b of the contents is based on nothing other than the direct perception of these contents. Consciousness_b of an act of perception therefore consists in the perception of the representational content of this act. Metaperceptions play no role here.

(2) Awareness_b of volitional thought acts: Volitional thought acts have a complex form. This consists not only in a representational content, but also in an attitude towards this content. In the case of the fear of a lion, it consists of the form of being afraid of a lion. The awareness of volitional thought acts therefore concerns not only their representational content, but also the attitude towards this content. However, since the perception that is presupposed by a volitional act of thought only has the representational content of this act of thought as its content, but not the attitude to this representational content that arises from the will, a further perception must be added to the volitional act of thought so that a consciousness_b of this volitional act of thought—as described in quotation 1—can be given. The consciousness_b of volitional acts of thought thus consists in a further perception, namely the perception that something is wanted, feared, etc. And it is precisely in this way that Descartes describes the consciousness_b of volitional acts of thought in quotations 10, 11 and 14.

On the basis of this distinction between two cases of consciousness_b of acts of thought, we can see that for Descartes consciousness_b by no means has the same deep structure for all types of acts of thought. In the case of perceptual acts, it consists simply in the perception of a representational content. In the case of volitional acts of thought, it consists in the existence of a second act of perception that refers to the volitional act of thought. This insight into the heterogeneity of the deep structure of consciousness_b is lacking in the approaches discussed above, according to which consciousness_b for Descartes consists either in an (actual or dispositional) meta-act or in a self-representational performance of perceptions.³⁹ The

³⁹ AT VII 107 can also be used as evidence for such a difference in deep structure. There Descartes says that every act of thinking is conscious to the thinking being “in some way”. Admittedly, this passage is anything but unambiguous. One obvious reading, however, is that the

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proposed interpretation also allows us to resolve the difficulties encountered by these approaches:

(1) The objections to the attribution of an actual meta-act conception: We have seen that some authors attribute an actual meta-act conception of consciousness to Descartes. This position is not convincing, since it exposes Descartes to a regress objection. Moreover, Descartes explicitly rejects such a conception of consciousness_b in his reply to Bourdin’s objections. The proposed interpretation of Descartes’ conception of consciousness_b avoids these problems. According to this interpretation, Descartes’ conception of consciousness_b avoids any regress. In the case of perceptions, this is clear, for each perception alone provides for the consciousness_b of itself, although this consciousness_b has the act of perception as its content only insofar as it carries a representational content. The situation is different in the case of the consciousness_b of volitional acts of thought. In this case, metaperception is necessary. However, a regress is nevertheless avoided, because the consciousness_b of this metaperception—as in the case of all perceptions—does not require a metaperception, but the metaperception itself arises for this. But can the proposed interpretation also do justice to the passage from Descartes’ reply to Bourdin’s objections? At first glance, this does not seem to be the case, because in this reply Descartes emphasizes that an act of thinking arises for the consciousness_b that has this act as its content and therefore a meta-act is not necessary (see quotation 6). But according to the interpretation presented, this is not so, at least in the case of the consciousness_b of volitional acts of thought, for in this case a metaperception is supposed to be necessary. But this objection to the interpretation presented can be countered, firstly, by the fact that it is not clear that Descartes has all types of acts of thought in mind in quotation 6, including volitional acts of thought, and not just perceptions. For in his discussion of the analogy with the master builder, he speaks of a thought “through which we notice something.” In volitional acts of thought, however, we not only notice an object that we become aware of in the execution of the act, but above all they contain an attitude towards this object. Descartes’ formulation suggests

consciousness_b of thought acts can occur in different ways and that these ways of occurrence differ in their deep structure.

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at least suggests that in quotation 6 he is concerned with perceptions and not with volitional acts of thought. Secondly, the objection can be countered that volitional acts of thought (in the pure sense) would be conscious to the thinking being even if they were not accompanied by metaperception. Volitional acts (in the pure sense) always involve a perception of an object, namely the object that is the object of the corresponding attitude. However, since perceptions as such already provide for a consciousness_b of their representational content, a volitional act of thought (in the pure sense) that is not accompanied by a metaperception would also be associated with a consciousness_b of itself. This consciousness_b would not be a consciousness_b of the fact that the thinking being wants, fears or hopes for something specific.

… but only an awareness_b of the volitional act of thinking, insofar as this has a representational content. However, it is sufficient to satisfy Descartes’ explanations in quotation 6, according to which the mind is conscious of each of its acts of thinking without a meta-act being necessary for this.

(2) The objections to the attribution of a dispositional meta-act conception: Attributing a dispositional meta-act conception of consciousness_b to Descartes encounters the difficulty that consciousness_b for Descartes represents an actuality and not a potentiality. Moreover, it contradicts Descartes’ claim that children do not possess a near capacity for purely intellectual acts of thought such as reflexive acts of thought. The interpretation developed above is not subject to these objections. According to this interpretation, consciousness is based on actual acts of perception. Moreover, it does not contradict Descartes’ assertions about children. According to Descartes, they only have confused perceptions, i.e., perceptions and sensations. However, according to the proposed interpretation, the consciousness of perceptual acts does not require purely intellectual acts of thought such as reflexive acts of thought. The fact that, according to Descartes, children cannot perform purely intellectual acts of thought is therefore compatible with this interpretation.

(3) The objections to the attribution of a self-representationalist conception: The self-representationalist approach to interpretation is not convincing for two reasons: Firstly, Descartes does not explain at any point that perceptions also represent themselves as perceptions. Secondly, the approach contradicts Descartes’ assertion that children are still developing their innate intellectual ideas.

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could not be updated. We have already seen that the interpretation developed above is compatible with the second point. But the first objection also poses no problems, since for Descartes, according to this interpretation, consciousness_b does not involve any self-representation in the sense that every perception represents itself as perception.

6 Criticism of Lähteenmäki’s interpretation of the different deep structures of consciousness

In the previous section it was argued that the deep structure of consciousness can take different forms for Descartes. This has been overlooked by most authors. One exception, however, is Vili Lähteenmäki, who in a recent essay also argues that consciousness_b can have different deep structures for Descartes. As mentioned at the beginning, Lähteenmäki distinguishes between (a) a rudimentary consciousness, (b) an (involuntary) reflexive consciousness and (c) an (arbitrary) attentional consciousness in Descartes.

For Descartes, rudimentary consciousness consists of a phenomenal consciousness of experience. Rudimentary consciousness accompanies every act of thought, i.e., according to Lähteenmäki, Descartes believes that every act of thought is connected with a certain experience.⁴⁰

According to Lähteenmäki, reflexive consciousness supplements phenomenal, rudimentary consciousness with a conceptual component: not only is something experienced, but the act of thinking is understood as a specific act of thinking or the experienced is understood as something specific.⁴¹ Lähteenmäki gives the example of a sensation being understood as new⁴² and refers here to a passage from a letter by Descartes to Arnauld.⁴³ If reflexive consciousness brings a second act of thought into play, however, this does not mean that it also becomes conscious as an independent act. On the contrary, according to Lähteenmäki, Descartes is of the opinion that both

⁴⁰ See Lähteenmäki 2008, 194.

⁴¹ See Lähteenmäki 2008, 181 fn 8 and 199.

⁴² See Lähteenmäki 2008, 187.

⁴³ See quotation 8 (= AT V 221).

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acts are not conscious as two distinct acts, but as an act in the performance of which something is simultaneously experienced and understood.

While rudimentary and reflexive consciousness occur involuntarily according to Lähteenmäki, this is different in the case of attentional consciousness. This consists of an intentional reflection on an act of thought, to which attention is thereby paid.

Lähteenmäki now believes that Descartes uses both rudimentary and reflexive consciousness to explain the consciousness of thought acts. However, according to Descartes, it is not the case that every act of thought exhibits rudimentary and reflexive consciousness. Rather, for Descartes, consciousness_b could contain different deep structures:

(1) Awareness of perceptions in children vs. awareness of perceptions in adults: Lähteenmäki believes that, according to Descartes, (involuntary) reflexive consciousness accompanies most adult perceptions, but is generally lacking in children. But adults can also lack reflexive consciousness under special circumstances, for example when they are in certain states of illness⁴⁴ or dreaming.⁴⁵ According to Descartes, the consciousness_b of perceptions in children therefore consists exclusively of a rudimentary consciousness, but in adults, at least in the waking state, it usually consists of a simultaneously rudimentary and reflexive consciousness.

(2) Consciousness_b of perceptions vs. consciousness_b of volitional thought acts: According to Lähteenmäki, Descartes also sees a structural difference between the consciousness_b of perceptions and the consciousness_b of volitional acts of thought. Descartes sees the consciousness_b of perceptions as rudimentary (children) or as a combination of rudimentary and reflexive consciousness (adults). However, this is different for volitional acts of thought. According to Descartes, the consciousness_b of them is always of the type of reflexive consciousness, because for Descartes, the consciousness_b of volitional acts of thought would always include a reflexive consciousness of the object of the volitional act of thought. In other words: a volitional

⁴⁴ See Lähteenmäki 2008, 187f.

⁴⁵ See Lähteenmäki 2008, 194.

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According to Descartes, acts of thought are always accompanied by a reflexive awareness of the object of the act as an object.⁴⁶ In addition, volitional acts of thought had another special feature: they were always accompanied by an awareness of themselves as the volitional acts that they are. Volitional acts of thought possess an inherent reflexivity.⁴⁷ For Descartes, the consciousness_b of volitional acts of thought would then comprise two things: First, a grasp of the volitional act of thought as the act of thought that it is; the act itself would be responsible for this awareness of the act as an act. This would contain an idea of itself as an act. Secondly, each volitional act would be accompanied by a perception that would provide an awareness of the object of the volitional act as a particular object. Thus, for Descartes, the entire consciousness of volitional acts of thought would emerge from two sources: The portion concerning the consciousness of the act as an act would be fed by the volitional act itself. The part that concerns the consciousness of the object of the act would consist in a metaperception.

While Lähteenmäki can be conceded that the consciousness of acts of thought for Descartes can indeed have different deep structures and that Lähteenmäki’s distinctions in Descartes can be proven on the basis of textual passages, the way in which Lähteenmäki characterizes these structures is not convincing. This will now be demonstrated in detail:

(1) Rudimentary awareness

Lähteenmäki believes that, according to Descartes, every act of perception is rudimentarily conscious to the thinking being.⁴⁸ This rudimentary consciousness does not consist in a conceptual consciousness of something as something, but in a phenomenal consciousness, i.e., in a certain experience that accompanies the act of perception. In the case of children’s thoughts, consciousness_b consists exclusively of rudimentary consciousness. In the case of adult thoughts, on the other hand, it is usually enriched by a reflexive, conceptual consciousness, at least in the waking state.

⁴⁶ See Lähteenmäki 2008, 189f.

⁴⁷ See Lähteenmäki 2008, 190-192.

⁴⁸ And insofar as all acts of thinking—including volitional acts of thinking—at least contain perceptions, rudimentary consciousness is thus characteristic of all acts of thinking (see Lähteenmäki 2008, 194).

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But what does this rudimentary consciousness consist of? Lähteenmäki claims that Descartes explicitly offers no explanation for this form of consciousness. However, an explanatory approach can still be reconstructed in his work if the inherent reflexivity of volitional acts is transferred to acts of perception.⁴⁹ The starting point is Descartes’ assertion that a thinking being is always aware of itself in the execution of a volitional act. Descartes would now explain this fact by saying that the volitional act contains an idea of itself, i.e., that it represents itself as the volitional act that it is. If we transfer this explanatory model, as proposed by Lähteenmäki, to perceptual acts, then this would mean that every perceptual act always also represents itself as a perceptual act.representwould.Wewould bethuswitha self-representationalistconceptionof therudimentaryconsciousnessof acts of perception. However, the attribution of such a conception of the rudimentary consciousness of acts of perception is prohibited for two reasons: First, for Descartes, ideas are always representations of something as something. Lähteenmäki rightly emphasizes this. Thus he understands Descartes’ talk about the consciousness of volitional acts of thought being created by an idea of these acts of thought in the sense that an intentional reference to this act of thought as an act of thought is thereby established.⁵⁰ But this is not compatible with the purely phenomenal character of rudimentary consciousness according to Lähteenmäki, which is characterized precisely by not being a consciousness of something as something. Lähteenmäki cannot simply transfer the explanatory model of self-representation from the case of volitional acts of thought to the rudimentary consciousness of perceptions without his interpretation becoming inconsistent.

Secondly, however, there is also a factual reason why Descartes’ rudimentary consciousness cannot be explained by a self-representationalist conception. According to Descartes, children have a rudimentary consciousness of perceptions. The self-representationalist conception explains this consciousness with reference to an idea of the act of thinking, i.e. in this case with reference to the idea of perception. But this idea is an intellectual idea. And since children—as we have already seen—

⁴⁹ See Lähteenmäki 2008, 192.

⁵⁰ Lähteenmäki speaks of an “intentional structure” that consciousness exhibits with regard to the fact that a volitional thought act is given (see Lähteenmäki 2008, 192).

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since they cannot yet actualize their innate intellectual ideas, they cannot represent their perceptions as perceptions. [GT: And since children—as we have already seen—innate intellectual ideas cannot yet be [updated/actualized], they cannot represent their perceptions as perceptions.] Descartes therefore could not have held a self-representationalist conception of rudimentary consciousness.

For these two reasons, Lähteenmäki’s proposal fails, according to which Descartes could explain rudimentary consciousness by analogy with the case in which a thinking being is conscious of a volitional act of thinking. But then the only explanatory option that Lähteenmäki believes to find in Descartes for rudimentary consciousness fails. The consequence then seems to be inescapable that Descartes gives no explanation for rudimentary consciousness and thus for consciousness as a whole with regard to perceptions.⁵¹

But are we really forced to say that Descartes simply does not develop an explanation for the rudimentary consciousness of acts of perception? This is not the case, because as seen in section 5, Descartes should rather be understood in such a way that he understands the consciousness of acts of perception not in the sense of a consciousness of them as acts of perception, but only in the sense of an consciousness of them, insofar as they have a certain representational content. The content of the consciousness_b is thus the content of the act of perception, but not the act of perception as an act of perception. With this interpretation, we can meaningfully interpret the problematic places for Lähteenmäki’s proposal. Because, as already noted, according to this interpretation, no updating of an intellectual idea is necessary for the awareness of perceptions. It is therefore not inconsistency when Descartes claims that children are aware of their perceptions and at the same time are not able to update their innate, purely intellectual ideas.

But are we really forced to say that Descartes simply cannot explain of the rudimentary consciousness of acts of perception? This is not so, for as seen in section 5, Descartes should rather be understood in such a way that he does not understand the consciousness_b of acts of perception in the sense of a consciousness of them as acts of perception, but only in the sense of a consciousness of them insofar as they have a certain representational content. The content of consciousness is thus the content of the act of perception, but not the act of perception as an act of perception. With this interpretation, we can meaningfully interpret the problematic passages for Lähteenmäki’s proposal. For, as already noted, according to this interpretation, no actualization of an intellectual idea is required for the consciousness of perceptions. It is therefore not an inconsistency when Descartes claims that children have consciousness_b of their perceptions and at the same time are not capable of actualizing their innate, purely intellectual ideas.

(2) Awareness of the object of volitional thought acts

Lähteenmäki interprets the consciousness of the objects of volitional acts of thought according to the model of reflexive consciousness of acts of perception.⁵² The latter is complex in its deep structure, because it is based on the existence of two acts of perception. On the one hand, it consists of a perceptual act, which for a rudimentary

⁵¹ See Lähteenmäki 2008, 192.

⁵² See Lähteenmäki 2008, 189f.

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consciousness; on the other hand, it consists in a purely intellectual perception that arises for the consciousness of the act of thinking as such-and-such.

If we now apply this model to volitional acts of thought, as Lähteenmäki proposes, we get the following situation: Firstly, we have a volitional act that is directed towards a certain object; secondly, there is an intellectual perception that represents this object as an object and thereby brings it to consciousness. Lähteenmäki bases his interpretation on the following passage from a letter by Descartes to Regius:

[Quote 15] Understanding is in the strict sense a suffering of the mind and willing its activity; but because we never will anything without at the same time understanding, and we hardly understand anything without at the same time willing something, we do not easily distinguish suffering from activity in these things. (AT III 372; see Lähteenmäki 2008, 189)

Lähteenmäki understands Descartes’ talk that every volitional act of thought is accompanied by an understanding in the sense that this understanding is a reflexive perception that refers to the object of the volitional act of thought. However, this proves to be unnecessary if we consider Descartes’ conception of volitional acts of thought. These are always complex in themselves: they always contain an intellectual perception that represents an object. The will also becomes active and leads to a certain attitude towards the represented object. Descartes’ statement that every volitional act of thought is accompanied by an understanding or grasping of the object is therefore trivial from his point of view, because without a perception of an object, a volitional act of thought cannot arise in the first place. A further reflexive act of perception, which is directed towards the object of the volitional act of thought and ensures an awareness of the object of the act, is therefore not necessary at all. As we have seen above, the perception of an object simultaneously provides an awareness_b of this act, insofar as it represents this object. Thus it is clear that the perception, which is presupposed by every volitional act of thinking, already provides an awareness_b of the object of the act.

(3) The awareness of volitional thought acts as volitional thought acts

The consciousness_b of volitional acts of thought is not only about the object of the act, but also about the act of thought itself. Lähteenmäki now believes that this consciousness of the volitional act of thinking as a volitional act of thinking is based on an

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inherent reflexivity of this act of thought itself. Accordingly, a volitional act of thinking contains an idea of itself, thus representing itself as an act and in this way providing an awareness of itself. Lähteenmäki bases his interpretation on quotation 11.

However, this interpretation cannot be correct for factual reasons. The problem is that Descartes clearly distinguishes the will from the intellect and only the latter is responsible for representational achievements. Volitional acts do not contain ideas and therefore do not represent, at least not insofar as they arise from an activity of the will. They do so only insofar as they contain a perception. Therefore, volitional acts of thought considered as volitional acts of thought, i.e., insofar as they exhibit an attitude towards a content, cannot contain an idea—let alone an idea of themselves as an act of thought. And even the perception that a volitional act of thought contains cannot arise for the representation of the volitional act of thought as such an act of thought, because this perception only represents the object of the volitional act of thought, but not the volitional attitude towards this object.

Furthermore, the passage that Lähteenmäki cites for his interpretation allows for a reading that does not commit Descartes to a self-representation thesis with regard to volitional acts of thought. Let us look again at quotation 11:

I maintain that we have ideas not only of all that is in our intellect, but even of all that is in the will. For we can neither will something without knowing that we will it, nor know it without an idea. But I do not maintain that this idea is distinct from the action itself. (AT III 295; my emphasis)

The crucial question is what Descartes is referring to with “l’action” in the last sentence. If we draw on the distinction we made above, it is by no means necessarily the case that Descartes is referring here to a volitional act of thought in the pure sense, but he could also mean volitional acts of thought in the enriched sense. In the last sentence of the quotation, Descartes would then be expressing the fact that he understands activities here as volitional acts of thought in the enriched sense. And then quotation 11 would by no means commit Descartes to the view that volitional acts of thought in the pure sense represent themselves. Rather, it would apply that volitional acts of thought in the enriched sense represented themselves by means of the perception they contained, insofar as they contained a volitional

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thought act in the pure sense. Quote 11 is therefore also compatible with a reading that allows a meta-act conceptual explanation of the consciousness of volitional acts of thought. And since Lähteenmäki’s interpretation cannot be correct for factual reasons, quotation 11 should also be read in this sense. As suggested in section 5, Descartes should be understood here as suggesting that the consciousness_b of volitional acts of thought as volitional acts of thought is based on a second intellectual perception. A meta-act conception is thus necessary for this aspect of the consciousness_b of volitional acts of thought.

7 Conclusion

We have seen that attempts to understand Descartes’ conception of consciousness as a meta-act or a self-representationalist conception fail. They do not lead to a coherent picture. Their weakness lies in the tacit assumption that consciousness_b for Descartes has a unified deep structure. However, this is not the case. Because both the meta act-conceptual and the self-representationalist approach overlook this, they do not lead to a coherent interpretation of Descartes’ statements about consciousness_b.

Vili Lähteenmäki presents an interpretation that distances itself from the assumption that consciousness_b has a uniform deep structure for Descartes. However, it should be noted that Lähteenmäki does not adequately reconstruct the different deep structures that consciousness_b can assume according to Descartes. He sees the self-representationalist approach as the only explanatory option for the consciousness_b of perceptions in children. However, this option is ruled out for factual reasons. He also interprets Descartes’ self-representationalist explanation of the consciousness_b of volitional acts of thinking as acts of thinking. Such an explanation cannot be attributed to Descartes either, since (pure) volitional acts of thought cannot represent themselves as acts of thought. Finally, he understands the explanation of the consciousness of the object of volitional acts of thought with reference to a metaperception. However, such a metaperception is superfluous, since every volitional act of thought already contains a perception of the object that can arise for this consciousness_b.

A promising interpretation of Descartes’ conception, on the other hand, can be

The passage from quotation 1 can be understood against the background of Descartes’ remarks on the concept of the idea and the form of thought, especially in the

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Third Meditation. It turns out that the consciousness_b of thought acts consists in the perception of the form of the thought act. There are in turn two types of these forms: representational contents and attitudes towards these contents. The consciousness_b of perceptions is then to be understood as a consciousness_b of them, insofar as they have certain representational contents. Even if the consciousness_b of perceptions is directed towards acts of perception and thus deals with them, it is only concerned with their representational content. To a certain extent, the representational content enters the consciousness, but not the act of perception as an act of perception. To explain the consciousness of perceptions, Descartes thus refers neither to a self-representational performance of the acts of perception nor to metaperceptions. The situation is different in the case of the consciousness of volitional acts of thought. As Descartes’ explanations show, the content of consciousness_b has a propositional form for him in this case. It is a consciousness_b that a thinking being wants, fears, doubts, etc. something specific. In order to be able to account for these propositional contents, Descartes can neither refer to the perception that the volitional act contains, nor to a self-representationalist achievement of the volitional act of thinking. Descartes can only have a meta-act-theoretical approach in mind here. According to Descartes, the consciousness of volitional acts of thought comes about through the existence of a meta-perception with the content that the thinking being wants, fears, doubts, etc. something specific.

Even if the proposed interpretation is thus an interpretation of Descartes’ conception of consciousness_b that seems exegetically appropriate, since it is compatible with Descartes’ various statements on this phenomenon, one could nevertheless object that this interpretation has the flaw of allowing consciousness_b to disintegrate into at least two distinct phenomena. On the one hand, the consciousness_b of perceptions consists simply in the perception of a represented object; on the other hand, in the case of volitional acts of thought, we have an explanatory approach that refers to meta-acts. It now seems that the concept of consciousness no longer denotes a unified phenomenon for Descartes. But if this is the case, would Descartes not have drawn attention to it?

This objection is based on a false assumption. It is true that the deep structure of consciousness in Descartes is different in the case of perceptions and volitional acts of thought. However, it does not follow from this that these

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different structures are not based on the same explanatory idea. Rather, for Descartes, consciousness_b generally consists in the perception of something. In short: for Descartes,consciousness_b is nothing other than perception. The different deep structures result from the fact that the content of consciousness_b differs depending on the type of act of thought to which consciousness_b is directed. For Descartes, it seems obvious that volitional acts of thought of fearing, hoping, doubting, etc. are accompanied not only by an awareness_b of the representational content of the act, but also by an awareness_b of the fact that something is feared, hoped for, doubted, etc. The awareness_b of purely perceptual acts of thought such as those of perception/perception, imagination or abstract thinking, on the other hand, does not always seem to him to have the respective act of thought as an act of thought as its content. And with this latter point, Descartes complies with the familiar phenomenological fact that a perception of something usually takes place without awareness of the fact that something is being perceived. With his assumption that the consciousness_b that accompanies all acts of thought has different deep structures, Descartes can take this phenomenological insight into account without at the same time having to claim that volitional acts of thought are also conscious only with regard to their object, but not with regard to the attitude towards this object that is associated with them.⁵³ And the assumption of different deep structures in no way has the consequence that we can no longer speak of a unified conception of consciousness_b , since Descartes remains true to the basic idea of understanding consciousness_b generally as a perception of something.

Abbreviations

ATAdam, C./Tannery, P. (eds.) 1982-1991: Oeuvres de Descartes. 12 vols. Paris.

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